CHAPTER V

Politics: Attitudes, Ideas, and Action

Major Trends of Attitudes and Behavior

It is appropriate to place the discussion of Transnistria's political life after the discussion of its economic and cultural pursuits .It was much less important. The reasons for this can be identified . At first the problems of existing at all-in view of all the shortages-made any systematic attention to government organization or to political programs or theories unlikely. Only in a minority did the very chaos engendered by the change of authorities seem to have been prompted a desire for political action. This may be attributed, in part, to the long years of Soviet rule; most citizens-especially, the youngest ones-found themselves politically confused-they were unaccustomed to thinking in terms of political alternatives.

Moreover, the Romanians provided another compelling reason for political inactivity. Their earliest directives forbade all manifestations of political activity. Because of the police, censorship, and the limitations imposed on contact with the world abroad, it was nearly impossible to voice or try out political ideas in free discussion or to gain facts and ideas from intensive contact with foreign groups or publications. But in Odessa there was little inclination even to try such things. To questions that implied a political outlook the ordinary citizen would make the counter query "What's in for me? or "What's the use?" The occupying authorities also felt that fear of Soviet retaliation in case the Red Army returned - a feeling widespread both in the summer of 1941 and in the last year of the occupation-inhibited the expression of political sentiments.1*

Public interest and behavior were directed in the opposite direction. Most people in Odessa-and on this refugees and contemporary German reports concur-preferred to forget about politics; their attitude was "We want to live," ( and live comfortably, securely, and pleasantly). Another report pointed out that, when Romanian propaganda took up the theme "Enjoy yourself," it rode the crest of popular wave and became effective.2* In a way this was a political program, but it was not perceived as that. The dominant view was "Po-dalshe ot politiki": away as far as possible from politics. In deliberately steering clear of political "involvement," the majority appear to have been motivated principally by fear, fear both of Soviet and of Axis action, they had learned at a bitter price, was a risky and unrewarding business.3*

Yhere was in Odessa, it is true, a small group of intellectuals who wasted time in hailing the new order. A few self-styled activities got signatures of local citizens to a pompous address which was handed to the authorities. Some did so out of "careerist" motives; others were sincere in their support. The son of a rich merchant, who had lost all his possessions in 1918, went among university professors urging them to back the "Christian" Romanian against the Bolsheviks and to express their willingness to collaborate. There were a number of signatures, but most of those approached declined to sign-either from fear or, as informants insist, from the sense that such an appear was "indecent" A number signed out of political naivete and within a few months came to regret the support they had given; among these was Professor Varneke, the theater specialist. The address was printed with all signatures, in the first issue of Odesskaia Gazeta.4* This kind of effort was, however, quite exceptinal.5* There exists, of course, a basic difficulty in gauging political attitudes, both at the time and, even more, at present, years after events. As has been pointed out in other studies of Soviet behavior, and has been found true of Soviet behavior under the German occupation, there was a remarkable gap between attitude and behavior.6* The rather well-informed German consul general in Odessa complained, in early 1943, in discussing the existence of pro-Soviet sentiments in the population. "The faces don't betray it, and the words cannot be believed."7*

Indeed, the basic ustanovka (attitude), discussed among residents of Odessa, was that one must "operate" and pretend-in effect, stay out of trouble, and by hook and crook make the most or best of the situation; there was little concern over arriving at a correspondence of pretense and substance, and for the morals of personal behavior.8* The political allegiance of the population-overt or genuine-was inevitably affected by external events. The course of the war itself was of tremendous importance, for many a citizen felt that truth (or at least safety) was on the side of the stronger battalions. Such an attitude was nowise tantamount to inertia; people who make choices made them, and not always in the line of least resistance. In the fall of 1941, public respect for Soviet authority had broken down. At least the overt tokens of allegiance were transferred to the new order by the major social strata with a minimum of soul-searching. This happened mainly because Soviet controls and authority seemed to have collapsed so completely, and because it was generally felt that the Romanian occupation- unlike the German(though even here feeling were mixed)-was a transitory phenomenon that could not possibly by permanent-it was an aberration of history and one had accept it as one accepted and adjusted to droughts wars, and pestilence.
The overwhelming majority were willing, in the fall of 1941, to wait and see what another regime had to offer and to make the best of it. One is tempted to maintain the most of intelligentsia-the evidence on urban workers is too inadequate for one to hazard any guess-were prepared to make a genuine break and effect a lasting divorce from the Soviet cause. This did not mean theey endorsed the Romanian regime.

The first reaction to the Romanians, as has been seen, was cool if not hostile, Changes in Transnistrian attitudes fall into three distinct periods: (1) the initial months of shortages at terror, strangeness and privation; (2) the middle period, roughly the year 1942 and part 1943, when economic life and civil government ere more stabilized and there was greater plenty and greater security-a time when the relationship between victors and vanquished was closer; and (3) he final months, almost the entire last year of the occupation, in which the Romanians' weakness and corruption reached new extremes, the military situation turned against them, relations deteriorated, and everything favored the people's divorcing themselves from their temporary masters.

Political activity was minimal not only in the first period but also in the second. Only the final phase seems to have witnessed an upsurge of political life. The most acceptable explanation of this seems to be that toward the end Romanian controls weakened to a point where they permitted what they had earlier barred. Probably there also had to be a time lag, a relative stabilization of day-to day life and economic conditions before one segments of the population moved to the next, and more sophisticated stage; a search for political answers. A parallel development took place in German-held areas of the USSR. The rising tide of patriotism or nationalism which engulfed Soviet-held areas of USSR-whatever its motivations and limits -could not but constitute a challenge and evoke certain echoes in Transnistria. Many in Odessa were aware of relaxations of the Soviet side; rumors of even more far-reaching reform circulated frequently; and the heightened political interest in 1943 represented, as it were the question, addressed to the Romanian authorities, "Can you match this?"
That political activity came to the surface in 1943 must no lead one to assume that there were no political attitudes earlier. They were revealed in tell-tale ways. In fall of 1941, there were some instances of local residents denouncing pro-Soviet saboteurs to the Germans and Romanians, though at times ( a German report stated) "initially only under pressure." While (as will seen in the following chapter) Soviet partisans had virtually no popular support, commonly residents would not think of turning them in, so long they personally were not threatened by failing to do so. Nor would the people turn in escapees from the Red Army who had failed to register with the Transnistriaan authorities, or escapees from Romanian prisoner-of-war camps. Curiously, even collaborators who accepted the new order and benefited from it would indignantly balk at the idea of turning in their fellow-citizen-svoik- to the authorities-oni.9*

Collaboration was thus not necessarily an index to attitudes. Yet it appear to have been true during the first period-though not during the second-that the fear of Soviet retaliation and fear of an unknown new regime combined to deter many intellectuals from seeking or accepting positions in the administration. Though refusal out of fear of consequences did not necessarily imply political hostility, there were cases where it was an element: at least two teachers refused to work "for the Romanians" as a matter of principle, even though they thereby risked their personal well-being. Cases of people refusing not all work, but to teach a particular "absurd" thesis or to carry out a specific "revolting" ordinance became more numerous, and some were fined or ousted from jobs. Refusal to collaborate for obviously political reasons, was rare among all groups so long as the Romanians were in full control. It is a curious indication of the political horse-sense of the population that refusal to work with the Germans was far more widespread and emphatic. In May,1942, for instance, the German Economic Mission in Odessa tried to talk some Russian specialists at the hydrometeorological institute into working for the Reich. To their surprise they found that "willingness to enter into German service is very small." And , when, in the spring of 1944, the Germans wrested the administration of Odessa from the Romanians just before the final collapse, the popular antagonism was so striking as to frighten the Wehrmacht authorities: the city seemed to have died out overnight; stores closed down; supplies were no longer for salt; and people became uncommunicative. Part of this was due, no doubt, to the imminence of the Soviet return, but it also reflected the almost universal judgment that the Germans were far more brutal and hostile then the Romanians: whenever Romanians and Germans wwwere compared, the Transnistrian population congratulated itself on having the Romanians.10*

Political factors entered the thinking of that section of intelligentsia that helped restore a modicum of government. During the era of "stabilization," some institutional framework was felt necessary as a matter of "order"-one needed some ustroistvo (institutions) to know what one could do and what one could not, a system of government that would make it clear who had what authority and who was responsible for what. In large measure, participation in Transnistrian government represented not a political judgment but a search for security and order. The specific political structure elicited considerable discussion, but it excited little passion and investigation. People accepted the fact that "some authority" was inevitable; since the whole system seemed so transitory it mattered little just what the rules were as long as they were reasonably consistent and fair.11*

The 1942-1943 era of relative comfort and security produced a minimum of political activity; it seemed to extend little beyond the publication of interminable memoirs of former labor camp inmates or anti- Bolshevik editorials of the orthodox, pro-Axis variety. Whatever else there was took place beneath the surface. Yet, apparently a deterioration of faith in the new system set in, or continued. One informant has seriously suggested the intelligentsia in Odessa increasingly had the feeling that " it had made the Romanians into conquerors and the Romanians into...victims"; the convenient (and not entirely untrue) rationale depended on the Romanians behaving as victims; their failure to do so tended to intensify discontent. The greatest impetus to reassessment of allegiance, however, was the military about-face. The echo of Stalingrad reverberated throughout Odessa. Germans reports speak rather openly of general panic in the city, reflected in the drastic rise of prices on the market, the preparations some officials made to evacuate their families and belongings westward, and the beginning of attempts by some residents to "whitewash" themselves by co=operating with the few Soviet agents and partisans around Odessa. It is here that the third, final stage began.12*

After Stalingrad "no one in his right mind" believed that the Romanians would be able to hold Transnistria indefinitely. Soon the government began making concessions with the intent of binding the population more closely to the Romanian chariot. As frequently the case, however, concessions merely whetted appetites and, taken as an indication that the authorities were "on the skids," provoked further alienation. Reports of Soviet victories and reforms meanwhile filtered through, and many who had high hopes for the future of Transnistria now looked forward to the Soviet return as a "lesser evil."

Many, it is true, did not take an anti-Romanian stand because Soviet rule was even more unpalatable to them, particularly if they had been drawn into the whirlpool of collaboration. The tragedy from the point of view of the "liberal intelligentsia," was the absence of any third course of third force. The only choice was between Axis and Soviets.

Even those, however, who would not act or take sides against the Romanians-and probably they were in the majority-felt a certain alienation that transformed what had been latent resistance into more overt opposition. In schools, students vied with each other to demonstrate their politically-determined orneriness.

In private conversations many who had never admired the Bolshevik order now suddenly found that that under Soviet rule the absence of social distinction between white-collar and manual workers had really been an appealing though unnoticed fact. In the country, peasants watching the planes go over would again speak of the Red Air Force as svoi-"our" planes-as they would not have two years earlier. And when, in late 1943, the Transnistrian administration began to ask for the names of employees wishing to be evacuated in the case of crisis, the majority even of collaborators (though most exposed to Soviet persecution) refused to sign up. In people's eyes, Romanian rule suddenly became a symbol of futility, obsolescence, and injustice, and the Red Army appeared in moments of wishful thinking as the People under Arms, protagonists of a national crusade, and bearers of a new and appealing sage.13*

Not every citizen of Transnistria underwent such a metamorphosis of opinion. A minority of collaborators-primarily white-collar workers-(perhaps rationalizing self-interest) were determined to stick to the regime that employed them; other did not want to believe that the Red Army could ever return and sought solace in rumors of secret weapons and British landings.

