CHAPTER II

Transnistria: Theory and Practice

Romania and the War

Romania, which had undergone a series of domestic upheavals during the previous year, found the German invasion of the Soviet Union a unique opportunity. Under its self-styled dictator, Ion Antonescu, it espoused a pro-German orientation and abandoned its traditional pro-Western sympathies. Romania stood to gain by joining with its new "ally," who had in effect occupied it. Bucharest thirsted to regain Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, lost to the Soviet Union the year before, and to give vent to long-standing hostility against the Eastern Slavs. Humiliated and angered by the German-Italian arbitration of its conflict with Hungary, Romania sought in every way possible to press its claim to Transylvania, a large part of which had been ceded to the Magyars. Unstable politically, economically, and militarily, Romania was a dictatorship; the monarch (young King Mihai) and his regent-mother (Elena) were revered but hardly assertive figureheads; it had its apparatus of terror but used it relatively casually, tending to let some political foes survive . Berlin took Romania into its confidence when the war against Russia was been planned, months before the attack. It took little persuading to get Antonescu to pledge military aid to the Germans. Indeed, of all the "allies" and satraps of the Reich, he was the only one "in" on the preparations for invasion. Romania thus entered the Eastern war in search of glory and "justice" (the recapture of its lost provinces); it also entered in spirit of acquisitiveness and revenge.1*

It seems impossible to trace just where the idea of Romanian "Transnistria" arose. In the 1930s there had existed in Romania a small Asociatia romanilor refugiati transnistreni-i.e., a society of refugees "from beyond the Dnestr," refugees from the USSR. Romanian eastward expansion was alluded to in conversations between Hitler and Antonescu in January and again in June,1941, though still in vague and problematic terms.2* Hitler, it would appear, personally pressed Romania to take over Soviet soil-in part, to reward Romania for participating in the struggle and assume its continued alliance and assistance; in part, as a crude maneuver to "compensate" in Romania for its lost of Transylvania to Hungary and to make it shift the direction of its territorial covetousness from west to east.

Given these ends, the logical area to assign to Antonescu was that east of Bessarabia. Bessarabia lay between the Prut and Dnestr; one could carve an analogous province between the Dnestr and Bug Rivers-large, fertile, and reasonably well populated area, with Odessa as its capital. A convenient rationale to conquest was provided by Moldavian (or Romanian, as they were now called) settlers in this area; a large part of the Dnestr-Bug area had actually been set up as the Moldavian Republic under Soviet rule. This then was the land beyond the Dnestr-Transnistria( Trans-Dnestria) a politically-minded Romanian scholars were prompt to call.3*

By the start of invasion on June 22,1941, German policy-makers were aware of the "compensations" to made to Romania. Even the relatively ill-informed economic planning staffs knew that special arrangements had to be made because "Odessa will be transferred to Romanian possession."4* There were those in official Berlin who strenuously objected; the were largely in the group that sought a pro-Ukrainian puppet state. The Ukraine, already due to lose Galicia and at least temporarily divided into areas of military and civil government, was now due to forfeit an "inalienable" part of its territory. This seemed unsound in principle, as well as stupid tactics, to the Ukrainian-oriented wing of the newly-formed Rosenberg Ministry for the Occupied East. Rosenberg's deputy for political affairs, Dr. Georg Leibbrant, himself a Volksdeutscher born near Odessa, submitted in mid-July a formal memorandum to prove that the future Ukraine needed Odessa as a harbor (it was impolitic to mention the more blatantly political arguments),5* but to no avail. Hitler's staff, with the consent of the military, went ahead on formalizing the arrangements with Romania.

There were also dissenting voices in the Romanian camp. There is evidence that Antonescu himself, although certainly not averse to receiving this territory, was not eager to annex it. It appealed to him above all as a pawn to trade in postwar negotiations. Transnistria would increase his bargaining power for Transylvania. Some considered this game chimera Iuliu Maniu, the veteran leader of the Peasant Party-in semi-retirement and in effect under house arrest-commented in disgust that Romania do well to beware of its "trances"-Transylvania and Transnistria. In 1943 the German press admitted that "there had been ..fears in Bucharest about whether Romania had done well in assuming so difficult a task." However, in the summer of 1941, Bucharest seemed "entranced".

Bessarabia and Bucovina were promptly reoccupied and on July 25,1941 officially reintegrated into Romania. The "liberation" of Transnistria was next on the agenda, with German armies leading the way over much of its territory.6* On August 4, as if anticipation of conquering it , government -financed Romanian weekly entitled Transnistria appeared, which sought to show that historically and geopolitical that province was a logical and necessary complement to Romania Moldavia.7*

With operations proceeding at more rapid pace on the southern front, Hitler, on August 14,1941, wrote Antonescu concerning plans to turn over vast stretches of Soviet territory to Romania. The Fuhrer even spoke of the Romanians occupying the area "between Dnestr and Dnepr" - a territory far in excess of Transnistrua. Three days later, on the 17th, Antonescu replied, assenting to Hitler's plan with the following stipulations: the Dnestr-Dnepr was to be divided at the Bug river into two spheres, one lying between the Dnestr and the Bug, i.e., Transnistria, the other, to the east between the Bug and Dnepr. In Transnustria, Romania would immediately take responsibility for law and order, administration, and economic exploitation. In the eastern sphere, Romania offered security forces only once the fighting there was terminated. Romania said Antonescu, lacked "means and specialists" to provide this sphere with civil government. Thus Antonescu turned down a chance (which Germany might not actually have given him) to expand further to the east. Obviously aware of his inferior status vis-s0vis the Fuhrer, Antonescu, proceeded in yis letter to ask Hitler to specify the rights and duties of the Romanian administration in Transnistria.8*

On the basis of this exchange of views a working agreement - at times erroneously called a treaty - was signed on August 19 in Tiraspol' between the Romania and German commands. ( Antonescu, who had just promoted himself to marshal, thereupon proceeded to decree the establishment of Romanian occupation government in the Dnestr-Bug area. The German military command, in control there - or, rather in control of as much as had been occupied by the 11th Army - continued to insist, with ill-concealed hostility for the Romanians, that the terms were overly vague and that there was much still to be ironed out.10* A three-day conference took place from August 28 to 30,1941, at Tighina, on the Bessarabia side of the Dnestr, across the river from the provisional "capital" of Transnistria, Tiraspol.

The result of the conference was a compact signed by the chief of the Germany mikitary mission to Romania, Major General Hauffe, and a representative of the Romania General Staff, Brigadier General Tataranu. The "Convention of Tighina" confirmed the arrangement outlined in correspondence between the heads of state but left open the northern border of Transnistria. It spelled out in some detail the rights and duties of two occupying powers as to sea and rail transportation, economic exploitation, and security troops. The plan to have Romania assume responsibility for the security of the Bug-Dnestr are (roughly, south of the Uman' Cherkassy line) remained alive, but in the following weeks was tacitly abandoned. Thus Bucharest found its rights to Transnistria confirmed and, as it were, recognizes by international (though military, rather than diplomatic) agreement. It should be noted that no mention was made of annexing or incorporating the province into Romania.11*
Anticipating developments, it may be well to add that this agreement was never formally abrogated,
though disputes-for instance, over the northern border of the province-continued to flare up time and again.

Hitler would occasionally urged Antonescu to annex Transnistria, but Antonescu would delay, fearing that the Germans were trying to lure him eastward.12* Individual Romanian staff officers would tell the Germans that they knew Transnistria would not be annexed before the end of the war, and that even then there would first to be a blebiscite.13* When pressed by Hitler to enrich himself at the expense of the Ukraine, Antonescu is reported to have suggested a trade: let Romania regain Transylvania cede Transnistria back to the Ukraine or its German successor regime, and compensate Hungary for its loss by giving it the Galicia districts of Stanislav and Kolomea-an ingenious albeit impossibly intricate and unrealistic scheme.14* Berlin did not bite, and Bucharest certainly would not have either. Romanian-Hungarian tension and recrimination were on the increase, and did not until the end of the war.

Before the end of 1941 it was clear that Transnistria would never take the place of Transnistria in Romanian hearts. The German Military Mission in Bucharest warned that Bucharest had even found it opportune, after the capture of Odessa and the successful penetration of the Crimea, to weight withdrawing from the war: it was felt Romania had done its duty, kept its promises, gained what it wanted, and lost most than it had been prepared to invest. The Romanian court, including young King Mihai, apparently opposed the venture across the Dnestr, When the king visited the Romanian troops fighting farther east in the summer of 1942, he ostentatiously avoided stopping and inspecting Odessa.15* It became clear after the recapture of Bessarabia (wrote the Germans) that the majority of the Romanian people considered the war against Russia an unnecessary adventure, and that "the entire enthusiasm for Transnistria was... an artificially kindled brush fire."16* Transnistria was looked upon as an object of plunder, but of no value as a permanent possession. "The effort to deflect the Marshal (Antonescu) from Transylvania by territorial acquisitions in the east must already be considered to have failed".17*

Berlin was dissatisfied with Romanian performance, in military matters as well as economically and politically; yet Marshal Goering was aware (as he told General Thomas, head of the Economic and Armament Branch of the High Command) that "one must be very cautions with Antonescu;" he is "quite a stubborn mule but the only one in Romania who sticks to the pro-German line."18* Especially during the following year-1942- there were frequent disputes between German and Romania ( with the Italians occasionally involved) over deliveries of oil and grain to the Reich. At first Romania reluctantly yielded to German insistence that all "excess" grain from Transnistria (presumably after feeding the Romanians) be transferred to the Germans, nut Bucharest soon balked and backed out of this informal commitment. The German had hoped for as much as one million tons of grain; bitter recriminations to Bucharest were to avail. Finally, in November,1942 - when Germany and Romania were exchanging mutual accusations over the situation at Stalingrad - Mihai Antonescu, the foreign minister, told Berlin that the Reich could count on no grain from Yransnistria.19* As the war proceeded, the German-Romanian alliance was subjected to increasingly severe strains; the Transnistrian situation contributed much to the deterioration of the alliance.

Transnistria: Vital Statistics

On August 19, the very day the Tiraspol' agreement was signed, Antonescu appointed a governor of Transnistria, with Tiraspol' as his temporary capital; actual rule was to start the next day.20* Henceforth Transnistria's status was ambiguous; Romania had proclaimed its sovereignty over it, but firmly desisted from annexing it. Its position has been compared to that of Poland under the Germans: in substance, a dependency completely at the mercy of the occupying power, yet with some of the attributes of separateness, perhaps because there was no sound ethnic or political basis for annexation. Some Romanian wartime maps of Romania Mare-"Greater Romania"-showed Transnistria as part of the state; others did not. Romanian law did not automatically apply in Transnistria; not could Romanians or Transnistrians cross from one area to other freely .In practice, Transnistria's government was entirely separate from that of its occupying power; it had a Romanian civil governor and an administration that a composite of Romanian and indigenous elements.