The basic pattern, however, appear to have been substantially the same for all social and age groups: after the first cooling in 194, a certain relaxation and accommodation, and then a new alienation. As suggested earlier, pro-Communists seemed to be most numerous among the youngest, and collaborators most numerous to the age group between 40 and 50; the oldest group, at least of intellectuals, tended to be most reversed and perhaps animated by Russian nationalist sentiments and more rigid standards of morality, refused to engage in "wanton collaboration" The spirit of alienation seems to have struck the workers earliest - not so much for political as for economic reasons-and the peasantry last and least-perhaps for a combination of political and economic reasons. Pro-Soviet nostalgia in general appears to have been distinctly weaker in the countryside than in the city.

The Communists

An issue on which the ordinary citizen was forced to make a personal political choice was presented by the Communists who remained behind . Some Communist Party members and ex-officials had managed to survive. It is true that the Party brass had been evacuated and that officials of rayon committees and primary organizations who stayed went underground. Yet there were some people who concealed their Communist past and some who had been, or claimed to have been, no more than nominal Communists.14*

There were, of course, some denunciations of Communists to the new authorities-inspired by political zeal, a desire to ingratiate oneself with the police, or a wish to settle old accounts. By and large, however rank-and-file Party members were left alone. Non-party members were hesitant about hiring them-partly from the fear of the Romanians, and partly from fear of running into Soviet agents among them; but there was no mass hostility toward individual Communist Party members, or members of the Komsomol.15*

Romanian policy toward the Communists was rather ambiguous. Once the initial wave of terror subsided, it did not go so far as to exterminate them, as the Nazis at times suggested. A number of former Communist Party members even worked in various official capacities under the new regime. All Communists, including Komsomol members, were required to register (and stay registered in case of movements); they had to check once a week with the local police uchastok (precinct); and they were formally barred from employment in government or municipal enterprises-but this was not stringently enforced. A few "active" Communists were put in jail, but except for agents and partisans, prosecution of them was always nil. The extent to which they continued in the open without any special onus and the extent to which they were anxious no profess their change of heart are best illustrated by the Party organization, 42 men strong, of the Odessa trolley line workers. In 1942, the group volunteered (on those initiative is unknown) to repair crosses on the Odessa churched when the latter were reopened; but this the former Party cell received an expression of gratitude from the Romanian church authorities.

The Romanians began liberalizing their policy toward party members in the summer of 1943. Antonescu's decree of June 15,1943, removed some restrictions. One summer Sunday , the commandant of the Odessa military district, general Gheorghiu, had- ex-Communist and others convene at a mass rally on Kulikovoe Pole, and announced their release. No longer were they subjected to any registration procedures or job discrimination. The move, it is unanimously reported, made a distinctly favorable impression on the population. Interestingly enough, there is no evidence that a single one of those thus unleashed joined the Red partisans.

There were , no doubt, men and women in Odessa who considered themselves Communists throughout. There were those who heatedly defended dialectical materialism over the kitchen table and fervently prayed in church on Sunday. There were those who simply could not free themselves from the ways of reasoning and responding that had become so habitual over a period of years. But the tenacity of doctrine, per se, was surprisingly small. Practical experience rather than theory guided and determined action and allegiance. And if evidence is needed to prove the ability of the Soviet population to discriminate, to accept some things and reject others, a striking demonstration of it is seen in the spree of destructiveness right after the Soviets left: it is reported that almost everywhere statues of Lenin remained standing while those of Stalin were knocked down.16*

Ersatz Politics

In the absence f opportunities for overt political activity, political opinions and attitudes manifested themselves indirectly in what may be called an Ersatz politics. Rumors were one such substitute, and while their tenor and content seem impossible to reconstruct at this date, those who were there concur in stressing their great frequency, their relative reliability, and their ability to mirror crucial issues of the day-at times merely reflecting the thirst for and the desire to transmit news; at other times suggesting slogans or formulas for "solving" problems.17* Almost in the same category are political jokes which seemed to flourish from mid-1942 on, largely at the expense of the Romanians.18* This may have been a complex compensation mechanism that permitted the "occupied" to feel superior to the victors. It is interesting to note, however, that no political jokes have ever been reported from the entire German-occupied area of the USSR. There, the dominant atmosphere was too inauspicious for rumor.19*

As has been suggested, cultural activity-be it as teachers, newspapermen, or as actors-was a form of, or rather a surrogate for, political activity, for many intellectuals.20* The university's request to be governed by the by-laws that gave it autonomy was symbolic and fraught with political implications (see above, Chapter IV). The very concentration of intellectual endeavor in cultural pursuits, broadly viewed, was due, in some measure, to the political fields' being closed. "Cultural" work was personally honorable, useful, and socially respectable, through the press, the classroom, on the stage one could help perpetuate Russian culture, values, and traditions.

The church, too, was a form of political expression. It was used, it is true, primarily by the spokesmen of monarchism; the extent to which the monarchists monopolized the church repelled some of the "liberal intelligentsia" and made them desist from church attendance altogether. In some ways, however, the church represented a generalized anti-Bolshevism, and did not require or suggest more specific political ideas. For some, more than any other of the permitted institutions, the church provided the best symbol of a Russia purified of Bolshevism.21*

Neither of the two emigre movements that had some support in other occupied areas-the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Russian Solidarists, discussed below-made much headway in Odessa. Once again, many who backed them seemed to be searching for a political solution not too closely identified with either Romanians or Soviets. This quest for "third solutions" produced one project that was unique to Odessa. As early as January 1942, a German SS officer, who wanted the Reich to take over Transnistria from the Romanians, reported that it had been rumored that Antonescu would give Odessa to Germans "as a Christmas present," and that people were discussing the possibility of making Odessa a "Free City"-like Hanseatic city, in recent times, Danzig.

This idea had a history. Odessa had been made a free port in the early 19th century, largely to attract foreign trade. During the Civil War, the idea was revived by Ukrainian nationalists, who faces with anti-separatist sentiment in Odessa, promoted the Free City idea as a compromise: at least the port would not then be an independent Russian enclave in the Ukraine. In 1942, the idea again gained currency, especially among white-collar workers who had feelings of guilt about working for the Romanians. It provided a way of avoiding Romania and German as well as Soviet control. It appealed to the romantic, to local patriots, and to those who felt guilty about their lack of Soviet patriotism. Not seriously considered by the Romanians at any time, the idea remained alive, and at least one informant-rather given to enthusiastic espousals-insists that, in 1942, it would have "received a majority vote" if freely voted upon in Odessa.22*

Program for Tomorrow

None of the published sources and none of the informants suggest that there was anything vaguely resembling an articulate political party or program evolved in Transnistria. In some measure, to be sure, this was because the Romanians prohibited political activity. Yet, even in private conversations, according to informants, its intelligentsia-perhaps the most likely locus for embryonic movement or formulation of goals-apparently did not discuss anything that could be called a program. It is true that most of the intelligentsia remaining in Odessa were specialist in fields other than the social sciences and had no direct experience in government or systematic training in political theory except for dialectical materialism. This was not peculiar to Odessa; under Soviet conditions, whenever Communist leadership was removed there would inevitably be a shortage of people experienced in the field of government.

There is no indication of what kind of future Russia the people hoped to see. The only available evidence-save the peasants' demands for particular reforms, discussed elsewhere-comes from a few dominant concepts "in the air" which, they felt, would have been accepted by most of the intelligentsia. It is easier to identify the areas of rejection than concepts positively espoused, Rather clearly, terror of any sort-Soviet or non-Soviet-was rejected. As a political system, fascism had exceedingly few advocates. Monarchism-whether in the old tsarism garb or a constitutional form-was considered virtually unthinkable, "impossible," except for some older individuals. "Capitalism" had assumed a sufficiently negative coloration in the course of years, and its establishment seemed economically so impossible, given the Soviet legacy, that well-nigh nobody would have accepted it or even propounded it as the basis of the new order. Only two positive concepts seem to have had real currency: the idea of popular sovereignty and the concept of parliamentary government. Beyond that, the political image becomes blurred and divided.23*

There seemed so exit widespread satisfaction with the renewed contact (however abnormal the means by which it was achieved) with the "West". All informants and some contemporary sources express gratification about it and point to it with pride.24* Consulates, trade ties, mail, trips, university exchanges, guest performers-all this seemed to put Odessa back on the map, seemed to show that it had rejoined the human race. This anti-isolationism was apparently pronounced in all occupied territory (perhaps more pronounced in Odessa than in less cosmopolitan cities) and gave rise to the expression, cited independently by several informants, zapakhlo zaadom - "one could again smell the West".

Such a feeling did not prelude the rise of some Soviet or Russian patriotism. What is surprising , however, is how little patriotism there was, less than anywhere in the USSR-both Soviet and German-held. No adequate explanation can be advanced . It is only a suggestion, but perhaps the reason is that, in both Soviet and German-occupied areas, patriotism was a lubricant, an incentive, a rationale for action against o foe: the objective situation, with iron logic, invited a fight. Nor so in Transnistria; here the climate of public life was far more neutral, more denatured, more reconciled; here the people seemed tired of banners, slogans, and political emotions, and seemed to prefer a a comfortable and secure life. Perhaps one other hypothesis should be added : the unusually strong "local patriotism" and feeling among Odessites of being an in-group displaced and partly obviated the all-Soviet patriotism which emerged elsewhere. Such an argument, however, can easily be overstressed, and the virtual absence of tangible patriotism in Odessa must remain something of a mystery. Only in the last half year or so of the occupation does any evidence of Soviet(or Russian)patriotism appear in conversations and political anticipation.

A consistent attitude toward state property or state management is equally difficult to uncover. On the one hand, there seems to have been no hostility toward government ownership of heavy industry, public utilities, and other large economic enterprises; on the other, there was distinct opposition to state direction of agriculture (particularly in the form of kolkhozes) and to state monopoly to retail trade and other forms of business, as discussed in another chapter. Thus the drive for personal profits from economic activity seemed to co-exist with another set of values that accepted government ownership, particularly of "greater," "heavier" branches of the economy, as more equitable. A positive image of the successful businessman, the individual entrepreneur or storekeeper using his talents, now unshackled from Soviet restriction, developed, but it co-existed with Soviet stereotypes-reinforced by experiences under Transnistrian rule-of capitalism abuse, corruption, and injustice. One might suggest that the occupation was too short to permit the crystallization of any real formula; the interim concept, if there was a dominant one, was probably that of a mixed economy.25*

Finally , one should mention, as a fringe kind of political concept, the peculiarly strong sensitivity of the people to injuries to the individual's dignity-a sensitivity equally strong in German occupied areas. Soviet rule had apparently sensitized Soviet citizens to react strongly to corporal punishment and other forms of personal humiliation and abuse. Soviet indoctrination about the dignity of man had been accepted and was turned against abuses perpetrated by the Soviet regime itself. The same sensitivity inspired some of the Russian resentment of Romanian abuses and terror; it also contributed to the high value placed on the "individual" by the Russians under non-Soviet conditions, when a different hierarchy of values began to appear.

None of this, however, adds up to a political program. The emergence of some conventional political activity came only as a concomitant of the weakening of Romanian rule and the appearance of Russia emigre representatives.

Emigre politics

In politics a disproportionate influence was wielded by two numeriacally small categories: the so-called byvshie luidi ("former people, who had status or wealth before 1917)m and the returning emigres. Their influence was due, one suspects, to the fact that they were more articulate in formulating their views, that they remembered concretely actual alternatives to Bolshevism, and that they were now politically more secure the rest of the population; they could therefore in leisure and safety better afford to devote time and effort to political activity. Moreover, many were professional and anti-Communists and as such far more sensitized to political concepts and nuances and far more likely to have their favorite brand of patented reforms than average Soviet citizens. The "former people" tended to dig up genuine or spurious old titles of nobility, awards and decorations dating back to the tsarist era, and other claims to status and distinction. The Romanians seemed to honor these claims; probably because they regarded the :formers" as politically more reliable, they gave them certain privileges in securing apartments, employment, and pensions.26*

The returning old emigres were few in number. They were mostly Russian who had gone abroad and settled in Bessarabia, or other parts of Romania, or Bulgaria and now desired to "return home" or, in some instances, to profit from their linguistic and other skills. The Russian emigration in the Balkans, and particularly in Romania, was a mixed for. While some had resisted Romanization, many had changed they outlook, language, even their names. By and large, the e Romanians had suppressed Russian schools, church, and cultural activities within their borders. And among those who were legally permitted to enter Transnistria were, perhaps by an unavoidable process of selection, a great many whose cultural or political standards were none too high and who were apologists for fascism; most of the rest were politically rather reticent.

It is not surprising that they by and large evoked hostility in the local population-more then the Bessarabian influx did. They seemed to have "learned nothing and forgotten nothing"; those who had once belonged to the privileged classes now sought to reclaim their former factories or land or dwellings, they bitterly disappointed those residents of Odessa who had looked to them for political guidance; "For long time we, having lived thirty years under Communist tyranny, had the conviction that our emigre compatriots...represented a powerful force in the free countries." It was a shock, to learn they did not, and that their political positions were the subject of controversy; "this...stopped some of us from assuming a clear-cut political position."

There were exceptions. Artists were welcomed back with genuine pleasure: they had something to give and demanding nothing unfair in return. Vronskii, Likovskaia were in this category; so was Petr Leshechenko, the night-club singer, who enjoyed considerable popularity. Nor did the hostility extend to the children of old emigres who returned to study Odessa; in the country, there was a sense of quiet, dignified pride in their having returned. But mostly there was disappointment and hostility. The refugee novelist P.Ershov, in later reconstructing Transnistrian life, picked as his prototype of the emigre the schoolmate of his hero: a lazy barin (lord), he makes a decidedly poor impression on the Odessa residents who once knew him; his snobbery, his self-advertising, and his utter lack of sense of social justice and "equality" arouse the indignation of the younger set.

Some emigres, of course, were personally quite well liked. Some baffled the local residents by their effrontery and the shameless way they promoted their own interests, either bu their own efforts or with the support of the authorities(usually gained through some well -placed bribes). Some emigres demanding their property back were rebuffed by the primaria, and Odessites apparently fully backed the primaria. In mid-1943, the new Antonescu decree sanctioned the return of houses to their former owners; a few emigres had deeds or other proof and managed to have their homes restored to them. Thanks to pull and bribery, the daughter of rich merchant, who had meanwhile died got back a seven-story apartment house her father had owned until 1917; she even managed ( a mere six months before the retreat) to sell it to a Romanian. Such operations evoked more bewilderment and wonderment than enmity. The restoration of landed estates and industrial facilities caused resentment, but the return of living quarters commercial sites was accepted.27*

It was inevitable that the right wing of the Russian emigration tended to have something of a monopoly. Middle-of the -road and leftist refugee groups had scarcely any following in Eastern and Central Europe; and those few who lived in Axis Europe (for instance, Prague or Paris) had no way of publicizing their views or contacting their fellow-citizen on occupied soil. The first refugees to reach Odessa were -and local residents guessed this with a curiously keen instinct-often agents of the Gestapo and SD or the Romanian Siguranta. A few agents claimed an affiliation with emigre political grouping, but this was often purely nominal.28* One Savchenko, for instance, claimed to be an old army captain, and pretended to be working to create a Russian :youth movement"; he turned out to be recruiting personnel for a German intelligence organization. Though some individuals undoubtedly worked with him, the urban youth, which he aimed at, rejected him.29*

Though apparently not until 1943, refugees representing General Abramov, the head of the Bulgarian branch of tyhe ROVS (Russkii obchchevoinskim souiz), a rather extensive military organization of "White" Army veterans (repeatedly the target of Soviet infiltration) made some bona fide contacts with Odessa residents. The contacts, however, appear to have been sporadic and for information only.

A bit more substantial were the endeavors of the NTS, the organization of Russian Solidarists. A younger, more "activist" group, the NTS had a fascist-corporate ideology and a number of capable members; it sought to enlist in its ranks those with official positions-mayors, chiefs of police, editors, or interpreters - in the occupied parts of the USSR. To most residents of Transnistria-as elsewhere in the USSR-NTS was entirely unknown. Only a select few, generally leading collaborators or university professors, were approached by them and contact was made through personal acquaintances. In mid-1943 Nikolai Fevr, a journalist on the staff of the Berlin Novoe Slovo and the NTS member, visited Odessa for nearly two months (unfortunately his memoirs on this period have never been published). Popular in some intellectual circles, he spent some time recruiting adherents. However, the official position called for circumspection, particularly since the rift between the German officials and the nationalistic NTS was growing.30* Two NTS men, apparently from Yugoslavia (where the NTS had had its center) approached a certain professor in the fall of 1943 in a spirit of romantic subversiveness. The professor recalls that he had never previously heard of them and that they seemed immature-half-childish, fanatical. They asked for help in staging a mass rally-which was never held-and in distributing brochures.

In late 1943, a small youth delegation came to Odessa-either from Yugoslavia or Bulgaria; it was impossible to determine which. The Russian emigres, or children of emigres, who made it up called themselves vladimirovtsy- it has been impossible to trace or identify them further, but the name suggests a Monarchy-cum-Orthodoxy orientation. One refugee from Odessa, who was then "in the know" on primaria affairs, writes:

According to my information, this entire group was recruited by the Gestapo (probably not strictly correct, but used as a genetic term for German intelligence organs ) for surveillance and agents' work in occupied territory. Strange as it may seem, this....(group)established contact with the few NTS members who resided in Odessa.

It is even alleged that a number of the group, Verbitski, now dead, was specially charged by the NTS to expose anti-NTS Russian even by means of provocation-an allegation which, however, cannot be verified.31*

The vladimirovtsy are nowhere else mentioned and were unknown to other informants. It seems possible that the author confused them with a group elsewhere reported as petrovtsy, known formally as the Organizatsii molodiozhi imeni Petra Velikogo, the Peter the Great Youth Organization associated with ROVS. If so, this is probably, the very group of those twenty-two men who were the subject of considerable emigre controversy because of their chief, captain Klavdii Aleksandrovich Foss. Foss was Abramov's aide in Sofia. In the pre-war ROVS he was the part of so-called "Inner Line," the medium and object of widespread Soviet infiltration move; in late 1938 Abramov's son, whom Foss had apparently recruited, was proved to be a Soviet agent. During the war Foss and his group moved from Sofia to Nikolaev, where they worked for a German intelligence agency-apparently naval intelligence, though this cannot be established with certainty.32*

The efforts of another group of old emigres, the so-called Schutzkorps (guard corps) had some tangible results. The Schtzkorps was a military organization, consisting of three, later five, regiments of old emigres residents in Yugoslavia; in 1941 it volunteered to help the Germans liberate Russia from Bolshevism. On the whole they were a rather reactionary lot, intrigue-ridden, composed mostly of men in their fifties and sixties. The Germans initially sanctioned the use of the corps for guard service; later made an anti-partisan combat unit, it was repeatedly thrown into action against Serbian guerrillas.33* In 1943 it became a regular formation of the Wehrmacht and allowed to extend its recruitment to other countries, including Romania. As a by-product of this permission, in December,1943, the Schutzkorps opened a recruitment bureau in Odessa; the former Cafe Libman, a popular and centrally-located spot, was assigned to the bureau and the old Russian (tsarist) tricolor flag was displayed in its windows.

The flag and the way the office appeared aroused considerable interest in town. This was, after all, the first endeavor of this sort, and the only in Soviet territory. But curiosity almost at once turned to hostility. The office lasted only a few months and in that short time had several chairmen, who were relieved one after another. One of its "chiefs of staff" was Sr.Lt. Zalevsky, a typical old-guard professional military man with monocle and stick, who "dealt with volunteers as tsarists officers had with their valets.

Odessa officials helped get Zalevsky recalled.

The Schutzkorps recruiters seemed to be offering a third solution, a way of avoiding both the Bolsheviks, who were just then advancing at a menacing pace, and the Germans. Informants agree that those who enlisted did so only because they had completely failed in Odessa-there were relatively few of these-or because they feared the returning Soviets. Since the corps took only volunteers with no next of kin, men with families and belongings could not use the Schutzkorps as a way of getting to Yugoslavia. Still, a few did join, though apparently none of them out of genuine conviction. Their experience with the Schutzkorps proved execrable; the old White officers looked on the "Soviet scum" with disdain and scorn. A few volunteers fled from Serbia back to Odessa.34*

Vladimir Petrov, a refugee who passed through Odessa on his way westward, describes in his memoirs his encounter at the Odessa. "Recruiting Post for Russian Volunteers" with an officials who, a year earlier, had been chief of police under the Germans in the North Caucasus.

"Is the recruiting successful here?" (Petrov asked)
"Well not too much so - ten or fifteen men a week. Life is good in Odessa, so that there aren't many people who want to go and fight. The ones who volunteer are usually those for some reason have to get out of Odessa quickly. For instance, criminal elements, thieves, sometimes bandits, or simply homeless refugees".
"Do you think they'll thank you for that type of volunteers? I asked him
He waved his hand. "I don't give a damn. I'm not looking for any medals for this work. My job is to take everyone who willing and sent them to Belgrade.
Usually about half of them desert on the way, but that's outside of my responsibility..."35*

For all classes in Odessa the Recruitment Office seemed a confirmation of the stereotypes about how reactionary and moribund the emigration was.

It was apparently not that were "Whites" of the Civil War that made the Schutzcorps seem undesirable-the only resident political organization of any consequence was composed of veterans of the campaigns of 1918-1921.36* This was the OBCh or OBVCh (Obshchestvo Bivshikh Vioinskikh Chinoy) or more simply Veteran's Society, formed through the efforts of Nikoi Lukich Rustovoitov, an professional soldier who had been a colonel in the Tsarist army but had spent the entire Soviet period in Odessa (partly in . in hiding). Pustovoitov was not the ignorant, pompous, narrow-minded martinet kind of professional soldier; he apparently befriended a number of individuals in "Transnistrian society" He persuaded the Romanians to authorize his organization as a mutual-aid society-anyone who had belonged to any of the earlier (presumably Tsarist and "White") armies could join. According to the informant really familiar with its work-though perhaps too favorable to it because f his own close association with it and with Pustovoitov-the society also engaged in other activities, such as establishing an orphanage37* and financing the St. Magdalena Church in Odessa. Civilians became lay members, so to speak "sympathizers," and a women's auxiliary was set up, which helped invalids and prisoners of war in he Odessa area and was active in church work; the Society earned the benevolence and backing of Metropolitan Vissarion.