Transnistria, in which were included part of the Moldavian and if the Ukrainian SSR, had an area of 39,733 square kilometers (about 10,000 square miles). Its total prewar population of 3,4 million had, according to Romanian sources, meanwhile dropped to about 2,250,000.21* Nearly one out of five lived in or around Odessa. Odessa had grown comparatively little in the Soviet period-from about 500,000 to some 620,000; what with evacuation, mobilization, and migration, it had declined to an estimated 300,000 at the time the Romanians took over, In the following months some residents returned from rural areas and captivity; almost the entire Jewish population was forced to leave. Thus Odessa's population fluctuated ranging between 300,000 and 400,000 in 1942-1943, and dropping in April,1944, on the eve of the Germans' and Romanians' departure, to 230,000.22*

There was a considerable disproportion among demographic groups. As a result of Soviet mobilization and evacuation, the adult males were direly under-represented. In rural areas, the Germans complained, they could find no males between 25 and 50 years of age.23* One source suggests that only 45,000 persons in the city were males above 21 years of age; there was perhaps another 15,000 in the age group between 18 and 21. Of the 230,000 surviving in April 1944, fewer than 100,000 were employed;; of these, fewer than 40,000 were males capable of military service (presumably a rather broad category that included persons earlier listed as under-age).24* Among adults, it seem reasonable to assume a ratio of 2:1 between women and men.

Transnistria was unusual in its ethnic composition. Exact figures are lacking, but the bulk of the rural population was Ukrainian and Moldavian, along with a strong admixture of Russian, Volkdeutsch, and other nationality groups. The urban population was overwhelmingly Russian, with high proportion of Jews and, in Odessa particularly, of Greeks and Armenians. It should be noted here that this area, especially its southern part, was closer to a "melting pot" of nationalities than most part of the USSR; settled entirely from outside, it had no "indigenous stock." As a result, the nationality question played a rather subordinate role in this area.

Odessa was the only large city. Tiraspol', the temporary capital,, had had only some 30,000 inhabitants.25* A few other towns-Rybnitsa, Dubosary, Mogilev-Podol'ski, Balta, and Zhmerinka-were about the same size.26* Many of the first reports speak of the reduction of population at the time of occupation. Only 5,000 of the residents of Berezovka were there when the German arrived in August,1941; in the inner boroughs of Anan'ev, the were only 1,500 left out of estimated 5,000 to 7,000.27* Soon, however, some men and women came out of hiding; others returned from near-by farms or from the road, to which they had taken in futile fight; prisoners came home; and deserters from the Red Army registered as legal residents. There was also a small immigration into Transnistria from areas of German rule, despite German and Romanian barriers of all sorts; by hook and crook succeeded in moving into the more wealthy and reputedly more comfortable Transnistria.

The port and industry f the Odessa region were both now wrecked, but its agriculture was rich; its whet, and also fruit-growing vineyard culture, and cattle-breeding, made it productive agricultural region. Only 5% of the land was forest; over 70% had been under cultivation.28* For Romania, as well as for wartime Germany, its agriculture was bound to be important.

The lateral borders of the province were well-defined by the Dnestr and Bug Rivers, and the southern by the Black Sea, but the northern boundary of Transnistria remained to defined (see mar 2.p.139) Field Marshal Keitel, in memorandum on August 24,1941, spoke of it as following roughly the northern border of the Moldavian SSR (approximately the Kamenka-Savran'-Pervomaisk line) The "Convention of Tighina" six days later did not fully satisfy Romanian aspirations: though generally reluctant to take any Soviet territory under its wing, the Romanians also illogically sought to increase the area to be administrated by them, particularly that adjacent to Bessarabia and Bucovina. On September 3, Romania requested-and received- from Germans a northward expansion which included the areas of Mogilev-Podos'ski, Zhmerinka, and Tulchi.29* Negotiation about other borders continued for months, but without results.30* Rosenberg, who distrusted the Romanians, meanwhile sought and claimed to have obtained Hitler's consent to moving the border a trifle westward at Nikolaev, located right across the Bug River from Transnistria. He justified with the statement that "as thing stood now, the Romanians can look into all (German-run)wharf installations" at Nikolaev.31* Not even this change was make, however. The following summer (1942) the border question flared up with new complexity. The German foreign office did not deem the Tighina accord binding , because it had been concluded between the two armies, not two states. The foreign office wished to leave the question open; the German army had not lost interest, because the territory had been turned over too civil government; the Rosenberg Ministry and the Naval high Command sought to recover some of the territory, including Ochakov, but without prospect of success.

What ensued were weary and futile negotiations that contributed further to German-Romanian tension.32*

The New Order

The German forces entering the area first established the customary network of komendaturas-local military government offices. The operation of military government, even on a local basis, was difficult; thre was confusion, some of it from lack of directives, some from lack of interest in it, and some of lack equipment and personnel to administer it. There were also clashes between German and Romanian officers and staffs, each accusing the other of abuses or looting. The pattern of military occupation can be seen in Tiraspol', were the German army established a komendatura ( as did the Romanians), appointed a fifty-year-old Moldavian bookkeeper, Michail Ivanovich Zelinski, as mayor, and ordered the screening of personnel for an auxiliary police, the restoration of water and electric power, the repair of roads used by the army, and conscription of Jews to clear rubble. Elsewhere, e.g., Berezovka, the man picked for mayor had also been mayor under the Soviets; of his four deputies, one was a Russian, one was a Ukrainian, one was Moldavian, and one was a Volksdeutscher-this probably showed more equity and circumspection than was customary. Soon after occupation the population would be ordered to turn in all arms and ammunition-and machine guns, pistols, rifles, and grenades, and rounds of ammunition (often abandoned by the Red Army) poured into receiving points-though probably only because of the dire punishment threatened in case of disobedience.33*

Here and there a crisis would occur. In the town of Kodyma a local woman claimed to have overheard a conversation or rumor of impending Communists sabotage (the burning harvest), and reported this to the Germans. The latter promptly shot a number of residents as hostages, committed cruel atrocities in the Jewish section of Kodyma, and threatened similar retribution if sabotage occurred. For the few days a mood of real panic prevailed.34* There were no major excesses, except for those committed by the SD's (security Service of the SS) special action teams (the so-called Einsatzgruppen).

The command of the 11th Army was primarily interested in securing the rear, establishing a modus vivendi, and pushing on to the east. "On the whole," the Germans reported on September 2, 'the population is entirely willing to work and glad to... have been liberated. Only rarely does one encounter sabotage...35*

By the late August, Romanian officers began to claim that they had been appointed "prefects" and where to replace the German komendaturas; two weeks later, bu mid-September, all the military government units of the German army (technically, Army Rear Area 553) had moved eastward, out of Transnistria. The only officers left were in Tiraspol' and Berezovka, to help transient German military personnel.36* There were two exceptions to the general evanescence of German influence and control. In the ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) settlements of Transnistria, the Reich reversed special rights and inhabitants received privileged treatment.37* For instance, in the Kuchurgan area-which included the settlements of Selz and Manheim, southeast of Tiraspol'-the Germans replaced the initial Romanian administrators, established a German-style village government consisting of a village Shulze (mayor) a scribe, and a village council.

Village-wide assemblies were convened (reported the regiment in charge); those to be appointed were determined by acclamation, and the they were installed by responsible sergeant by a hand shake...

Confirmed later the German district administration, these local appointees, gathered in one of the larger Volksdeutsche villages to elect an area Schulze. In the villages, three-men courts were also picked as were special appointees for school and church affairs and animal husbandry.38* The Germans maintained certain agencies in Romanian Transnistria. Keitel, in his memorandum of August 24, had specified that a central German coordinating staff would continue on the spot-preferably in Odessa. The German army's transport administration was to assume responsibility for the repair and operation of the trunk rail lines. The German army was to provide coastal and antiaircraft installations along the Black Sea 39* Virtually all of their provisos stemmed from German self-interest or from distrust of their military inferior Romanian "ally".

The German-Romanian Convention of Tighina ( August 30) 40* fully spelled out the Reich's prerogatives in each of these fields, and also in communications and economic liaison. Pursuant to it, a German commandant had charge of the port of Odessa and regulated its security, reconstruction, anduse.41* An over-all liaison staff (Verbidungsstab) replaced General Coubiere's operational headquarters; at first under Panzer General Lutz, and from December,1941, under Lieutenant General von Rothkirch, it had command authority over virtually all the diverse German army echelons remaining in Transnistria. 42*

In addition to the military (and some counterintelligence personnel), the German maintained diplomatic representatives in Transnistria. One of the subordinate German ministers in Bucharest, Pflaumer, was made Antonescu's titular adviser on Transnistrian affairs-but without voice or authority.43* Since Transnistria was, as it were, foreign territory, Germany in the late spring of 1942 opened a Consulate General in Odessa. Its head, Dr. Werner Stephany, technically reported to ambassador Killinger, the Nazi fanatic who represented the Reich in Bucharest. There were also occasional visits of German officials and dignitaries to the area-SS General Lorenz came in July 1942, (in connection with the Volksdeutsche question), and Rich Minister of Transportation Dorpmuller in October,1943 (in connection with problem of shipment and evacuation),44*

Romanian rule began with a peculiar situation. For nearly two months, while Odessa itself was being fought for, the Romanians had had only the rural hinterland to occupy. They seemed reluctant to establish a full-fledged administration with part of the are still in enemy hands. The greatest hindrance to the establishment of civil rule was the Romanian troops themselves, chief disrupters of the very law and order they were supposed to maintain. It was not without reason that the Soviets, after the war, charged that the Romanians in Transnistria had as their slogan, "Plunder and Romanize."

The reasons for widespread pillage are not hard to determine. The Romanian army had never had the discipline needed to make it immune to opportunities for personal advantage. It was, moreover, expressly invited to live off the land. Revenge had inspired the entire campaign-and seemed to sanction abuses and retribution. The Romanian soldier received but 2 lei a day, a trifling sum, and often not even this was paid. As the Romanian army had never properly organized its supplies and reinforcements, the troops were more or less compelled to tae what they could.46*

But this does not wholly account for the wanton destructiveness, the physical mistreatment, rape, and manslaughter frequently reported by the more highly disciplined German army. (Acts of individual terrorism and abuse were punished by the Germans; but collective acts on a much vaster scale were both ordered and carried out by them). A far dossier could be made of German reports to higher echelons about Romanian pillage, requisitioning without pay, and destruction of buildings, equipment, or foodstuffs; also of their senseless looting of useless items, discrimination in the distribution of food and supplies and the assignment of jobs, and a variety of other offenses. The reports are too numerous and come from too widely-scattered sources to have been concocted by anti-Romanian officers.47*

Things reached the point where General Schobert, CG of Eleventh Army (killed soon after) wrote Marshal Antonescu a frank letter of complain. Coming from the pen of a German professional military man who was not disposed to sentimentality or compassion for the native population, it makes strikingly reading, It was, after all, addressed to the head of an allied state. Living off the land, he wrote Antonescu, does not mean wanton rape or senseless destruction. "The plunder by Romanian in the occupied areas has assumed such proportions that one must anticipate a political aversion (against the Germans) on the part of the Ukrainian population." Schobert requested, in the interest of victory and pacification, that the sternest measures be taken against violators of discipline.48*
In the following months, there was some improvement, especially as combat troops moved on, as transportation and supply facilities operated more smoothly, and as the civilian gendarmerie replaced the military police. But the German army still had reason to complain about Romanian behavior 49* and if they did, one may safely assume that the local residents had even more reason to complain. Until the end of 1941, the use of force remained widespread and the most usual "vehicle of change."50*

In Odessa proper, the "new order" was quickly established.51* One can scarcely speak of an "interregnum" between Soviet and Romanian rule. The Romanian troops entered suddenly, obviously unprepared for the seizure. Groups of 20 to 30 men would be assigned to a street or section, would find billets, and post the first orders. Romanian behavior was, as one refugee put it, "without special dignity or air;" the few Germans who arrived, on the other hand, inspired both awe and fear. The new authorities almost at once proclaimed a list of "don'ts" under pain of death. All orders were to be obeyed: arm were to be turned in; 9:00 p.m. was set as curfew hour; all public gathering were forbidden; all Red Army men were to report and register.

Other orders dealt with the repair of public utilities.52* "Water, light and bread" were the three main objectivities which the city administration gave up its first task. Difficult enough in normal times, it was made difficult by the destruction already by the Soviets and by the further destruction done by such agents as continued to operate in the area, The task of the new authorities was also complicated by the lawlessness of both sides, the population and the army. Looting in Odessa, it will be recalled, started on the eve of the Red Army's departure. Now it became more widespread. Who started it, who engaged in it? No one seems able to tell. "As usual, when authorities change," one refugee explains, " the appeared 'dark elements'" who looted stores and apartments abandoned by the evacuees. According to another informant, there was a sequence to the looting: food stores first, then furniture and house hold equipment, then useless things, in an increasing pitch of "acquisitiveness" as long-frustrated desires to use hands and elbows were released. A good many of the looters were teenagers. Here is how a novelist describes it; in an unpublished manuscript y writes:

On the way home, Lida noticed in the buildings of the sanitarium ( on the outskirts of Odessa ) a groups of village boys, racing each other home from the sanitarium... They were stealing the belongings of the resort pharmacy. They carried containers of all shapes and sizes, jars and glasses, rubber syringes... boxes with pills and medicine; someone had carried off the pharmacy scales.
" In town they're taking darned near everything from the stores and ware houses, it's awfully crowded, and nobody's stopping you," an eight -year-old boy proclaimed with the excitement of sensational news..." 53*

The sanitarium were, indeed, among the first buildings pillaged, and soon cases of poisoning from stolen medication were reported. The neft'baza (gas station) was likewise early wrecked. The sugar supply at the PO (the consumers' co-operative) was looted. A few people tried to stop the looters , but in vain. It seemed to be kind of release after long tension. At the root of the pillaging were need and deprivation, but once begun, "everything went." Curiously, the drive was not merely acquisitive; it was also destructive-some statues (for instance, of Stalin) and some buildings (apartments of hated officials) were completely wrecked.

Looters fought each other, or ganged up to deprive others of some particularly cherished spoil. Not only state property but the goods of neighbors who had left were shamelessly appropriated.
Many, of course, did not join in the looting-from fear, principle, or lack of "know-how." And after a few days, the pillage subsided. " On the streets there are few people; the shops have been looted; there is no light; no streetcars are running... It is scary in town."54*

The people as a whole were neither overjoyed nor irrevocably hostile to the new order; they were insecure and wondered about the future. The Romanians themselves acknowledged that many feared them more then they had feared Soviet terror.

The same novelist describes October 17 in a suburb of Odessa : All day long fishermen and their wives would drop to talk it over with N: "What does it all mean? And won't it even be worse than before?" 55*

The Romanians were not necessarily evil, but they were foreigners, hungry and lousy strangers, who could not even make themselves understood, Who knew what they were up to? An Italian newspaperman gives a scene from the second day of the occupation: an elegant old piano is standing on the sidewalk, abandoned by some evacuee or a looter who had changed his mind... a girl goes by, stops to play some chords, but a few people gather...furtively she sits down to play, but "without joy..." just then a Romanian officer appears down the block.. the music stops../ he only smiles and walks on ... and the playing resumes...56* Except for some shooting at night, some arrests by day, except for wiry young looters, for the hungry and frustrated who joined them, except for the few busybodies who already began to "adjust" to the new regime and were writing memoranda and manifestoes to the Romanian authorities, Odessa was quit and tired.

The ordinary householder experienced the Romanians in a special way. Hungry Romanians patrols would go from house to house , from apartment to apartment, ostensibly seeking pusca (weapons), which were to have been surrendered. It did not take housewives long to discover that their guests' interest could be easily deflected from official duties to food, above all to sugar. Indeed, Odessa residents soon spoke of "sugar patrols" because visits usually ended with sugar or the entire sugar container (especially if it was silver) in the pocket of the soldiers. A cup of tea with sugar came to symbolize a willingness to co-operate with inspecting patrols. However, there was a limit to the sugar residents had, and when the patrols started multiplying, coming back under spurious pretext to the same apartments within hours of each other, residents began to insist of their inspection. The verdict, "VERIFICAT"( verified), written in chalk, adorned the doors of Odessa houses. But not even this deterred some Romanian patrols; the same door might have five, six, or more "VERIFICAT"'s- witness of once abundant sugar supply.57*

All this did little to inspire awe of or respect for the Romanian troops. Two specific acts committed by the Romanians soon furthered the alienation: their acquisition of "prisoners of war," and the mass retaliation for an act of Communist sabotage.

Capture and Terror

The Romanians ordered all males to report, with their Soviet passports, to certain schools or other official buildings to be registered and to have Romanian visa entered into the passport. Jews were report to separate registration boards. Used to Soviet insistence on "documentation, " the population accepted this without undue surprise or concern, and by and large heeded the order. It was amazing , refugees state, how many males had apparently managed to stay in Odessa. On the day of registration non-Jews soon realized that the armed guards at registration points would not them out; soon there were huge crowds inside, milling around aimlessly waiting to be processed. At 6:00 p.m. all (except a few who, by pull or bribes, had managed to get out) were marched off to a local barracks. From there, thousands-these civilians picked at random-were sent to Romania as "prisoners of war." The rationalization was that any adult male have been a Red Army soldier, an official, or a Communist. Few bona fide captives had been taken in Odessa; the Romanians, therefore, devised this way of acquiring at least 7,000 prisoners. Many of those had no connection whatever with the Red Army or the military. According to German intelligence there were soldiers in Odessa:

...several times this number remain in the city in civilian clothes. All these elements have served their military service in the Red Army and have either remained behind on their own or else were purposely left behind.

But these were often in hiding. It was simpler to send off the "registers"-white-collar workers and janitors, intellectuals and laborers.

In Romania the prisoners were for the most part to farm labor. After some months, they began to be "released" from prisoners of war status. Some died in captivity; those who came back generally told tales of abominable conditions, but not of systematic cruelty or shooting. 58*

This feeling of having been trapped, cheated, and mistreated persisted, despite the reversal of policy toward the prisoners- which coincided with a general trend on the part of the Romanian occupying authorities toward a more liberal course. By the spring and summer of 1942, some prisoners were constrained to admit this. The return had practical results especially in the rural areas, relieving the shortage of manpower on the farms.59*

The Romanians did seek and succeed in getting the Germans to release Transnistrian prisoners, arguing (as did the "Bessarabian wing" in Transnistrian politics) that Transnistrians had a status comparable to that of Romanian citizens. The status was certainly not identical, however; the Romanian army-for pragmatic reasons-did not demand and did not even permit military service of Transnistrians. 60*

There continued to be prisons-of war camps in Transnistria, even in Odessa itself. Though poorly kept, housed mostly in buildings wrecked by aerial attack, the prisoners were still better off than their countrymen in Germany. In the last year of the occupation the German even permitted local residents to help care for them. Russian girls brought food, and the women's auxiliary of one of the few Russian organization permitted - veterans of the First World War (see below, p.283) - gave prisoners prepared parcels, food, and tobacco. Lectures and religious services were eventually allowed in the largest camp in Odessa. These efforts in their behalf, its reported, were genuinely appreciated by the captives but failed to dispel their profound skepticism of anything that came tothem by or though the Germans.61*

The awareness that there were prisoners of war, both wrongly so-called and genuine, helped perpetuate the feeling of distance between the population and the Romanians. Instinctively and unthinkingly the people felt closer to and commiserated with the captives; their hostility to the Romanians seems not to have diminished when the Romanians relaxed their policy and permitted prisoners to be aided.

Acts of terror and atrocities committed by the occupying forces naturally also aroused violent fillings of hostility among the native population. The Romanian authorities started taking hostages within a few days of the occupation. Moreover, "suspects were seized and handed on poles or from balconies" for the most insignificant violations of orders, though more serious violators sometimes would be treated dilatorily and laxly. On October 17, it was reported, the Romanians shot Soviet citizens who had membership cards in MOPR or Osoaviakhim. On October 19, the Romanians began taking action against the local Jewish population, detailed elsewhere in this paper. But terror reached its peak after October 22, when the former NKVD headquarters on Marazli (later Engels) Street, occupied by the Romanian staff. was blown up by a Soviet agent(see below, pp.330ff.). Retaliation was prompt, cruel, and indiscriminate. Public posters threatened, the execution of hostages at varying ratios, up to 100 for every Romanian soldier, and 200 for every Romanian officer or German killed. And, in the words of a factual Abwehr report:

... on the morning of the 23rd (the day after the explosion), about 19,000 Jews were shot on a square in the port, surrounded by a wooden fence. The corpses were sprinkled with gasoline and burned.