Some people who might have supported the OBVCh kept away from it because it had reputedly attracted the attention and interest of the Abwehr and Siguranta; it was thought that they recruited agents from among the OBVCh's military membership, though the extent of their activities is not known; apparently the civilian arm was not involved in this way.

OBVCh had, in addition to its philanthropic character, a certain political significance. The Bulgarian branch of ROVS sent in a good deal of propaganda material, including primarily monarchist publication such as the wartime appeal of Grand Duke Vladimir Kirilovich, pretender to the Russian throne. Its appears that this material was received "very coolly," except by a few old-timers. The monarchist spirit of the OBVCh, at first rather pronounced (thanks to the background or its membership and Romanian support), declined as the increasing influx of civilians, especially i the latter part of 1943, strengthened the liberal wing. What finally tipped the balance against the restorationists was the news of Vlasov's so-called Smolensk manifesto.38*

The manifesto called for an anti-Stalin movement composed of Soviet citizens and was led by Lt .General Andrei A. Vlasov , who had been captured by the Germans in July,1942. That the manifesto was published indicates that this particular "political warfare" notion had been accepted by at least some German military and propaganda circles. The Vlasov movement gained some momentum in 1943, but was soon on ice. The members are supporters of movement (and its military arms, the so-called ROA) never seem to have realized the full extent and nature of German control and direction of at least its overt manifestations. In Odessa the Vlasov movement was unknown until at least the late spring of 1943. It remained less well known there than in most urban centers of occupied Russia. The Romanians occasionally mentioned it in their domestic press, but they were loath to foster any Russian national sentiment that had an institutional framework, lest the native population make greater demands and seek to become more independent. News of the Vlasov movement did get in: the relevant items occasionally appeared in the local press; at times, copies of Russian emigre newspapers arrived from Paris, Berlin, Belgrade, or Riga; and at times visitors to Odessa "spread the world." In mid-1943 the German leadership clamped down on the Vlasov movement, and news of it ceased -much to the bewilderment of those interested in it, in Odessa as elsewhere in occupied areas. Pustovoitov, one of those, who had shown considerable interest in it, then applied for permission to send a five-men delegation to Vlasov. The Romanians failed to reply to his request, and so dragged out the decision that he decided to sent three men anyway. Through informants within his own organization, one suspects, the Germans learned of his intention and intervened to prevent the trip. When Count Eristov, then on the staff og the Vlasovite military arm, ROA, passed through Odessa on the way from the Crimea to Berlin, he promised to "establish liaison" between them and Vlasov's "headquarters." But nothing developed from this momentary contact. Finally, when the Schutzkorps opened offices in Odessa, some pro-Vlasovites-generally, the anti-monarchist, nationalist Russian intelligentsia, including some of the older men-got the OBVCh to apply o the Primaria for permission to recruit replacements for the ROA. Their demand was rejected but they were allowed to collect contributions. In early 1944, the establishment of Fond Osvobozhdeniia (Liberation Fund) was announced. One informant active in its formation states-though his statement was not substantiated by others-that 40,000 marks were collected on the first day alone, a sum which so scared the Romanian authorities that they ordered the account closed and the collection suspended.39*

In scope political activity connected with emigre groups was thus rather modest, though its potential was in some instances relatively vast. The actual membership of quasi-political groups was limited primarily or exclusively to white-collar workers and the new elite-a fact which may reflect the social selectivity of the informants but which more probably indicates the hiatus in Odessa society between the white-collar and manual workers. Politics may have been no less important to manual workers, but it was more inaccessible, more unintelligible, and as something to get involved in , more pointless.

The Nationality Question

In Odessa, Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and other ethnic groups were mingled, but evidence of national friction and feuds in strikingly absent. Jews were officially subjected to special discrimination and Germans and Moldavians were officially elevated in status. But this was the product of occupation policy rather than of popular sentiment.

In Odessa itself, the Ukrainians-that is, those who spoke Ukrainian at home and considered themselves Ukrainians-were only a small fraction, variously estimated at from 5% to 20% of the population; those who understood and spoke Ukrainian were considerable more numerous. In the hinterland, the proportion varied from place to place; some areas along the Bug were solidly Ukrainian; others had a Ukrainian majority, with Russian and other (German, Moldavian) minorities; in parts of what was formerly the Moldavian SSR there were few Ukrainians. All the evidence suggests an absence of Ukrainian chauvinism and separatism. Refugee informants,40* and contemporary reports agree on this. As early as September 2,1941, SD reported from Transnistria, "in the territories examined, one must note that among the Ukrainians the is no striving for political independence."41* A few weeks later it stated more generally:

It is striking that among all three ethnic groups (in the Transnistria countryside) - the Ukrainians, Moldavians, and Germans-the distinctive ethnic character is still expressed only in the language. All other forms of national expression have almost completely died out after 23 years of Bolshevik rule. Popular songs and dances are present in scarcely discoverable remains. National dress and nationally-tinged spinning or weaving have completely disappeared...42*

A German officer, around the turn of the year, reported that in Odessa itself the people thought of themselves and their fellow-residents not in terms of ethnic categories but of local community.43* A German correspondent in 1942 was permitted to state in print that in Transnistria "the nationality question...is not of primary urgency (vordringlich).44*

If there was no nationality problem at first, inter-stimulation of Romanian (and also German) policy and the endeavors of Galician nationalists created one. Officially, Romanian policy called for ethnic and linguistic equality of Moldavians, Volksdeutsche, and Russians-or, in the hinterland, Ukrainians. 45* In practice, the Moldavians became an elite; the Germans were given a privileged position to which the Romanians had to reconcile themselves; the Russian occpied a middle position; the Ukrainians wre the object of somewhat greater discrimination than urban Russian groups; the Jews were the bottom of the ethnic pyramid.

Romanian enmity toward the Ukrainians had the history Conflict between Ukrainians and Moldavians as individuals were less significant in this than the conflicts thar arose between Ukrainian and Romanian nationalists on political issues; suffice it to point to Bessarabia and Bucovina as territory contested and claimed by both groups. In the Second World War Romanian expansionists were afraid that the Ukrainian nationalists would come to challenge their monopoly of power. Most Ukrainians rated no special consideration because they were peasants, and the small urban Ukrainian intelligentsia in Transnistria was viewed with constant suspicion by the authorities.

The Ukrainian nationalist emigres, on their part, provided some genuine basis for Romanian hostility. A few Ukrainian military formations attached to the German 11th Army crossed through Romania into northern Transnistria. Whatever the motives of their German sponsors, the Ukrainian political groups supporting the move had in mind the establishment of separate Ukrainian state (though necessary under German auspices) and of Ukrainian municipalities and governmental units on a local and regional level.46* Odessa was an obvious target for infiltration. Mstislav Chubai, a Ukrainian nationalist, in his memoirs, say that the group to which he was attached had been assigned by the Galician nationalist leadership the task of establishing in Odessa a temporary oblast' government. If driven our by Romanian or German action, they were to remain in Odessa as an organized underground. "Initially," he is forced to admit, the population looked upon them as German agents. The absence of Ukrainian separatism he attributes to Odessa status as a "stronghold of Russification." A few surviving member of the SYU (the "Union for the "Liberation of the Ukraine"), which had been almost exterminated by the Soviets some ten years earlier, joined the nationalist nucleus of Chubai's men, but otherwise the Galician enterprise was a failure.47*

The national consciousness of the Ukrainian population was, however, stirred by Romanian behavior. Memoirs abound in details of clashes and alleged abuses.48* A German army corps reported that Romanians were forcibly baptizing Ukrainian children in the countryside, and telling the population to learn Romania as the country would be Romanized.49* The Ukrainian theater in Odessa, licensed sometime in 1942, under the direction a competent veteran, Bondarchuk, was not allowed to function for long. Bondarchuk was arrested and the theater dissolved. Whether or not the charge was justified cannot be determined. It need not have been for another Ukrainian theater, opened in 1943, proved equally short-lived because of the withdrawal of the primaria's permit.50*

The semi-official account by Mykola Lebed', a key figure in the movement, admits that the UPA (Ukrainska Povstanska Armyia, or Ukrainian Insurgent Army) had little success in enlisting support. On October 14,1943, the Siguranta arrested several UPA members near or in Odessa along with a number of innocent suspected of Ukrainian nationalist agitation. After two weeks-Lebed alleges, and there is no independent substantiation of the story-all were freed, and the Romanians offered to negotiate with the nationalists. The ensuing talks, the states, were soon broken off by the UPA' political arm because (1) the Romanians would not "recognize" Bucovina and Bessarabia as part of the Ukraine, and (2) the Romanians were found to be subject to German dictation-something the nationalist leader had once themselves experienced but since escaped, By the end of 1943, he insists, :the first small units of the UPA" were established in Transnistria, particularly along the Dnestr River. They had a few minor skirmishes with Romanian gendarmerie near Zhmerinka but they never amounted to an armed force. This indeed seems to have been all the nationalists managed to do in this area.51*

The conclusion that the Ukrainian nationalists had no success or influence in Transnistria is inescapable. Among the reason for the failure is, of course, the traditional friction or Ukrainian nationalism in Odessa province. In addition, the terrain-there were no forests-was not propitious to the formation of rural partisan. The differences in the occupation policy of the Germans and Romanians also helps explain their failure. Nationalism, well-nigh non-existent in 1941 in German-held territory, also, grew in the subsequent couple of years, in part, because no other native political movements were permitted and, in part, because of the widespread popular hostility to both Soviet and German regimes; the feeling of "a plague on both your houses" took (at least for some tens of thousands) the form of espousing Ukrainian separatism as a third solution. In Transnistria, Romanian rule simply did not invited such a drastic "third solution." It is significant that, in Odessa, Ukrainian separatism seems to have gained some minimal support only in the final months when German began replacing Romanians as masters of the province.

The Ethnic Elite

Romanian, German, and Italian residents inevitably constituted an elite under the Transnistrian order.53* The Italian colony in Odessa was rather small. Its number were, on the whole well assimilated and did not evince the same condescension and superciliousness which the other two Axis minorities displayed. They had no economic or territorial claims that they sought to have indicated; and they continued to live as before, backed whenever necessary by the Italian consul in Odessa, a former journalist, Maurilio Coppini.Coppini, in the Italian consular service before the war, knew Russia and spoke the language, and seems to have been generally popular with the local residents, with whom he maintained some social contact. He backed Badoglio and was forced to leave hurriedly in the late summer of 1943. "Italian Odessa"-exposed to the competing pressures of Italian fascist indoctrination and local values-split into pro-Badoglio and pro-Mussolini factions, but unfortunately details are not known.54*

The Moldavians also became a privileged group. To the Germans, they would "specifically insist" that they were "not Romanians," that they felt closer to the Ukrainians than to the Romanians.55* Even the Romanian press-or at least its more moderate organs-admitted that the Moldavians had "no "conscious" Romanian nationalism.56* But, if the Transnistrian authorities wanted to give them a particularly privileged position, most Moldavians felt it would be foolish not to let them. They became more immune from punishment, privileged in the allocation of goods and in securing positions, politically less subject to terror, and in other unmistakable ways elevated in status.57* Their fellow-citizens of non-Moldavian stock took another attitude toward this metamorphosis: refugee informants agree that previously there had been no ill feeling against Moldavians, but that now most of the population became hostile, partly out of envy and partly out of indignation about the unfair advantage the Moldavians enjoyed.58*

The Volksdeutsche in Transnistria occupied a very different position. Clustered in villages in different part of the Odessa area, the were rather well assimilated and generally spoke Russia to each other (even the Germans had to acknowledge this) or a peculiar jargon of Bavarian, Palatinate, or some other regional German vernacular which their forefathers had brought with them. These ethnic Germans had been the subject of extensive study in the Reich.59* On principle Berlin claimed them, as it claimed all Germans abroad. It was hard to determine how many Volksdeutsche there were; in a census taken under the Romanians, when the benefits involved in claiming the status were well known, some 125,000 declared themselves Germans; German claims were as 185,000. In Odessa itself only some 7,500 German were left, with women in considerable preponderance.60* Most Volksdeutsche resided in a few rural areas.