Thousand more were allegedly taken to Dal'nik and there were massacred in anti-tank trenches. But not only Jewish residents were apprehended; and, in the initial frenzy of retaliation and terror, any suspicious sufficed for hanging. This rein of terror-of perhaps no more than ten days-cast a cloud of gloom over Odessa. Refugees report that women and children would become almost hysterical at the sight of long rows of gallows, for instance, along the trolley line leading out of the city. Others tell of groups of arrested citizens being chased over Soviet - laid mine fields to make the mines explode - with many casualties. 62*

When the notorious German Einsatzgruppe "D" moved out of Transnistria, to Nikolaev and the Crimea, it left memories of terror and mass annihilation .As time went by semblance of order descended. True, for a while, it was almost routine to hang anyone caught with a Party membership card or an army pay book.. Then this ceased. Terror from then on was more localize, more pinpointed against groups-such as Jews or partisans-and more "legalized." 63* Yet the early days of horror left what seems to have been an indelible mark on the people and prevented them from identifying with the Romanians. Soviet life had, of course, accustomed the population to violence and terror. It was the unabashed publicity, the almost proud display of cruelty, and the means of execution which shocked the people. A secret murder in an NKVD jail was accepted far more readily than a public hanging or the burning of hostages. Deep down, one suspects, there was a feeling that there had been dome tortuous rationale for Soviet terror; that of the new lords seemed utterly unjust. 64*

Transnistria: The Government

A decree-law promulgated by Antonescy on August 19, 1941, but not publicized until later, established the government of Transnistria. It outlined the structure of government and give as the first tasks of the administration: to supervise the resumption of normal economic life, particularly agriculture; to repair roads, railroads, and bridges; to establish an indigenous police subject to the supervision of the Romanian gendarmerie; and to open schools and churches. This order included both a slight demagogic appeal to the new subjects and an interesting definition of their prerogatives: "All citizens of province will enjoy civil rights, except for the right to engage in any political activities whatsoever."65* The Transnistrian government was publicly proclaimed on October 17, the day after Odessa. fell.66* Up to December, 1942, the governor's headquarters was Tiraspol'; it then moved to Odessa.,67* and the restored Vorontsov Palace was used both as governor's residence and his official headquarters.

The civil governor was Professor Gheorghe Alexianu.68* The holder of a chair in administrative law
at Cernauti University, a close friend of the "Number Two Man" of Romania, Mihai Antonescu,(Alexianu qnd Mihai Antonescu had co-authored the volume on Romanian law in comparative-law series published in Paris before the war.,69* Alexianu had the reputation of being both "the only liberal" in the Romanian government and the sponsor or the anti-Semitic measures under the Goga regime a few years earlier. Alexianu was apparently a Western-type intellectual with megalomaniac tendencies, some administrative ability, and a good deal ofvitality.70* His secretary-general was Emil Cercavski (or, in Russian spelling Cherkavski).71*

In addition to his own secretariat, the Governor's staff consisted of a series of Directorates. The original Antonescu order had established Directorates in such fields as administration, transportation, agriculture, industry, education, religion, sanitation, and finance; by October 1942, their number had grown to 19, some with sizable staffs. Their functions expanded with the passage of time; thus the Propaganda Directorate assumed responsibility for all censorship and managed the piped radio system once it was retored.72*

In the civil government there were , as a matter of policy, a considerable number of Bessarabians who knew the Russian language and were familiar with the cultural background and special problems of Transnistria. There were also ambitious young Romanians who had studied under Alexianu or his colleagues and obtained draft exemptions to serve in this way. In the hope of attracting "good people" -and making it possible for them to give up other jobs-Antonescu, in his first decree, provided that officials in Transnistria were to receive double the corresponding salary in Romania plus a subsistence allowance up to the basic salary. A Romanian civil servant transferred to Odessa would thus receive three times the pay he drew in Iasi or Galati. A number of Transnistrian officials were Romanians who had been attracted by high pay.73*

The districts, in turn, were divided into rayons, or counties, as under the Soviets. Each of the 64 rayons of Transnistria had a rayon chief as a praetor, named by the prefect of his district. Most praetors were Romanian professional civil servants or officers; at their side, once again, were local praetors with advisory functions, usually former Soviet official. In the towns, government was in the hands of an appointive mayor, known as primar, who (except for the two larger urban areas, Odessa and Tiraspol') was responsible to the rayon chief. By law both praetors and primars could be "natives," but almost all rayon chiefs were Romanians, while many of the mayors were former Soviet citizens. In all, Transnistria had two municipalities, fifteen townships, and 1261 rural communities. 77*

The professional competence of this somewhat improvised but rather simply constructed administrative apparatus is matter of some dispute. Apparently there were some failures , just as there were cases of competence. Their main problems, it seem, was to find suitable personnel for the lower levels.78* Though perhaps not a completely impartial observer, a German officer who accompanied Antonescu on an inspection trip through Transnistria in mid-1942 reported:

Most of the prefects are meritorious colonels and make a good impression. Most of the praetors seem to be usable. The overwhelming majority of mayors, especially in the small localities, on the other hand, indolent, inexperienced Ukrainians of limited intelligence. 79*

A former high Romanian official who made frequent visits to Transnistria, however, found it most difficult to deal with the colonels and majors who headed the districts, whom he considered cocksure, stupid, and politically ignorant.80*

Antonescu's original policy statement, cited above, was flexible enough to suit different schools of thought. Military commanders in the first days of the occupation had stressed that village elders were to be selected from among "the most decent and honest" residents. "The Romanian government," the proclamations blithely asset, "will treat the population with perfect humanity." For the moment, all laws-i. e., Soviet laws-were to stay in force unless specifically revoked or altered by the new adopted initially a colonial approach: Transnistria is to be exploited, not reconstructed-an approach that was bound to have both economic and political repercussions.82*

By the end of 1941 the issue of how to treat Transnistria seems to have come to a head within Romanian circles, with one polar position maintained by pro-fascist politicians and propagandists, and the other, by a group of Bessarabians deeply steeped in Russian culture. The first group included Nichifor Crainic, the pro-fascist and pro-German Propaganda Minister, formerly a professor at the Bucharest theological seminary and a member of the German-sponsored commission to investigate the Katyn massacre. Professor Herseni, Crainic's representative on the spot, who directed propaganda work in Transnistria, appears to have supported this group, which viewed Transnistria much as German officials viewed "the Slavic east."83*The "Bessarabians" on the other hand, of whom there were a considerable number in the Transnistrian government, were largely men who had lived under Russian rule until the Revolution, some of them as tsarist officials and officers. Although usually without political sympathy, for either tsarism or bolshevism, they frequently had considerable warm feeling for "the Russians" as such, spoke the language, though at times awkwardly after many years of disuse, and tended to the view that no pacification or lasting order could be established without enlisting the native population, the Romanians must give it a stake in the new order-material benefits, status, and creature comfort.84*

Governor Alexianu occupied a middle position.85* He sought to build up Transnistria and to convince the authorities in Bucharest to pour in funds and goods, perhaps, in part, to enhance his own power. But his attitude was basically patronizing, almost hostile, toward the native population; he widely proclaimed the need for radical re-education, for developing political understanding; though the peasants disliked them, he claimed that it was impossible to abolish collective farms; his formula, "freedom and labor" gave to the average citizen a freedom that was distinctly limited, and labor that was plentiful. Yet comparing his with extremist views and with German practice in the neighboring Ukraine, Alexianu was a moderate.

At times he would ascribe the relative peace and prosperity of his satrapy to the correctness of the "mollifies"' approach.86* His liberal tendencies were encouraged by the activities of individuals of some prominence in Romanian court circles. Countess Alexandrina Cantacuzino, for instance (whose family, Moldavian gentry, had once been close to the Russian throne), now chaperoned girl-students from Odessa and " promoted cultural intercourse." As she declared publicly, "Whatever the future, no one will be able to deny that the Romanians, even in wartime, build places of culture and faith."87* A certain pride accomplishments and economic plenty crept the outlook of Romanian officialdom in Odessa. From about the spring of 1942 on, there was an inchoate but unmistakable effort to give special privileges to the native intelligentsia and to foster the rise of collaborating, trustworthy elite.
Though by 1943 there was little enthusiasm in Romania itself for the new province and "every Romanian asked himself whether Transnistria was worth the sacrifices that continued to be made in the East, :Romanian official in Odessa were eager to demonstrate to visiting German newspapermen that the "mild" policies pursued in Transnistria yielded far better results than those followed in the Ukraine. The newsmen, at least some of them, were impressed.88*

Odessa: The Primaria

The city of Odessa was at first placed under military government. When the Romanian army, accompanied by some German contingents, entered Odessa in mid-October, General Glogoseanu, one of the ranking commanders, was appointed military commandant.89* Within six days (as described elsewhere) his headquarters, a number of officers, and he himself were blown up. His successor was General Trestoreanu, Commanding General of the 13th Division.90* Neither had any special experience or interest in military government. Their orders struck the population as saber rattling; it was not felt that the Romanians would enforce them, certainly not if there were mass disregard of them. That there should be so many regulations punishable by death seemed unfair and unreasonable- yet innumerable civilians already dangled from improvised gallows, lamp posts, and streetcar stops.91*

The need for a local government was obvious to all in these days of requisitions, senseless streets, looting, and chaos. The problems, as one refugee recalls, ranged from where to get a piece of bread to how to regulate street traffic. The chaos of currencies, the transportation bottleneck, which prevented peasants from bringing their goods to the city, and, of course, the need to establish law and order in general made an effective government for Odessa imperative.92*

The Romanians decides to give Odessa a government but administratively independent of it. They established a municipality or Primaria (the Romanian name, which came to be used by local residence as well) headed by a mayor, who together with several vice-mayors, formed the board of "city fathers." Under them was a structure of directorates reminiscent of those in the governor's office. There was at first no provision for the participation of residents, but with the general shift toward greater indigenous participation and responsibility, there were modifications that permitted Odessa residents to become heads of city directorates, even vice-mayors. The establishment of the municipality was announced on October 22,1941 in the first issue of semi-official city newspaper, Odesskaia gazeta, with pompous proclamations and appeals. By December,1941, the Primaria had begun to function in a more or less orderly fashion. Housed mainly in the old Stock Exchange building, specially and luxuriously repaired for it, its offices spread to other choice spots in the city, including the so-called Sailors' Palace (Dvorets Moriaka).93*