Some of their settlements experienced German occupation before the area was transferred to Romanians hands. A part of the famous Branderburg Regiment (which had basically intelligence tasks) occupied the German villages along the Kuchurgan River and around Gross-Liebental near Odessa.61* Though the Germans claimed that "many" residents were glad to see them, they had to report that there had been Communists among the German colonists, that many Volksdeutsche wanted no part of the new order, and that general standards of health, education, and cultural aspiration, let alone national consciousness, left much to be desired. Nonetheless, the official German approach was to make fellow-nationals (Volksgenossen) "again" aware of their "true" ethnic affiliation. The German began a thorough administrative reorganization that involved the revival of the pre-Bolshevik system of village government; bringing in the harvest; installing guards and securing property; setting up prices controls for food and other critical items; "elimination of suspect (belastete) elements"; compilation of vital statistics and basic data; revival of medical and social services and the church. The widespread raids of marauding Romanian soldiers resulted in frequent German protests. On August 15,the Commanding General of the German 11th Army proclaimed that the Volksdeutsche were under his protection; Romanian chiefs of police near the German villages were at once informed of this and some tightening of discipline resulted. After a couple of weeks, however, German units were moved out of Transnistria;62* they left behind a modicum of government and order, and an atmosphere in which "privileges" for ethnic Germans were taken for granted.

The Romanians who took over made no such distinctions. They automatically confiscated grain and cattle and they looted in German villages just as they did in other villages. By early September, a German report caustically (and wistfully) stated; "Since the introduction of Romanian administration one may speak without exaggeration of the systematic plunder of the country." Other German reported-in this instance truthfully, it would seem-that the Volksdeutsche greeted the Romanians with apprehension and regret.63* The German authorities soon started negotiations with their Romanian allies about the status of these compatriots-to -be. The priori formula that the Reich had jurisdiction over all Germans everywhere had been honored by the Romania when she permitted the removal of Germans from Bessarabia and Dobrudja. The Reich now wanted back some sovereignty id had ceded to Romania: in substance it asked for extraterritoriality for the German colonies. This was a demand difficult for Antonescu to refuse, yet most irksome to grant. The German negotiations were conducted by both the Foreign Office and the military, though the administrator of the ethnic Germans was to be the Sonderkommando "R" of Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (or VoMi), the resettlement and servicing agency of the SS. Of many moves involved in persuading Bucharest, suffice it to cite the preparatory German conversations with Alexianu and with an ex-Minister, Cornateanu, both of whom were to present the Reich's arguments to Antonescu. On November 10, 1941, the Nazi ambassador, Killinger was to take up the problem officially. Basic agreement was reached on November 14,1941, with Antonescu unwilling or unable to object. Talks aiming at a more detailed agreement implementing the terms were conducted in Transnisrtia between Alexianu's staff and the VoMi chief, Oberfuhrer (Colonel) Hoffmeyer. The result was that the VoMi was given a completely free hand in Volksdeutsche villages; a network of eighteen districts (Bereiche) was established, with an SS officer as commandant (Bereicskommando-Fuhrer). Over them were the praetors of the four predominantly German rayons (Landau, Hoffnunstal, Selz, and Gross-Liebental); new praetors were to be appointed and were to be Volksdeutsche citizen of Old Romania. The Transnistrian authorities recognized the local government and police that had been set up in the German settlements and, in effect agreed to keep out as much as they could.64*

This agreement did not settle all outstanding issues, and new ones accumulated as time passed. In the first months of 1942, the VoMi had a special team conduct a census of ethnic Germans; all over the age of 14 were given certificates to take the place of Russian passports; the certificate entitled the bearer to German protection. The Romanians were somewhat dismayed by this. Another source of tension was the question of whether ethnic Germans were liable to military service, and if so, whether they should serve in the German army, the Romanian army, or the local police force.65*
In general, however, the German paid little attention to the Romanians. In June,1942, the Jewish theater in Odessa was reopened as the "Deutsche Haus" Without consultation the VoMi began a newspaper in Odessa, Der Deutsche in Transnistrien. On a low informational and political level, this weekly was widely circulated among the Volksdeutsche but, according to a German admission, far from satisfied their hunger for news and printed matter.66*

In the summer of 1942 a new agreement was negotiated between Hoffmeyer and Alexianu. It confirmed the VoMi's authority to publish a newspaper; it approved the formation of Selbschutz, a Volksdeutsche militia for men above 18, which had already been established to maintain order locally, and to handle paratroopers, partisans, and others. Such a force had been implied in the earlier agreement; but some Romanian prefects had asked the militia to turn n their arms, a demand curtly rejected by the Germans. De facto seizures of land by the Volkdeutsche communities-they apparently had taken advantage of their stronger and more organized status to appropriate the land and harvest of adjacent villages-were "formalized". Alexianu promised to release Germans convicted for possessing private radios, and, in exchange for agricultural produce, agreed to supply the ethnic Germans with cigarettes, spirits, salt, and matches. Rather one-sided in its terms, the agreement was signed by Alexianu on August 14 and by Hoffmeyeron August 30,1942.67*

The ethnic Germans had been far from happy both under the Soviets and during the initial phase of the occupation. In the rural areas, the SD asserted in November,1941, many Volksdeutsche felt they had been better off under the Soviets than under the Romanians, who were still living off the land in an indiscriminate fashion.68* Before the end of the year, however, the Volksdeutsche's condition improved-this was due in some measure to the superior organization and discipline imposed by VoMi and under German units, but largely to the special advantages they were accorded. German villages were freed from the necessity of delivering cattle and grain to the Romanians; they were protected from looting; they were allocated German war booty-Soviet horses, tractors, and machines; their fuel problem was taken care of by the authorities; and their ration quotas were higher than those of the neighboring Ukrainians.69* Inevitably their privileges caused resentment among non-Germans; the Volksdeutsche were themselves aware of it, but entirely unwilling to give up their special status on that account.

The visiting VoMi head, Lorenz, was struck by the improvement when he toured Transnistia in mid-summer, 1942. He Reported to Himmler that, in administration, economic utilization, private incentive, the food supply, and status in general, the Volksdeutsche were "in every respect a model." He urged Himmler to make a trip to see for himself. Even Gottlob Berger, the chief of the SS administrative headquarters in Berlin, noted the contrast between the ethnic Germans in the German-held Ukraine and in Transnistria; at the Fuhrer's headquarters it was asserted that in the Ukraine things were "dead," in Transnistria, "burgeoning life has emerged, in 1942 the number of births has risen substantially, and the economic revival is unmistakable."70*

German help from then on was minor once raised to the status of rural elite, the colonists, though subsisting in semi-isolation. continued rather well off. In 1943 a survey showed them as decidedly better of than other farmers, largely because of the tax exemption they enjoyed. German effort now concentrated on the introduction of home industry and new skills; much of he weaving and spinning equipment confiscated by the Germans in Belgium and Northern France was to be shipped to Transnistria for their use.71* However, the course of the war forestalled such transfers. The question that loomed above everything else was the transfer of the Germans themselves.
Berlin had never taken a clear-cut position on their future of the Volksdeutsche in Transnistria. It sought to have all Germans under its sovereignty; but, as in Italy, it was loath to press for major resettlement from the territory of its allies, especially in wartime. An internal report by the army units initially in charge of the Kuchurgan area reflected a widespread sentiment that "future life and construction were possible only under German sovereignty," and that "many (of the colonists) look forward to resettlement."72* Whether or not this was wishful thinking, certainly in Berlin there was a school of thought favoring this. A representative of the Four-Year Plan who toured the area in November,1941, reported that former German owners expropriated by the Bolshevik Revolution now sought to reclaim their belongings. Prince Wittgenstein had personally gone to inspect a village formerly a possession of his family. Such men justified their claims as being in the interest of Germany in: in German held areas of Russia no private property was being re-established, but it would be well to register all German claims in Transnistria with the Romanians-"should Transnistria remain with Romania, these former German properties would revert into hands."73* However, it was clearly premature to do anything about this, and there were' from the Nazi viewpoint, strong objections to reinstating pre-1917 owners. More appealing, though just as chimeric, was a plan connected with the Germanization of the Crimea and eventually the Tatars were to be moved out; the SS (which handled the planning) looked for "replacements" and stumbled upon the idea of transferring the 140,000 Transnistrian Germans to the Crimea-without their property.74* The plan was approved in principle, but its execution was postponed. The atmosphere of the times is well reflected in Himmler's comment, in January,1943, at the time of Staligrad.

I too of the opinion that the Transnistrian Germans cannot be transferred before the end of the year. Perhaps, in the view of the conditions in Transnistria and the necessity of keeping up the war potential there, it will be possible to transfer them only the war after next.75*

Such long-range plans were obviously frustrated by the course of the war. The general trend of migration was westward, rather than eastward, even before the tide of war changed. In 1942, a number of Volksdeutsche from the Ukraine voluntarily migrated to Transnistria. In Transnistria meanwhile. a consolidation of villages had taken place: the VoMi forcibly moved all ethnic German families living among Russian and Ukrainians into consolidated Volksdeutsche settlements. More than 200 communities were "emptied" of their few German residents; these Germans were consolidated in 228 villages (and the city of Odessa). This act at last turned the ethnic Germans against their SS overlords in decisive fashion, in spite of the material advantages they enjoyed.76*

As the Red Army approached Transnstria, the German authorities concentrated their evacuation efforts on the Volksdeutsche; the VoMi was, after all, expert in moving of millions. Young men were encouraged to volunteers for the Waffen-SS-apparently some did, though they retained their hostility to the anti-Christian tenets of the SS. Others were evacuated wholesale; the cluster of villages around Alexaderstadt and Kronau was removed in late )ctober,1943, going first to Romania and Galicia, then on to Easter Germany. Almost all the Volksdeutsche who remained behind, tough oppressed by the reports of lack of care, shelter, and food for the evacuees, felt that they had no choice. The Soviet Union had abolished the Volga-German ASSR early in the war and exiled its population; German residents of the USSR seemed to have been proscribed, liquidated, or moved into utter isolation. Thus when the Soviet onslaught came early in 1944, virtually all of the 135,000 Volksdeutsche left their homesteads in Transnistria and moved westward-some succumbed on the way, but most reached Austria or the German-annexed provinces of Western Poland.77*

The Volksdeutsche were a problem primarily to the Soviet regime and to the Nazis. To the residents themselves-both German and non-German-it had not been much of the issue; it only became of the policies of the authorities. Rather obviously, the privileges enjoyed by German colonies aroused the resentment of their neighbors, who did not happen to be of German descent but who worked just as hard, or even harder, who had to pay considerably higher taxes, and who enjoyed far less security and had a lower standard of living. The creation of an ethnic elite proved economically possible; but only as the price of arousing profound antagonism in the rest of the population.