Gherman Pantea was appointed primar. A Bessarabian who knew Russian well, Pantea had studied at Odessa University, served as a captain in the tsarist army during World War I, become an ardent Moldavian patriot, and been active in the Bessarabian assembly-the Sfatul Tarii- during the Civil War.94* After two decades under the Romanians, he now returned as their lieutenant to Odessa. He is described by one observer as "a real little kulak, clever, covetous, not without brains." He would show up, unescorted and unheralded, at the city markets at 6:00 in the morning, passed-by recognizing him, addressed him unceremoniously in the colloquial Russian form as "German Vasil'evich."95* He was active, spoke Russian, and understood the problems before him. Though not revered or admired, he was at least respected and widely accepted, not so some of his deputies. One of five (at times, four) deputy mayors, two were local residents. Vladimir Gundert, a Volksdeutscher architect, who quite competently, it seems-directed reconstruction in the city; and M. Zaevloshin, a Moldavian professor without special claims to fame. Neither appears to have had political influence. But the others, Elefterie Sinicliu, Vladimir Chiorescu, and K. Vidrascu, were Romanians or Russian-speaking Bessarabians and enjoyed far greater prerogatives. The most important and most colorful was the young Vidrascu, described as a flighty oversexed "lady's man," who knew how to look out for his own pleasures and interest. He had no inhibitions about using his official position for personal advantage, and arranged sumptuous parties with hands and lavish entertainment. Readily admitting that he was in Odessa to get rich, he was phenomenally brazen about accepting bribes-taking, for instance, a gold watch from a man seeking a two-month license to open a circus. He had to pass on licenses to open stores, theaters, and restaurants, and would often withhold authorization until :there was something in it" for him. People learned to include him, or one of his friends or relatives, as a stockholder, member, or beneficiary of proposed enterprises, to make sure of getting a permit. As will be seen, he was not alone in his venality--Chiorescu wound up buying a Bucharest hotel for several million lei after his sojourn in Odessa-but Vidrascu performance was more scandalous, dramatic, and unabashed than that of other officials.96*

Under the Primaria there were some sixteen ( the number fluctuated slightly) municipal directorates.97* In some fields, for example, education, broad directives issuing from the governor's corresponding directorate bound them; but other directorates had considerable leeway, except as limited by the Primaria itself. Decisions could be made by the mayor himself or by plenary meetings of the mayor, the deputies, and the heads of directorates. Some of the directors were Romanians, others, Odessa residents.

Some was reported to have been reasonably honest and competent; at least, was an accomplished scoundrel.

The tasks of the various directorates were rather obvious. The Housing Directorate, among other things, registered vacant and abandoned apartments and assigned them to those who "deserved" a change of quarters. The inventory Directorate, headed by a Moldavian resident of Odessa, registered all abandoned property, government stocks, and recovered loot-an activity of special and direct interest to Romanian officials Small shops came under the functional directorate involved, such as Food or Engineering-Technical Large plants were taken over the city; they remained directly under the Governor. The Land Directorate, under a local professor, stated renting small dachi (country houses) on the peripheries of Odessa at low rents, to encourage truck farming and fruit growing there-those had not flourished under Soviet cooperatives but now proved attractive to the homeless and unemployed.98*

Inevitably the Romanian chiefs had to rely on local help. Every section had its translator and native aides. Much inevitably was taken over from Soviet administrative practice and organization, whether the Romanians wanted it or not: often native officials had served in the same capacity under Soviet rule. In the Directorate of Finance, on which some information is available, central financial control (uchet) and production planning followed the Soviet pattern: a central book keeping department, and department of taxation, another for the collection of fees, tariffs, and imposts, and finally a smetno-biudzhetnyi (estimates and budget) section, which correspondent to the old Soviet economic planning section. Having no capital of their own to start with, all enterprises had to submit advance estimates of their receipts and expenditures; in return, the directorate would give them paper advances; over-expenditures of sizable amount were punisheble.99*

In the Primaria real power did not always reside in the men who formally held it, and in dealing with the Primaria much depended on personal pull, or "know-how." Considerable actual authority was wielded by a young, temperamental, capable Bessarabian girl, Cleopatra Consolarino. Smart and "activist" almost in the Soviet sense, she became Vidrascu's right hand and often made the real decisions. Incidentally, she helped the local theater procure substantial funds, mainly because she madly loved one of its dancers 9she even had a brochure privately printed in his honor).A refugee novelist describes her under name Dagmar-a woman who handled everything, applications got coffins, permits for school supplies, licenses for merry-go-rounds, requisitions for opera lights, even the inventory of the city museum. The official Soviet investigation, after the war, charged Cleopatra with active complicity in Romanian spoliation of Odessa, including the removal of art and property to Romania-charges which refugees are inclined to accept as well-grounded.100*

There were others like Vidrascu and Cleopatra in and around the Primaria. A few people worked hard-not so much from idealism as from self-interest. Many, while looking out for their own good, did their job. Others, merely enriched themselves to thr neglect of their official duties. Working hours, in Italian fashion, were from 8:00 to 12:00 and from 3:00 to 7:00; the afternoon shift tended to be purely perfunctory.

Matters of urgency were often permitted to drag. Some city ordinances bordered on the ridiculous.101*. As one refugee lawyer stated, people were amazed to see another system could be even more inefficient than the Soviet.102*

Romanian prestige-and local pride and Odessa patriotism-tended to go up whenever high dignitaries visited the city. Rumors, some inspired, of visits by King Mihai or Queen Mother Elena, who for some reason enjoyed particular popularity, were frequent. marshal Antonescu made visits in June 1942, March 1943, and again in June 1943. Alexianu periodically visited Antonescu and his advisors in Bucharest. But the conductor, as Antonescu was called, remained a remote figure. Though his portrait-next to King Mihai's and sometimes Adolf Hitler's-adorned most public establishments, he never achieved any popularity; not even the comprehensive decree of mid-June,1943 (see below, pp.131ff), which relaxed restrictions and met some of the aspirations of the citizenry, rendered him popular. A few Odessites noted favorably that he attended a performance of the restored Odessa opera and that the opera thereafter had lee trouble getting its budget approved.103*

To the average citizen marshals and kings were fairy-tale figures, distant symbols of authority, even more distant than Soviet rulers had been. What was within his immediate experience was the Romanians' unpredictability and their stupendous proclivity to bribery, draft, and corruption. It did little good to recall that practices were customary within Romania and other Balkan countries. Their impact on the Soviet citizen was further intensified by experiencing these same practices in areas of life unconnected with government and administration, as will be later discussed.

At times official reports would cautiously comment-as did the German consul general in early 1943-that "subordinate organs occasionally incline to arbitrariness and corruption." 104* Other German observers were more outspoken: "With the introduction of the Romanian administration one can now speak of the systematic plundering of the country, without any exaggeration."105* Indeed, in mid-1943, a German journalist who visited the area wrote in confidential report to the German Propaganda Ministry:

Transnistria is being exploited by the Romanians to the highest degree, in part... to alleviate the food situation in Romania, which has become somewhat difficult but above all for the personal enrichment of a clique which was already well in Romania.106*

If a German visitor perceived this, so certainly did the inhabitants of Transnistria.

Examples of corruption are too numerous to adduce; suffice it to cite two. The Soviet report of its postwar investigation in Odessa mentioned one Romanian official, formerly storekeeper, who wound up as owner of the Passage Hotel, the "Victoria" movie house, the restaurant "Karpaty," a printing press, several stores, and a soda water plant. The same report gives the testimony of a lawyer named Diakonov. Though Diakonov had collaborated with the Romanians, they charged him with concealing Jews. He bribed the Commissioner handling the case to minimize the charges; his family then bribed the procurator of the military court who heard the matter, and got a favorable verdict.107*

In one of the few books on Transnistria available in English, Vladimir Petrov describes his experience in Odessa during the "retreat" from the Caucasus.

In Transnistria, under wartime conditions, the possibility for Russians to avoid unpleasantness by paying bribes was definitely an advantage. After all, the appetite of the Romanians was fairly modest one. When the Office of Public Safety held up permission for me and my friends to move to Odessa , I merely asked the captain in charge, "How much? " He looked at the ceiling and answered with a shrug, "One hundred marks." I was surprised. You could buy a pair of geese or six pounds of good salami at the market for 10 marks.

To a Soviet citizen the situation was unbelievable, it was so unlike Soviet rule:

It sounded like a joke when Aunt Shura told me about the time the Romanian military ware house in Odessa had been robbed. The culprits were caught red-handed at the market, selling strips of parachute silk. They were tried by a military court and two of them were sentenced to death. However, their friends collected something like 5,000 marks and gave it to military prosecutor. The
next day the condemned men were free. 108*

The first American newsmen reached Odessa ten days after it was reoccupied in 1944. They spoke of the "one striking contrast" between Odessa and other areas-in Odessa "a background colored by complete corruption." 109*

Romanization

Other states had embarked on campaigns to "assimilate" the people of areas they had conquered, and Romania too decided to promote the "Romanization" of Transnistria. Since it could not make Romanians of the predominantly Slavic population of the area, "Romanization" consisted in fostering the Romanian (i.e., Moldavian) minority, teaching the language, spreading Romanian culture and demonstrating" Romania's historical claims to Transnistria.

This presupposed that Transnistria would be annexed or in some way integrated into Romania Mare. If it was to treated as a spoil of war or a pawn for bargaining, it was absurd to try to Romanize it. Once in Romanian hands, however, Transnistria's appeal to at least a fringe of extreme nationalists an Romanian fascists was sufficient to bring about a Romanization campaign. Although this was perhaps not fully appreciated in Romania, this campaign was in direct conflict with the policy of another equally extremist group, this group, as will be seen, wanted to make Transnistria a dumping place for "undesirables"-Jews, gypsies, and other groups who were being exiled from Romania proper.

A standard device of the politician seeking to justify territorial claims is to rewrite the past. Romanian historiography was called in to help the hard-pressed regime. Historians like Academician Stefan Ciobanu insisted that Transnistria had in past been a real part of the Moldavian principality. Special monographs on the Romanian element in the history of the Odessa region were commissioned; it took some effort but it was shown that the Dacian had occupied the area in Roman days, that Romanian principalities had extended along the Black Sea coast, and that bishoprics of the Romanian church had at different times had jurisdiction east as far as the Ingulets River. To show a continuity of Romanian influence took some strenuous "research," and the resulting studies were indeed peculiar products, with only useful facts presented and evidence often obviously distorted.110* But they were judged admirable enough to publish-one of them even in Russian translation, on the first anniversary of the fall of Odessa .