The Ethnic Dumping-Ground

Transnistria seemed a convenient dumping -ground to "purifiers" who sought to cleanse Romania of "alien" elements. The gypsies, traditionally a part of the Romanian countryside, were to be ousted; and not only were Jews to be eliminated from Romanian social economic life they were, according to some fanatics, to be moved wholesale into Transnistria.

With the gypsies, the process was relatively simple. With a minimal application of force, it seems, all nomad gypsies (just what the criterion was remains unclear) were, by October,1942, reported to have been exiled, or transplanted, to Transnistria. By implication, the decree had given them a "last chance" to settle and prove themselves law-abiding constructive citizens.78* Little was heard about them thereafter; perhaps Governor Alexianu's decree of October,1943, converting the army barracks at Birzula into a concentration camp for the re-education of beggars, vagabonds, and nomads was aimed at them.79*

By the large, the Jewish population of Romania was not involved in the Transnistrian situation, though discrimination and abuse continued. Anti-Semitism had been strong in Romania for a number of years; since 1938, under the Goga regime, "direct action" had been tolerated, even to the point of pogrom. Political fanatics sought the ouster of the Jews or, in Nazi fashion, their liquidation, other circles strove merely for the elimination of Jewish competition and control of Romanian's economic life. Even under Antonescu, however, anti-Semitism, though for a while fragrant and overt, never assumed Nazi extremes; paradoxically, during the last year or so of his regime, it abated considerably-partly reflecting the growing alienation between Antonescu and the anti-Jewish legionnaires (who 80* had enjoyed German protection), partly revealing Bucharest's preparations for a separate peace.

For more difficult, and more tragic, was the fate of the Jews in Transnistria itself and those in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, the provinces re-annexed to Romania as a result of the Eastern campaign. Of all aspects of the Transnistria experience, the fate of the Jews had received the most systematic study, and the source materials (though much of it is in Romanian, Yiddish, Hebrew, and Hungarian) are considerably more copious than on the other issues. Because of this, and because of significance of the question for the present paper is marginal, a relatively condensed account will suffice.81*

Prewar Transnistria had probably about 300,000 Jews, of these, more than half lived in the city of Odessa. It is commonly estimated that about two-third of this number were evacuated eastward before the Red Army abandoned the area; these estimates seems, if anything, a bit too high.82* Most evacuees were people in official positions or the professions; few, if any, of the poor left.83* Several refugees confirm that there was a widespread feeling among the Jewish residents who remained that "the Germans can't be so bad"- "I remember them from the First World War"-and that, although there might be some discrimination, the Jews would surely not be exterminated. Soviet silence about German anti-Jewish activities during the Nazi-Soviet Pact and also during the war-a silence which has been commented upon by others in various connections-helped make the Jewish population insufficiently aware of the particular danger they faced (and it was also uncertain whether Odessa would fall to the Germans or the Romanians) and thus helped doom them.84*

Their earliest experience of the occupation was not exactly comforting. From the start the Romanians used Jews to clear rubble; columns of them could be seen daily, along with war prisoners, in the Odessa streets. Romania's anti-Semitism. though intense and widespread, was generally neither animal nor systematic. During the first weeks, it is true, Einsatzgruppe "D" of the Nazi SD operated in Transnistria, and engaged in the same random wholesale liquidations that it had conducted elsewhere in the occupied East. Nor did the German army itself hesitate to retaliate for sabotage or subversion, real or presumed, by the Jews (as in the case of Kodyma, cited earlier); it also instituted the customary yellow stars and other external stigmata that set the Jewish population apart, preparatory to its physical segregation.85*

However, the Germans' stay was brief, and did not affect the area of major Jewish residence near the Black Sea,. This was the Romanians' chore. Their approach was at first ambivalent . The troops looted indiscriminately anyway and did not need a special moral justification, as had the Germans, to appropriate the goods for Jews. Anti-Jewish feeling was common among the soldiers but not necessarily virulent, and was often much subordinated to other emotions and aspirations.86* The blowing up of the NKVD building by a Soviet agent, the week after Odessa fell, precipitated the first draconic "retaliation." Actually, there is no conclusive evidence that Jews inspired it (though the Romanians claimed that the Great Synagogue was a headquarters of resistance) or even participated in anti-Axis acts. But after the explosion long columns of men and women were led down the streets to the port and to the suburbs, and were shot summarily by the hundreds. By October 23, there were over 5,000 victims of retaliatory terror, mostly Jews; and by end of the month, there were over 20,000 dead.87*

This sudden and rather panicky response was succeeded by an order .on November 7,1941, ordering all male Jews from 18 to 50 years of age to report to the city jail within 48 hours. On November 11, came Alexianu's Ordinance #23, providing for the establishment of ghettoes and concentration camps in Transnistria. The order, an analyst correctly suggests, made of the province "a gigantic penal colony." The Jews in each community were set up, in effect, as closed colony; they could not leave without permission, on pain of being shot. Group leaders were appointed to be responsible for every twenty residents. New wage scales were set providing for lower compensation for Jewish labor. A Russian refugee from Odessa recalls the catastrophe:

In November the formation of ghettoes was proclaimed. Now there began suicides; physicians, jurists, teachers drowned or hanged themselves, leaving behind brief tragic notes. A few went insane Those being chased into the ghettoes marched as in a funeral procession from their homesteads to their new residences (Dal'nik ,Slobodka, etc0Whole families, from the gray-haired grandfather on down, waked with solemn, stony faces into the unknown, into suffering. Little children silently staggered along, not understanding what went on. And then... then some wound up in some barns in Dal'nik, which were put on fire at night. The people tried to break out, jump out of the windows: they were shot, the burned alive. Many thousands died. In the coldest days of December and especially January (1942), they began transfer the Jews on cold cars from Odessa-Sortirovochnaia to Berezovka Rayon.The people froze to death in the cold cars, and at the destination the were lifted out like planks and buried in mass graves....88*

Beresovka became one of the center in which Jews from Odessa were resettled, with prewar Jewish population (officially) of about 175,000, in 1943 had only 54 Jews living there legally-all in a small ghetto operating as a government workshop. Condition in ghettoes ranged from execrable to tolerable. Health and sanitary standards were exceedingly low, and epidemics and mortality were high. Intellectuals suffered idleness. Little communication or contact with the outside world was permitted, though the Romanians could be bribed to allow an occasional food parcel to arrive, to let an inmate sell a ring or diamond, and certainly to desist from physical annihilation.89*

A curious side-story pertained to a Romanian attempt to push some 70,000 Jews from Transnistria into neighboring German-controlled Ukraine. In February.1942, the Rosenberg Ministry and Foreign Office in Berlin were notified that the first 10,000 or so had actually been shoved across the Bug "illegally" in the area of Voznesensk. Berlin promptly asked the transfer to be stopped, if only because of the danger of typhoid epidemics. The SS 'specialists" on Jewish affairs, Eichmann, notified the Foreign Office in April that, while Berlin approved of the Romanian effort to get rid of the Jews, this particular operation was dangerous, chaotic, uncoordinated, and hence objectionable. If the Romanians failed to stop the transfer, the SD was to be free to shoot the Jews. By mid-May,1942, the problem was over; the Romanians had complied. As the German official in Nikolaev reported, by then many of the evacuees had died, while some of the others were shipped back to the Odessa area.90*

Romanian "laxity" ( a term which can be used only with considerable reservations in this particular context) provoked Nazi reprimands. A minor reason for Romanian "indulgences" was that some branches of the economy in Transnistria would have been paralyzed if all Jewish artisans had been barred from work. More important, bribery-even of convinced anti-Semites-and personal sympathy did produce numerous exceptions to the overwhelming tragedy taking place. The property of evacuated and killed Jews was looted or formally reassigned to others. Even marble tombstones were removed from the Odessa Jewish cemetery. The Hoffmeyer-Alexianu agreement of August,1942, permitted ethnic Germans in Odessa to occupy the apartments of "departed" Jews, against payment for furniture to the Romanian authorities. In October,1942, it was announced that a mixed Romanian-German commission would check, inventory, and reassign Jewish property confiscated or looted in Odessa. Oddly enough, however, some indigenous Jews were employed by the Odessa police and other official agencies and Romanian Jews were given temporary permits quite legally to visit Odessa, for purposes of trade.91*

The attitude of Odessa population toward these events can not be easily summarized. It would be erroneous to deny the existence of anti-Semitism. It would be equally false to attribute to non-Jews any general jubilation over the Jews' fate-a fate that decimated their numbers to point where, in September,1943, there were officially only 32,000 of Transnistria Jews left alive.92* Contemporary documents speak of the help the Ukrainian auxiliary police-which was full of unscrupulous opportunists-gave the authorities in the persecution of Jews; refugees report a flood of denunciations (both truthful and false) of Jews to the new regime; as indicated above, groups of youngsters had voiced anti-Jewish slogans even before the Soviet order collapsed.93* The semi-criminal fringe of the population was responsible for much of this. Some of it stemmed from enmity, some from a desire to ingratiate oneself, and other personal considerations. Anti-Semitism was apparently least active in intellectual circles (evidence on rural life is too scant to permit inferences).Some of the freshly-baked white collar collaborators, however, in their initial zeal readily subscribed to appeals which indicted the Jews as germ-carriers or even progenitors of Bolshevism.

On the other side of the ledger must be placed the numerous examples of concealment and help offered to individual Jews by non-Jewish residents of Transnistria. The first German intelligence report after the capture of Odessa unequivocally indicates that "during the first days the population ...proceeded toward the Jews with relative loyalty." The official Soviet postwar investigation of condition in Transnistria contains the story of a lawyer the Syguranta prosecuted in summer of 1942 for hiding Jews. A refugee writes:

One must say, to the credit of the remaining population, that there were courageous people in town and country, who helped the (Jewish) survivors for long periods of time; and this at time when punishment for such help was severe...Objectivity requires one to note that the broad masses experienced these days (the extermination of the Jews) with a sense of shame, honor, and despair, and this helped determine their attitude toward the occupying authorities.