The Romanian Scientific Institute was established in Tiraspol' in late 1941. Under the directorship of Professor Nicolae Smochina, who was described as long a student of Romanian-Slavic relations, the Institute prepared Romanian language texts and grammars, dictionaries, libraries of Romanian books and magazines, anything that helped spread the language among the "Transnistrians." 111*

On the initiative of the Governor himself, a Moldavian Faculty was established at Odessa University in the winter of 1942, with the Romanian lady from Iasi as dean, and curriculum that was a humanities hodgepodge. Its students had an obviously privileged position-it was understood they would provide some of the future administrative cadres for the province- and they received special fellowships, dormitory facilities, and the like. In general, the Moldavian minority was transformed into ethic elite in the new regime.112*

The most zealous "patriots" sought to justify the appropriation of Transnistria by emphasizing of the number of Romanians farther east in the Soviet Union -even in the Northern Caucasus, and of course in the rest of the Ukraine. No one seriously "claimed" the areas on that account (though these happened to the areas where the Romanian divisions were fighting). By special agreement with the Germans a "census" of so-called Romanians was taken throughout the occupied part of the USSR. The figures-which a high Romanian official now privately admits to have been "exaggerated"-alleged that there were nearly 1,200,000, even 1,800,000, Romanians in the Soviet Union, 782,000 in German-occupied parts of the Ukraine and the Russian Republic.113* The way in which the census was conducted made purative Romanians conclude that its purpose was to have them transferred "back" to Romanian soil.113*

In October,1942, the Romanian cabinet discussed the possibility of having these rediscovered compatriots moved (presumably by force, if need be) from Ukraine to Transnistria, to make a more compact Romanian ethnic mass in the eastern province. This, however, never took place.114* An alternative way of Romanizing would have been a migration of Romanians from Romania to Transnistria. Businessmen and government employees went there of course, but not settle. Antonescu was reported privately to have spoken of using Transnistria to "solve" Romania's agrarian problem; land would be given to Romanian peasant-settlers willing to migrate beyond the Dnestr.115* Likewise in 1942, German censorship allowed the statement to be made that Romania planned to settle its own artisans and merchants in Transtnistria.117* But none of these plans for colonizing Transnistria was acted on.

The efforts to promote the Romanian had a significant and widespread impact on the average Soviet citizen. Church services were frequently conducted in Romanian, much to the consternation of churchgoers: street signs and store marquees were often in Romanian as well as Russian; streets and squares were renamed to honor such figures as the legendary Michael the Brave, young King Mihai, and Antonescu; Romanian became the compulsory first foreign language in all Transnistrian schools; Romanian literature was imported in Transnistria, either in the original or in translation; and, in general efforts of all sorts were made to impress the skeptical population with the high standards and accomplishments of Romanian culture.118*

. While knowledge of Romanian was often convenient, the average citizen of Transnistria regarded its study as a nuisance and an imposition, sometimes as an insult. Except among the most opportunist elements of the population, Romanization was met with passive resistance, Like other aspects in Romanian policy, Romanization had ita up and downs: little was done in the confusion of the first few months; it was pushed in 1942, a time of relative recovery and prosperity; from the spring of 1943 on, as the Axis military position deteriorated, Romanization was increasingly forgotten, though language instruction continued.

Reactions to the Romanization program varied. Hostility to church services in Romanian was well-nigh universal and often intense. Resentment of charges in street names was mild but symbolic. Schoolboys often learned Romanian very poorly, partly ( teachers insist) out of deliberate effort not to study it; girls generally knew it better, often because they went out with Romanian officers and men. Saleswomen in the open-air market twisted Romanian phrases to make fun of the occupiers. "Buna dimineata" (Good morning) rapidly became "Budemte meniat'sia" (let's trade); other distortions followed the same pattern, and reflect the spirit of condescension in the popular attitude toward the conqueror. 119*

Attitudes toward the Romanians

Specific facets of popular attitudes and behavior will be discussed in subsequent chapters, but something should be said here about popular feeling in its more general aspects.120*

There was, one refugee suggests, a small minority eager to work with Romanians under virtually and conditions; there was another minority-its size cannot be exactly determined but it was probably larger- irrevocably opposed to collaboration. The bulk of the population had mixed feelings: they were weary and politically indifferent, yet not without hope, particularly of attaining greater personal comfort and security. Relations with the Romanians were commonly conducted- as another defector puts it-"without excessive ideology." One made practical, day-to day adjustment. The basic impulse, all sources agree, was to "survive," and if possible to "life comfortably" and "enjoy oneself." This meant "operating," manipulating, as to get the most for oneself from the Romanians with the least trouble and embarrassment. There was no implicit endorsement of the new regime, but also no rejection of it. Expressions suggesting such clever maneuvering (nalovchit'sia, ne vlipnt', khitrit') recur time and again in the refugee's reconstruction of the era.121*

Romanian behavior -that facet of which the people could judge and assess on the basis of personal experience-was ill-calculated to win respect. It aroused apprehension and, among many, revulsion and indignation. After the more blatant atrocities and cruel abuses to the and, other aspects of Romanian behavior came into greater prominence, especially the Romanian soldier's impoverishment and covetousness, and the ubiquitous graft. A German visitor observed that people in Transnistria hardly viewed the Romanians as "conquerors" at all. Bu the curious psychological mechanism, the Transnisrtians seemed to take pride in "generously" or "condescendingly" "forgiving" the Romanians for their abuses (all terms employed by the refugees or found in contemporary reports). As a bitter German remarked in January, 1942:

The venality of the Romanians in all degrees and shades has already become known to the Odessites, so that their judgment of the Romanians is expressed in the term "gypsies"...(they have for them) more scorn than hate.

The most perceptive of refugee informants consulted for this study gave "irony" as the quintessence of popular attitude toward the Romanians-slightly defensive, as if holding Romanian rule to the transitory and immature, but certainly not a fatal development.122*

The disparaging judgment-and one can assume its prevalence after at least a few months of occupation-did not affect basic behavior. The people strove to adjust to the status quo, and to make the most " of it. An informant recalls that people soon knew that you had to have a five or ten mark bill in your hand when you went to a Romanian agency to get something done. Some were at first reluctant to accept jobs from the Romanians, but many later did not so for economic reasons, to satisfy their ambition, or out of sense of social responsibility, for to some this seemed a way to help rebuild a normal life. One may speak of three distinct phases in the history of the attitudes of a mythical "average" resident: initially, he was suspicious and fearful; although he lived under difficult conditions, he was still hesitant to appear as an agent of the occupying power; from early 1942 on, a more "business-like' and less emotionally charged relationship with the authorities developed; he recognized the new order as a reality, and made the most of it; toward the end of the occupation a third phase began, where the front returned, the Romanians yielded more and more authority to the Germans, material conditions worsened, and a spirit of panic and doom enveloped the "average" resident. The middle era, roughly from the spring of 1942 to mid-1943, was the high point of Romanian occupation.123*

A substantial barrier separated the Romanians and the population throughout. The difference in language was in itself enough to prevent genuine identification. Social contact between residents and Romanians was generally limited to semi-official functions, love affairs, or contact that came about where Romanians were billeted in or near indigenous families. Romanian terror did not instill the utter horror Soviet terror had: Romanian bribery constituted a safety valve and helped make Romanian terror seem less monstrous, less ubiquitous, less insurmountable than its Soviet form.124*

The people knew that they were substantially better off than they would have been under the Germans. Time and again they would point to the difference in material conditions or cultural opportunities between Odessa and Kiev. Travelers and refugees would confirm and perhaps even exaggerate these cliches. Toward the end of the era, there was genuine fear that the Romanians would turn Transnistria over to the Germans.125*

The general direction of feeling was, however, toward increasing disillusionment and bitterness. Due in part to the very fact of foreign occupation, due perhaps in greater part to the change in military fortunes, it must be ascribed also to the behavior and policies of Transnistria's rulers.
______________
1* For accounts of Romania in 1941, see Henry L., Roberts, Romania, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951; Henri Prost, Destin de la Romanie, Berger-Levrault, Paris,1954, and the concise statement in Arnold and Veronica Toynbee(eds.), Hitler's Europre 1939-1946, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,1954. On Romanian-German relations, by far the best study is Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol and Marschall Antonescu, Steiner, Wiesbaden,1954.

2* The following discussion is based on variety of sources, which are in general agreement on this subject: Evgenii Tverskoi, "Rumynskaia okupatsiia oblasti mezhdu Bugom i Dnestrom v 1941-1944 gg.," MS, Russian Reseach Center, harvard University, 1951 (hereafter cited as Tverskoi)' Hitler's Europe, p.606;
Trial of the Major War Crimilas, Internalional military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947, vol.7,p.163; Otto Brautigan, "Uberblick uber die bezetten Ostgebiete wahrend des @ weltkrieges," MS, Institut fur Besatzungsfragen, Tubingen,1954, p.19; "Transnistrien und die Rumanen," Ostland, vol.20,#24, December 15,1941, pp.428-432; interview F; Ion Gheorghe, Rumaniens Weg zum Satellitenstaat, Welsermuhl, Wels, 1952, pp.192-193.

3* The notion of giving Odessa to the Romania was not new. In 1855 it was part of fantastic master plan to dismember Russia, which was attributed to Britain. (See S. Korff, Russia's Foreign Policy, Macmillan, New York,1922,p.34) Similar rumors were current during World War I.

4* OKW/Wi Ru Amt (von Gusovius) memo to Stab I/0, July 4,1941, CRS, Wi/ID, 2.1174.

5* Leibbrandt , "Odessa als ukrainischer Hafen," Document 1044-PS, (July,1941). (Document series cited refer to evidence introduced at the Nuremberg trials).

6* See also Tverskoi; RMfdbO, "Vermerk uber die im OKH stattgefungene Besprechung wegen Ubernahme eines Teils der Ukraine in Zivilverwaltung," August27,1941, Document 194-RS' Hitler's Europe,pp.624-628' and Fritz Zierke, "Jenseits des Dnjestr," Volkischer Beobachter, July 19,1943.

7* Often quoted in other publications. No files of the original have been located. For some excepts, see Ostland,vol.20, no.24.

8* Antonescu to Hitler, August 17,1941, Document USSR-242 (full text), in National Archives, Washington, D.C.; for excerpts in English, see Trial of the Major War Criminals. vol.7,pp.317ff.

9* See Ostland, vol.22, no.3 February 5,1943,pp.54-55.