At times to be sure, there was a self-concerned element in their horror. When a woman on an Odessa streetcar joked about the anti-Jewish measures, one day in 1942, another woman loudly responded: "What are you rejoicing about? Today it's they, and tomorrow it'll be we." Yet there was more to it. As earlier noted, the viciously anti-Semitic series of articles in Molva prompted a decline in its circulation. Several theatrical managers and directors were known to have Jews among their personnel; the wife of Seliavin, the opera director, was Jewish: and one of the accusations leveled against Vronskii, it has been seen, was that he concealed Jews in his theater. Refugees report that individual Jews managed to stay for months in the city on various tasks, without being denounced to the authorities, though usually fear led their Gentile acquaintances to stay away from them in private and in public.94*

The most dramatic act was the transfer of Jews from Bessarabia and Bucovina to Transnistria. In line with the view of Transnistria as " a dumping-ground," the Romanian government decided on the wholesale removal of the Jewish population from the re-annexed provinces by force -this decision came at a time when Jews resident in Romania proper, though they suffered from discriminations, were free not only to engage in business but to go to Odessa. As early as August, 1941, the SD reported, rich Jews were given a chance to buy themselves free (i. e., bribe officials); the rest were chased across the Dnestr into Transnistria-then still German-held. The Germans refused to accept them. In the words of the SD report, they were

.. chased back and forth until they dropped... Old men and women lay along the road at short distance from each other... Up to the blocking of the Dnestr bridges the Romanians drove about 35,000 Jews into the area east of the Dnestr which was a German sphere until August 28,1941. As earlier reported, some 37,500 Jews were taken back to Romania soil at Mogilev-Podol'ski and Iampol'..95*

The wholesale migration from Bucovina and Bessarabia began in October,1941,and involved well over 110,000 persons. Inevitably, organizing them and housing and feeding them in Transnistria raised severe problems, and there were epidemics. The evacuees suffered untold hardships; some 28,000, quartered in ethnic villages, were simply liquidated. Of more then 110,000 known evacuees, only some 77,000 were alive in March,1943; by September,1943, their number had dropped to 50,000.96* By August,1942, when the transfer was almost complete, Bucharest announced that eventually "all Romanian Jews will be deported to Russia," presumably hoping that some could be dumped east of Transnistria, in German-held soil. Individuals from Bucharest and other urban areas were now likewise exiled to Transnistria, of course without their belongings. Illegal return to Romania was punishable by death. Conditions were miserable-partly from policy, but more often from the carelessness of lower-level Romanian officials responsible for the evacuees. The mortality rate soared. There were many thousands of orphans.97*

Yet the amazing thing was the inconsistency of Romanian policy. In January, 1942, Bucharest sanctioned a central agency for the evacuees. In mid-1942, the agency called for an inquiry by the International Red Cross. Official Bucharest at first reneged, but it did authorize the dispatch of a committee from Romania to investigate the condition of the Jews. Meanwhile foreign agencies had been given at least some information. The investigating committee was received by Alexianu and given a chance to inspect the major Jewish committee, to gather statistics, and to talk to Jewish residents. Its report was made available to the World Jewish Congress. The Red Cross, in Geneva, became interested in the evacuees' fate and in 1943 began to dispatch some food to help them
A reversal in Romanian policy on the Jews came about gradually. In 1942, the Queen Mother and the Romanian Orthodox Church apparently applied pressure on Mihai Antonescu to relax the anti-Semitic course. As the estrangement between the Conducator and Legionnaires became more complete, his zael for anti-Jewish action decreased. After Stalingrad, when Bucharest started thinking more and more concretely about separate peace, such a relaxation was deemed a "good-will" toward the Allies. In 1943, the evacuees were decidedly better off; morality and epidemics declined; the birth rate even increased. Toward the end of 1943, as the Red Army rapidly approached the borders of Transnistria, the whole problem of the Jewish exiles had to be reconsider.98* In November it was discussed by the Romanian cabinet: it turned out no one knew just how many people were involved . Antonescu , the stenographic minutes of the session indicate, opposed German pressure for the Jews' extermination. Now, to prevent their falling into Soviet hands, he agreed to re-admit them to Romania (except for Communists among them). The following month, a delegate of the Swiss Red Cross, Charles Kolb, was received by Mihai Antonescu and given permission to tour Transnistria for ten days. Unfortunately his report on conditions is not available, but it produced a Romanian retreat. In January,1944 the Romanians made a "compensation agreement" with the Jewish community in Bucharest. One of its provisions allowed Jewish exiles to return if they paid for their own railroad ticket and a high fee for valid passport. Actually only few managed to be repatriated; a few hundred more were shipped off to Palestine; the Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine were allowed to care for the remainder. Bucharest had completely reversed its policy.99*
The whole problem of evacuees affected the native Transnistria community but little. The average resident had only a hazy idea of what was going on. He was, however, aware that was another instance of mass discrimination and that his homeland was being made the "compost heap" of the Greater Romania. Such a realization could not but instill fear and revulsion.

Appendix: Forced Labor in Transnistria

Off all the measures adopted under German occupation, probably the most destructive of popular allegiance was the forced labor system. From the spring of 1942 to the end of the occupation, literally millions of men and women were forcibly conscripted and moved to the Reich to work under conditions that were materially and morally abominable.100* The residents of Transnistria knew of the atrocities and the fate of these forced laborers. Somehow, the Soviet-bred grapevine operated; some escapees from the German-held areas gave details; and Soviet propaganda, for once, needed to exaggerate little to instill genuine terror in the population.101*

The population of Odessa could not but indulge in some self-congratulation that it had escaped this experience; outside Transnistria the only escape was into partisan-held territory. It was true that there were hazards even in Transnistria. Without the consent of the Romanian authorities, the German liaison officer of the economic staff in Odessa had started recruiting for labor work in Germany. As soon as this was brought to the attention of Transnistrian authorities, Governor Alexianu protested to the Germans and forbade further recruitment, even ostensibly voluntary recruitment; he did, however, permit 800 men and women already conscripted to depart for the Reich. When Major General Nagel of Wirtachaftsstab Ost (the German staff in charge of economic exploitation ) visited Odessa on an inspection tour in June,1942, the situation was regularized and effect forced labor recruitment was killed. Nagel upbraided the officer involved for acting without the consent of the Romanians; henceforth, it was agreed with the Governor's office, recruitment would be only oral; no German publicity for it was to be permitted; and since no separate recruitment offices were to be set up, the forced labor draft-or whatever volunteering for it might occur-would be handled through the German consulate general just then being established. For all intents and purposes, this was the end of the Ostarbeiter program in Transnistria.102*

Another type of forced labor for the Germans was in effect for brief period during the harvest season of 1942. To relieve the shortage of manpower in the German-held Ukraine, the German requested workers, and 40,000 Transnistrian residents were placed at the disposal of the Reichskommisariat Ukraine to help with the harvest. What their fate was cannot be determined; presumably they returned home after completing their task.103* There is no indication that this gesture, which yielded the Romanians nothing, was ever repeated.

The Romanians had their own equivalent of forced labor. It was not as brutal, as forcible, and as catastrophic as the German, but it was real enough. On November 26,1941 (just as the Germans were about to decree that compulsory labor would be required of all able-bodies residents in their occupied areas), Alexianu issued an order compelling all residents from 16 to 60 years of age to spend up to a maximum of sixty work days a year on task set by the regme.104* In practice it was not as universal as it appeared on paper. Not only did school attendance and government work provide exemption (as discussed earlier), but bribery to get immunity from forced labor was institutionalized. An official tariff was set: 20 marks a day for men and 15 marks a day for women (plus an initial administrative fee of 25 marks) was considered equivalent to-and legitimate substitute for-compulsory labor. Evasion by paying the fee was extensively was extensively resorted to ; an official German report reveal that the Directorate of Labor made 8,000 marks in a single day from this source.105*

In October, 1942, the Romanians announced plans to give all males over 20 years of age one year of training; Jews were to be exempted. Presumably it was to involve semi-military instruction and would increase the physical fitness of the trainees, who were to receive dark brown uniforms. Actually the plan remained pretty much on paper.

There were compulsory labor contingents in Transnistria, engaged to a large extent in repairing war damage and restoring to operation facilities ranging from trolleys to industrial plants. In the fall of 1943, with shortages becoming more severe, the Romanians revoked the general exemption for students; at that time girls were sent in considerable numbers for a week's harvest work to the country-and, according to one of their instructors, returned rather satisfied, tanned, and none the worse for the experience.107*

In the last months of the occupation when the German took direct charge of the province, they reported no difficulty in finding labor where they needed it for last -minute defense and construction work throughout in hinterland. Only in the city of Odessa itself were there problems. "The labor force was secured with the assistance of military administration officials installed at the prefecture...
"They did not have the requisite security forces," they admitted, "to engage in measures of compulsion."108*

Some managed to get out of doing such service for the Germans; others did not. The last-minute effort forcibly to evacuate labor, and especially specialists, westward through Romania- an effort begun by the Germans weeks after it was impossible to assure decent condition-met with exceedingly mixed response. The overwhelming majority of workers preferred to stay where they were and take their chances with the Soviet regime.

The intensity and ever-presence of feeling about forced labor under the Germans, and its near-absence under the Romanians, goes a long way to explain the difference in public temper and allegiance between the German-held USSR and Transnistria.
______________
1* General Petre Dumitrescu, "Anweisung " August, 1941 (German trans. from Romanian original), CRS,AOK II,35774/6; Manuilov,p.57; interview D; O.K. Ananjev, op. cit., August 24,1941, CRS, Koruck 20383/10.

2* Tverskoi, Beauftragter dei der Heeresgruppen Sud, Maj.O.W. Muller, to RMfdbO, Fuhrungsstab Politik February 2, 19424, CRS, EAP 99/1184.

3* Interview C.

4* Interview D; Ershov , "Strannyi konets," p.34.

5* It may be noted that it was not the lack of " potential politicians" in Odessa that made for the lack of political activity. An absence of people suited by background, experience, or personal qualities to assume political initiative has at times been adduces to explain the dearth of autonomous politics under the German occupation. The instance of Transnistriaa suggests that the presence of such personnel necessary, but surely is not in itself enough to produce an active political life.

6* On this point, see Alexander Dallin and Sylvia Gilliam, "Some Aspects of the German Occupation of Soviet Territory in World War II," Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954.

7* German Consulate, Odessa, dispatch, February 26,1943, AA reel1273, frames 342512-15.

8* Interview C.

9* 50.Ing. Div.Ic, "Tatigkeitsbericht," September 6,1941, CRS,50 ID 16110/11 RSHA, "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," #117, October 18,1941; interview B.

10* Manuilov, pp.62, 140; interview D; Wirtschaftsoffizier Transnistrien, "Kriegstagebuch," op. cit.

11* Interview E; Manuilov pp. 84-85.

12* German Consulate , Odessa, dispatch, February 24, 1943,; Deutsche Akademie Munchen, Lectorat Odessa, CRS, file DAM 112.

13* Peterle, op. cit.; interviews A, D, and E.

14* Initially, the occupying authorities seem to have missed many Communists. The Germans, for instance, actually believed that in Anan'ev, a town of over 5,000, there had been only 30 Party members and that all of them had left. Likewise they believed, initially that all Bolsheviks had left Tiraspol'.

15* Interviews A, C, and E.

16* Interviews A, B, and C; Tverskoi.

17* SD report 100; interview C.

18* The more widespread among them were distinctly derogatory of Romanian culture and accomplishment. They included the apocryphal statement attributed to Nicholas I, who when told of the Romanian nation, is said to have replied: "A nation? I thought it was a profession." Quips like "a people with pass-keys and violins" (the words rhyme in Russian) were also popular.

19* Manuilov, p.57' interviews A and E.

20* Peterle, op. cit.

21* Manuilov,p.132; interview D.

22* Sdf.von Berg, "Lagebericht aus Odessa," January 1942' interviews B and E.

23* Manuilov, pp69-70; interviews A, B, and E.

24* Some of this, it is true, may well have been due to the fact that such sentiments were being communicated to "Westerners".

25* Interviews A, C, and E.

26* Manuilov,pp.84-85; interview E.

27* Manuilov, pp.59-62; interviews A, B, and E; Ershov,op.cit.,p.41.

28* Though without evidence, it appears that at least a few individuals who ostensibly were working for emigre grouping of the right and Axis intelligence agencies were NKVD agents or informants.

29* Manuilov, pp.114-118.

30* The NTS had initially co-operated with the Nazi authorities. However, in 1943-1944 the SS and other anti-NTS elements in Berlin brought about a suspension of collaboration and the temporary arrest of NTS leaders. For details, see Boris L.Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, Document P-768 The RAND Corporation,1955; and U.S. Deparment of State, External Research Staff, Series 3, #76, NTS-The Russian Solidarist Movement, Washington, 1951.