10* AOK II,O.Qu./Qu2, to OKH/Gen.Qu., August 26,1941, CRS, Korick 20383/7.

11* Vereinbarung uber die Sicherung, Verwaltung und Wirtschaftsauswertung der Gebiete zwischen Dnestr und Bug (Transnistrien) und Bug und Dnjepr (Bug -Dnjepr Gebiet)", Tighina, August 30,1941, CRS, DW Num 4; full text also in CRS, DHMR 76152; Document 3319-PS,pp.33-38. The agreement was followed by a German order of September 4 establishing a border along the demarcation line separating Transnistria from the German Army Group South Rear Area, and stipulating what persons and goods were to be permitted across in either direction.

12* Gheorghe, op. cit.,,pp.192-193.

13* SD Report 100.

14* Brautigam,op.cit.,p.19.

15* Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Gould Lee, Grown Against Sickle, Hutchinson, London,(1950) pp.33-34,41-42.

16* Such an attitude was, moreover, bolstered by the stand of the Western powers. The Unites States, for instance, informed Romanian in September 1941, that (while tacitly sanctioning of Bessarabia) it considered Romanian expansion beyond the Dnestr as an inimical act.(See, for instance, Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol and Marschall Antonescu, Striner, Wiesbaden, 1954,,p.143) The well- informed Neue Zurcher Zeitung(July 1, 1942) seems to have overstressed matters a bit by reporting that "There is unity in Romania on the question of rejecting the political annexation of Transnistria. One seems to count on a future population exchange between the Romanians of Transnistria and the Bessarabian minorities." Other organs, particularly of the Romanian extreme right, such as Porunca Vremii were at the same time arguing for annexation.

17* Deutsche Heeresmission in Romanien, memorandum, n.d., CRS, DHMR 76152. See also von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn,1955, pp.210-212.

18* OKW/Chef Wi Ru Amt. (Gen. Thomas), "Aktennotiz uber Vortrag bei Reichmarschal Goring im Sonderzug am7. Marz 1942, CRS, " Wi/Id 329.

19* Mackensn, dispatch to AA, October9,1942; Killinger, dispatch to AA, November 25, 1942; Weizsacker to legation Bucharest, December 5,1942; Killinger to AA, December 9,1942; Clodius to AA, December 26,1942; all AA, reel 244, frames 160544-49,160775-76,160838-39,160841-42, 160931-38.
20* A side issue contributing to the deterioration between Berlin and Bucharest was discovery by the Romanians that some German agencies (apparently of the SS) "illegally" exported grain by having ethnic Germans buy up grain in Transnistria with funds brought into province surreptitiously by German officials.

20* Antonescu, decree, August 19,1941 (German trans.), forwarded by Romanian Central Staff, August 20,1941, CRS, Koruck 20383/7.

21* One suspects that these figures may be inexact. A census was held in early 1942, but results were never published. Romanian data speak of a density 58,5 per square kilometer.

22* Bucharester Tageblatt, August 20, 1943; Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, Odessa, vol.2,no.19,May 16,1943; Karl J. Muller, "Das Land zwischen Dnjest und Bug," Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung, Rovno, July 26, 1942; "Transnistrien," Mitteilunger der Geographischen Geseltschaft Wien, vol.86, no.4-6, pp. 198-200; HansoJoachim Kaush, "Rumaniens Anteil: Der Aufbau in Transnistrien," Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, Riga, August 17,1943; Der nahe Osten, Istambul, vol.13, no.1, January 1, 1943,p.9, and no.16, August 15, 1943,p.373; Novoe Slovo, Berlib, February 7,1943.

23* LIV. A.K.,Ic, to AOK II, Ic/AO, August 4,1941, CRS, LIV A.K. 15420.9.

24* Bukarest Tageblatt, June 21,1943; AOK 6, AWiFu, "Lagebericht," April 23, 1944,CRS, Wi?id 2.361.

25* Exact statistics on urban population were not published by the Soviet authorities after 1926, except for data on individual large cities, released in 1940. The Romanian and German authorities do not seem to have found authentic material on the subject either. A rough German estimate spoke of 60,000 prewar resident in Tiraspol'- a rather unlikely figure.

26* See e.g., Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, vol.2,no.19.

27* Ortskommandantur Ananjev, "Lage in Ananjev," August 19,1941; O.K. II/939, "Einsatz in Beresowka," August 15,1941; and O.K. II/662, "Einsatz in Tiraspol," August 19,1941; all CRS, Koruck 20383/10.

28* In addition to standard sources on economic geography, see I.G. Farben, "Transnistrien," Microfilm PB 73518, library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

29* Vereinbarung...,"op. cit.; OKW/WFStIV/Verw. (Keitel), "Sicherung und Verwaltung des Gebietes zwischen Dnjestr-Dnjepr," August 24, 1941, CRS, DHMR 76152; OKW/WFSt/IV/Verw.(Warlimont), circular, September 4,1941, CRS, EAP 99/99.

30* Auswartiges Amt (Mackeben) to Stutterheim, November 11,1941, CRS, EPA 99/87.

31* Rosenberg, Vermerk uber Unterredung beim Fuhrer am 14.12.1941." Document 1517-PS, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol.27, p.272.

32* (RMfdbO. and Auswartiges Amt), "Aufzeichnung uber die Grage 'Grenzziehung Transnistrien' and Hand der H.Abt. I vorhandenen Vorgange," October 5,1942, CRS,EAP 99/1143.

33* See sources in note 27 above.

34* AOK II, file on Kodyma, August 1,1941, CRS, AOK II, 35774/6.

35* Beauftrage des Chefs der SiPou. SD beim Bth ruckw.H.Geb,Sud, "Tatigkeit."September 2,1941,CRS, AOK II,35774/6.

36* Koruck 553, "Ubergriffe deutscher Polizei-Organe im rumanischen Verwaltungsgebiet," October 5 and 6,1941, CRS, Koruck 20383/8.

37* See Chapter V,pp.294ff. for a discussion of the Volksdeutsche.

38* Schutzmasnahmen auf Aufbaurbeit der 6./Lehr-Rgt.'Branderburg' z.b.V.800 in den deutschen Siedlungen...(913.8 bis 25.941)" CRS, AOK II,35774/3.

39* "Siecherung und Verwaltung..." op. cit.

40* "Vereinbarung...,"op.cit.

41* Verbindungsstab der deutschen Wehmach in Transnistrien, "Merkblatt,"Febtuary 1942, CRS, DHMR, 29221/1.

42* OKH/HPA to VSt DW Transnistrien, wire December 9,1941, CRS, DHMR 76152.

43* Deutsche Heermission in Rumanien, op. cit.

44* Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, vol.1,no.3, August 2,1942; Bukarester Tageblatt, October 3, 1943.

45* USSR, Extraordinary Commission, "Soobshchenie Cherzvychainoi Komissii po ustanovlenii i rasledovanii zlodeianii: O zlodeianiakh, sovershennikh nemetsko-ruminskimi zakhvatchikami v gorode Odesse i raionakh Odesskoi oblasti," June 13, 1944 (International Militaty Tribunal Document USSR-47, hereafter cited as Document USSR-47.

46* Viejahrsplan, Geschaftsgruppe Ernahrung, Georg Reichart, "Berict," November 15, 1941, CRS, Wi/ID 58.

47* O.K Katarshino, report to Koruck 553, August 20,1941, CRS, Koruck, 20383/10 "Schutzmassnahmen...,"op/ cit.; Beauftragte des Chiefs der SiPo u. SD beim Bhf.H.Geb. Sud, "Bericht uber das Verhalten der rumanischen Besatzungstruppen," September 2,1941, CRS, AOK II, 35774.6; 2./123, "Meldung,"August 8, 1941, CRS, LIV AK 15420/9; LIV A.K., Ic, "Ubergriffe rumanischer Soldaten," August 17, 1941, CRS, LIV A.K.15420/9; Leonid Sobolev, Dorogami pobed v Burareste, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1944; AOK II,IV Wi, "Tatigkeistbericht," August 25, 1941, CRS, Wi/ID 2.515.

48* General von Schobert to Marshal Antonescu, August 15,1941, CRS, Koruck 20383/7.

49* In turn, the Romanians lodged complaints about the Germans whenever they could be shown to have committed abuses, forcibly removed machines, or the like.

50* Dr. Ihnen, OKVR, "Tatigkeitsbericht fur die Zeit vom 15.XI.-15.XII.,"December 15,1941,CRS, DHMR 76152; AOK II, IV, Wi, "Tatigkeitsbericht," August 6, 1941, CRS, Wi/ID 2.580; AOK II,IV Wi, April 15, 1942, CRS, Wi/ID 2.580 (summary report, no title).

51* The following section is based on intervies A, C; Peterle, op.cit; Tverskoi; Manuilov, pp.34-37; Rumanisches Blut fur neue Europa; Bukarester Tageblatt; Werner, op. cit., pp.176-180; Petr Ershov,"Strannyi konets"; Rafael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C. 1944, pp.565ff.

52* Text of the order of Odessa 16,1941 in OVOV, vol.2, p.6.

53* Ershov, op. cit., p3.

54* Ibid.,p.30.

55* Ibid., p.22; Hans Schumacher, "Im Government Transnistrien," Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, October 14, 14,1943.

56* Corriere della Sera, October 21,1941.

57* Peterle, op. cit.; Interview C; Manuilov, pp.37-40.

58* Manuilov, pp.37-40; Peterle, op. cit,; interview E; Abwehrstelle Rumanien, "Bericht uber Wahnechmungen in Odessa," November 4,1941,CRS, DHMR 29222.

59* Valentin Kataev, Za vlast' sovetov, 1949 ed., p.359; interview A; German Consulate Odessa, dispatch, February 26,1943, AA, reel 1273, frames 342512-15.

60* Tverskoi.

61* Manuilov, pp.121-124.

62* Peterle, op. cit., p.27;Document USSR-47; Mathias Carp, Cartea neagra, COSEC, Bucharest,1947, vol.3,p.199;OVOV,vol.2,p.20.

63* As late as November 3,1941,it is true, the Romanian command provided the death sentence for any injury to the occupying personnel, sabotage of their equipment, or concealment of food supplies from them. (Odesskaia gazeta,#4, November 5, 1941). on November 20, after two Communists killed two Romanian soldiers, the number of retaliatory hostages for every terror act was raised to 500. (OVOV, vol.2, p.7) There is no evidence that the decree was actually enforced .
The relative decline of terror after the first months is documented by Soviet postwar fifures. In Golovanevsk rayon, a total about 1,000 persons were liquidated under the occupation. Of these,908 perished before the end of 1941. (Ia.Iarovyi, "Ne zabudim, ne prostim!" Bol'shevitskoe zmamia, May 6,1944; OVOV, vol.2,p.26.

64* See also SD Perort 100; interview C; Koruck 553, op. cit.; O.K. Ananjev, op.cit.; E.1 Mamukov, "Ruminskaia okkupatsia Odessy i Transnistrii v 1941-1944 gg." MS (hereafter cited as Mumukov), Institute for tthe Study of USSR, Munich,1955, pp.19-20.

65* Antonescu decree, August 19,1941.

66* Joseph B.Schechtman, "The Transnistria Reservation," YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, New York,1953,vol.8,p.178; Prost, op. cit., p.163.

67* Manu refugee informants dated the establishment of the Governorship as of early 1943, clearly not awre that it had been functioning elsewhere for ever a year.

68* The substitution of civil for military government did not involve, of course, the complete removal of Romanian troops. Until 1943 one Romanian "fortification division" was stationed in and around Odessa, and three other divisions, formed almost entirely of reservists undergoing training, were stationed in Transnustria, Only in 1943 was a regular division -or rather, the remnants of an infantry division badly mauled at the front-stationed in Transnistria.

69* Gheorghe Alexianu and Mihai Antonescu, Roumanie, Delagrave, Paris,1933.

70* Zierke, op. cit.; interview F; gh, "Transnistrien: Das Werk des Governeurs Alexianu," Das Reich, Berlin, August 1,1943; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, Bechhurst, New York,1953, p.398; Bukarester Tageblatt, October 20,1941; The New Times, April 22,1944.

71* Carp, op. cit., vol.3,p 18; Der Deutsche in Transnistrien,December 13,1942, Bukarester Tageblatt, June 20,1943.

72* Dr.B., "Wiederaufbau in Transnistrien, "Sudost-Echo, Vienna, vol.20, #43, October 23,1942; interview E; Walter Hoffmann, Rumanien von heute, Meiner, Leipxig,1942, p.26.

73* Antonescu, op. cit.; Franz Rieddl, "Aufbau am Dnjest," Berliner Borsen-Zeitung, December 9,1942.

74* There were, roughly from north to south, Mogilev-Podol'ski, Tulchin, Jugastru(Iampol') Balta, Ramnita (Rybnitsz), Colta, Duborary, Anan'ev, Tiraspol', Berezovka, Odessa, Ovidiopol', Ochakov.

75* Carp, op.cit., vol.3, map; "Transnistrien , Bezirke und Kreise," CRS, DHMR, 76152,' Harold Laeuen, Marschall Antonescu, Essener Verlagsanstalt, Essen,1943, pp.169-171; Relazioni Internazionali, November 1,1941, trans. in Rumanisches Blut fur das neue Europa.

76* SD Report 100.

77* Antonescu , op. cit.;"Provisorische Richtlinien.... Beitrag zum Dekret_Gezetz Nr.1,"CRS, AOK II, 22409; Ihnen, op. cit.; Lemkin, op. cit.;pp.229-230; Bukarester Tageblatt, August 20, 1943.
In addition to the government agencies enumerated above, there were of course gendarmerie units-at least one or two Romanian companies per judet, and the native police; there were also intelligence and political police(Suguranta) personnel in Transnistria. Regular military units were still stationed there, though in considerably smaller numbers. The special economic exploitation staff is discussed in the next chapter. Transnistria had a regular inspection commission headed by Dr. Ilie Tabrea; and on April 1,1943, Antonescu named an ad hoc committee to take a 60-day investigation of the Transnistrian administration. A variety of smaller Romanian government and semi-government agencies had a lesser say in the activities of the province. ("Friedliches Odessa," deutsche-Ukraine-Zeitung, January 10,1943; "Provisorische Richtlinien...Beitrag zum Dekret-Gezetz Nr.1," CRS, AOK II, 22409' Bukarester Tagblatt, April 2,1943; interview A; Major Bartch, "Bericht uber die Frontreise des Matschalls Antonescu," June,1942, CRS, DHMR 27638/15; Donauzeitung, December 24, 1942.

78* Ihnen, op.cit.

79* Major Bartsh, "Bericht uber die Frontreise des Marschalls Antonescu," June 1942, CRS, DHMR 27638/15.

80* Interview F.

81* General Petre Dumitrescu "Anweisung," August,1941, CRS, AOK II, 35774/6 (German translation from Romanian original).

82* Ihnen, op. cit.

83* Tverskoi; interview F.

84* Tverskoi; interviews C and F.

85* This may be well illustrated in his tolerance og Gherman Pantea, the Bessarabian mayor of Odessa, and his hostility to the Kiev-trained Bishop Vissarion, who advocated a more unselfish "pro-population" line (See below, pp.230-231).

86* Rumanisches Blut, pp.173-175; Das Reich, op. cit.' interview F; Tverskoi.

87* Bukarester Tageblatt, June 1,1943,;Manuilov,pp.137-138.

88* Hans-Joachim Kausch, "Bericht uber dire Reise nach der Ukraine...., June 26,1943, document Occ E 4-11, YIVO,pp.18-20.

89* Bukarest Tageblatt, October 22,1941.

90* Carp, op. cit., vol.3, p.149.

91* Interviews A and C.

92* Manuilov, pp.56-58.

93* Manuilov, pp.62-66; Peterle, op. cit.; interview D.

94*On the other hand, he was no important enough even to be mentioned in any of the standard studies of Bessarabia after World War I.

95* Interview C; Tverskoi.

96* Interviews A, C, and E; Document USSR-47, Bukarester Tageblatt, November 2,1943.

97* These included the directorates for Administration, Finance, Engineering and Technics, Culture and Education, Housing, Land, Inventory, Electric Power Stations, Transportation, Sanitation, Parks and gardens, Vital Statistics, Water Supply, and Social Security. After a year, a separate Directorate of Religious. Affairs was added.

98* Manuilov, pp.67-81; interviews A and D; Odessa ,Serviciul de presa si propaganda a Municipiului Odesa, Ein Jahr rumanische Verwaltung,1943, abstact in CRS,EAP 99/87.

99* Manuilov,p.72.

100* Tverskoi; interview D; Ershov,op.cit., p.39.

101* Kataev, in the first edition of his novel on wartime Odessa, reproduces the text of Order #88 by the mayor, dated April6, 1943, strictly forbidding the sale and consumption in public of semechki, the favorite sunflower seeds, which used to be eaten-and spat out-all over Odessa. The fine for first offenders was set at 10 to 100 marks, for repeated from 50 to 500 marks.(Valentin Kataev, Za vlast' sovetov, Detizdat, Moscow,1949,p.502) The text of the decree is omitted from the later, revised edition.

102* Interview A.

103* Bukarester Tageblatt, January 22, February 24, and June 21,1943; interview C; Molva,#159, June 18,1943, AA, reel 1273, frames 342476-79.

104* German Consulate, Odessa op. cit.

105* SD Report 133, November 14,1941.

106* Kausch , " Bericht..."pp.18-19.

107* Document USSR-47.

108* Vladimir Petrov, Retreat from Russia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950, pp.204-205.

109* Richard E. Lauterbach, These Are the Russians, Harper & Bros., New York,1945, p.79.

110* Alexadru Boldur, Romanii si stramisii lor in istoria Transnistriei, rev. ed., Liga culturala, Iasi, 1943; Nicilae M.Popp, Transnistria: incercare de monografie regionale, Dacia Traiana, Bucharest,1943; Ernst Bauer, :Das rumanische Transnistrien," Neue Ordnung, Zagreb,#57, August 16,1942; Transnistria, Bucharest, August-Nivember,1941, cited in Ostland, vol.20, #24, December 15,1941, pp.428-432; Karl H.Theil, "Rumanen jenseits des Djestr," Volkischer Beobachter, July 23,1941, Iancu Nistor, Aspecte geopolitice si culturale Transnistria, Dacia Traiana, Bucharest, 1942.

111* Bukarester Tageblatt, July 9,1943; Riedl, op. cit.; Prof. S. Mehedinti, Institutul Stiintific Roman transnnistrian, "Dreptatea noastra," Universul, Bucharest, July 1,1942. See also Nation und Staat, Vienna,vol.14, 1941, p.429, and vol.15, 1942, p.236.

112* Interview D.

113* Romanisches Blut, p.165, interview F;Ostland, vol.20, #24, December 15, 1941.
A far more likely figure was that given by Romanian daily in March, 1943. It reported that, as of the summer of 1942, 23,000 Moldavian families had been located in Soviet territory east of the Bug (under German occupation). A group of these had been made to make records of their folk music "in order to preserve proof of the permanence of the Romanian element in the distant East" (Universul, March 15,1943).

114* The head of the registration commission, a demographer, Anton Golopentia, became head of the Romanian Statistical Directorate after the war, when its incumbent, Sabin Manuila, a follower of Maniu, escaped abroad. Golopentia "disappeared within year; in about 1948, his wife was invited to identify his body at the Bucharest morgue. Romanian exiles have assumed that he met his death largely as a result of his wartime "registration" activity in the USSR, where he zealously converted Soviet citizen into Romanians.

115* Schectman, op.cit., p.179; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, October 23, 1942. See also A Dol'nik, Bessarabiia pod vlastiu rumynskikh boiar, Cospolitizdat, Moscow, 1945, pp.171-172.

116* Gheorghe, op. cit., p.192.

117* Alfred Sztuka, "Wirstschafliche Grundlagen... Transnistriens," Osteuropa-Jahrbuch, Breslau, 1942 pp 211-213.

118* Peterle, op. cit.; interviews A and C.

119* Ibid.

120* Not surprisingly, German reports commonly insist that the population preferred the Germans to Romanians. While under certain conditions this may have been true, the consistent and consistent nature of such comments must be written off as unobjective.

121* Interviews A, C and E; Tverskoi; Manuilov, p.71.

122* Peterle, op. cit.; interview C; AA, "Ein Gewahrsmann berichter," December 31,1942, forwarded to POL XIII, AA, reel 5079, frames E 292536ff; Sdf von Berg to Sturmbannfuhrer von Kuensberg, January,1942, "Lageberich aus Odessa," AA, reel 2066, frames 448876-80; Manuilov, p.7.

123* Manuilov,pp.63, 86-88.

124* Interviews B and E.

125* Manuilov, p.137; Peterle, op. cit.; "Ein Gewahrsmann berichter, op. cit.; interview D.