31* Ibid; interviews A, D, and E.

32* Mamukov, p.56; Boris Nikolaevski, "Vnutrennaia liniia i kap. K.A. Foss," Noboe russkoe slovo, April 16,1950, and Ivan Solonevich, letter to the Editor, ibid., May, 1950.

33* For background information on the Schutzkorps, see chapter XXVII in Alexander dallin, German Rule in Russia,1941-1945 (London:McMillan,1957; rev.ed.1981).

34* Interviews A and D,; Manuilov,pp128-129; Bukarester Tageblatt, July 25,1943.

35* Petrov, Retreat from Russia, p.208.

36* One cannot affirm that it was the sole such group. There may well have been informal, quasi-political associations worker's circles, and other organizations. However, except for the Soviet partisans, it is the only one which any of the live informants or published sources refer to.

37* The opening of orphanage was publicized at the time (Novoe Slovo, #18, march 3,1943).

38* Manuilov, pp.117-121.

39* Ibid.,pp.129-131; interview D; Petrov, op.cit.,p.207.

40* It is probably revealing that the author's attempts to find a refugee informant from Odessa who was a Ukrainian nationalist failed, in spite of attempts to get in touch with various Ukrainian group and individuals in New York, Munich, and Canada.

41* Beauftagte des Chefe der SiPo..., "Tatigkeit," September 2,1941.

42* SD Report 100.

43* Berg, op.cit.

44* Gerhard Christoph, "Bessarabien und Transistrien, " Volk and Reich, Berlin, vol.18,1942,pp.99-103. See also Manuilov, pp.104-105, 241".

45* See "Friedliches Odessa, "Deutsche -Ukraine -Zeitung, January 10,1943.

46* For details on Operation "Roland," see John A.Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism,1939-1945, Columbia University Press, New York,1955.

47* Mstislav Z.Chubai, Reid organizatoriv OUN Vid Poradu po Chorne More, Cicero, Munich,1952, pp.52-54; Manuilov pp.104-105; Interviews A and D.

48* E.g., Chubai, op. cit.,pp.55-61.

49* LIV. A. K,Ic, "Ubergriffe".

50* Dr. Ihnen, OKVR, "Tatigkeitsbericht fur die Zeit vom 15.XI.-15.XII.,"December 15,1941,CRS, DHMR 76152; AOK II, IV, Wi, "Tatigkeitsbericht," August 6, 1941, CRS, Wi/ID 2.580; AOK II,IV Wi, April 15, 1942, CRS, Wi/ID 2.580 (summary report, no title).

51* The following section is based on intervies A, C; Peterle, op.cit; Tverskoi; Manuilov, pp.34-37; Rumanisches Blut fur neue Europa; Bukarester Tageblatt; Werner, op. cit., pp.176-180; Petr Ershov,"Strannyi konets"; Rafael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C. 1944, pp.565ff.

52* Text of the order of Odessa 16,1941 in OVOV, vol.2, p.6.

53* Ershov, op. cit., p3.

54* Ibid.,p.30.

55* Ibid., p.22; Hans Schumacher, "Im Government Transnistrien," Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, October 14, 14,1943.

56* Corriere della Sera, October 21,1941.

57* For instance,24,860 Moldavian families in Transnistria were supported at the expense of the state during the last quarter of 1942 (Porunca Vremii,February 21,1943).

58* Interviews B and D; "Poseshchenie Guvernatorom Transnistriii Prof. G. Alexksianu obsnchezhitiia srudentov moldavan,"Molva #130, May 12,1943.

59* Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, #5, August 16,1942 and #11 September 27,1942.

60* Himmler conference, February,1942, NG-1118; "Bericht des SS -Sonder-kommandos der VoMi uber den Stand der Erfassungsarbeiten."march 15,1942, CRS, EAP 161b-12/213, Gerhard Wolfrum, "Deutsche Aufbauarbeiten in Transnistrien," in Deutsche Arbeit (Berlin, December,1942, p.371) reports from that the 124,982 who registered as Volksdeutsche included non-German wives and widow of ethnic Germans.

61* For detailed report, see "Schutzmassnahmen ...,"op.cit.

62* In the case of Gross-Liebental, the occupation took place only on September 16, as the area had originally been part of the Odessa defensive perimeter. The Germans found the standard of living and education, despite far more extensive war damage, to be much better than in the Kuchurgan area, apparently because it was close to Odessa itself.

63* "Verhalten der Rumanen im Gebiet Transnistrien," SD Report 133, November 14,1941; Prinz zu Sayn und Wittegenstein, "Derich eber meine Fahrt nach Russland."

64* Reichart, "Berich", Ihnen, op. cit.; Verbidungsstab der Deutschen Werhmacht fur Transnistrien, Abt. La, "Bericht uber Lage der Landwirtschaft in Transnistrien," January 31,1942, CRS Wi?ID 2.1174; Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, #17, November 8,1942; Wolfrum, op. cit.

65* Bericht des SS-Sonderkommandos," op. cit.; VoMi to RFSS, March 6, 1942, CRS EAP 161b-12/167.

66* Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, #1, July 9,1942; Beauftragter bei der Heersgruppe Sud, op.cit.

67* VoMi, Einheit Feldpost 10528, "Rundansweisung Nr67," September 9,1942, NO5561. See also Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, #2, July 26,1942.

68* Vethalten der Rumanen," op. cit.

69* VSt Transnistrien, Abt.Lag, op. cit.

70* Berger, "Besprechung im Fuhrerhauptquartier," August 17,1942, NO -2703; Lorenz to RFSS July 10,1942, CRS, EPA 161b-12/193. See also Der Deutsche in Trasnistrien, #3, August 2,1942.

71* German Consulare, Odessa, op. cit.; "Heimindustrie in Transnistrien," 1943, CRS, 161b-12/193.

72* "Shutzmassnahmen...," op. cit.

73* Reichart, op. cit.; Priz zu Sayn und Wittgenstein,op.cit.

74* Himmler conference, op. cit.

75* Himmler to HSSRF Russland-Sud, SSRF Krim and RKfdFdV, January 20,NO-2209.

76* Bth.H.Geb.B Abt. VII, "Lagebericht," October 10,1942, 051-PS; Koep, "An der Bugbrucke," Revaler Zeitung, November 13,1942; Der Deutsche in Transnstrien, #17, November 8,1942.

77* Evacuation report from Alexanderstadt and Kronau, October 21,1943, CRS, AEP 99/47; Beaufttragter bei der Heeresgruppe Sud, op. cit.; Office of Strategic Services, R&A #2611, "Popukation Movements of Black-Sea Germans," November 13,1944, p.6.

78* Romanien ohne Zigeuner," Krakauer Zeitung, October 23,1942.

79* Bukarester Zeitung, October 15,1943.

80* The Yiddish Scientific Institute (YIVO) has a special section on Transnistria in its monumental bibliography project on the fate of the Jews in World War II now in progress. It can be currently consulted at the YIVO library in New York.

81* The most thoughout study is Mathias Carp, Carta neagra:suferintele evreilor din Romania, SOCEC, Bucharest,1947. Two good English summaries though each containing errors are:Joseph B.Schechman, "The Transinistria Reservation,"YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, New York, vol.8,1953, pp.178-196, and Gerald Reitlinger The Final Solution, Beechurst, New York, 1953. For dramatic account, see Curzio Malaparte, Kaputt Dutton, New York,1946.

82* It is, of course, dangerous to arrive at the figure by deducting the number of Jews registered under the Romanians from the prewar figure. Many Jews concealed their racial or religious affiliation. Even after the ghetto was established, one informant guesses, there must have been over 10,000 Jews living illegally in Odessa. Moreover, the category of Karaims (Tatars by race, though Jews by faith) who were not subject to persecution, mysteriously grew to several thousand in Transnistria-obviously a convenient cloak for Jews residents (Interview A0).

83* Schchtman, op. cit., p.180; Reitlinger op. cit. ,p 239-240.

84* Interview A; Peterle, op. cit.

85* Rumanisches Blut...p.175; Beauftragter des Chefs des SiPo...op. cit.; O.K Ananjev op. cit.

86* Curiously, the Romanians insisted to their German allies that they were anti-Semitic. Allegations that they were really not ( advanced for instance, by Heydrich Himmler's right-hand man ) were rebuffed, citing the Romanian pogrom in Iasi after its reoccupation, and other details. The Romanian envoy in Berlin likewise explained to the foreign office that such German claims were erroneous (Killinger to Auswartiges Amt, September 1,1941, and Erdmanndorff, memorandum, October 15,1941, Document NG-3989.

87* Petr Ershov, "Odesskaia trageviia," Biulleten's odesskovo zemliachestva, New York, 1953, # 6; Peterle, op. cit.; Reitlinger, op. cit., p.240; Carp, op. cit., vol.3, p.199.

88* Carp, op. cit., vol 3p.200; )VOV, vol 2, p.7; Schechtman, op. cit., p.180.

89* Schechtman, pp.182-184; Carp, op.cit.

90* Reitlinger, op. cit., pp.401-402; AA, Luther, memorandum, February 11,1942, RSHA IV B 4a (Eichmann) to AA, April 14, 1942, and AA (Rademacher) memorandum, May 12,1942, NG-4817; RMfdbO.,D III (Brautigam) to AA, March 11,1942, 3319-PS, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol.32,pp.183-184.

91* SD Report 100; interviews B and E; Berg, op. cit.; Prost, op. cit., p.163; Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, #12, October 4, 1942; VoMi "Rondanweisung," op. cit.

92* Schectman, op. cit., p.191.

93* Interviews A and C; O.K. Snigerewka, "Lage,"October 5,1941, CRS, Koruck 20383/10.

94* Abwrhrstelle Rumanien, "Bericht uber Wahrnehmungen in Odessa.," November 4,1941, CRS, DHMR 29222; Document USSR-47; Peterle, op. cit.; Manuilov, p.68; interviews A, C, and D.

95* Beauftragter des Chefs der SiPo u SD, "Bercht...Besaztungstruppen," September 2,1941.

96* The district of Mogilev had more than half the survivors and Balta a quarter of them. The district of Odessa and Berezovka had fewer than 1 per cent.

97* Reitlinger, op. cit., pp.394-399; Schectman, op. cit., pp.180-191; Carp, op. cit., vol.3 p.438; Lemkin, OP. CIT., PP.240,565; Hitler's Europe, p.616; Ihnen, op. cit.; Krakauer Zeitung, August 13,1942; Ng-4817, 3319-PS.

98* In May, 1943, German Ambassador von Killinger had wired Berlin from Bucharest that the International Red Cross had inquired Antonescu would support the emigration of Jews from Transnistria on ships supplied by the Red Cross. Antonescu, Killinger reported, who feels "the concentration of Jews in Transnstria is undesirable and who definitely wants to be rid of the Jews, is said to have replied that ...a new (and favorable) situation obtained if Red Cross, and not Romanian shipping were involved." Berlin instructed Killinger to try to keep the Romanians from letting the Jews go; Germany would "take them off from their hands," ostensibly so they could be used as labor in the East (Auswartiges Amt, Inland II (von Thadden), "Voltragsnitiz," June, 1, 1943, Document NG-3987).

99* Schechtman,op. cit., pp.184, 187-196; Reitlinger, op. cit., pp.401-409; "Auszug aus dem Stenogram uber die Sitzung des Ministerrates vom 17. November 1943," YIVO, Occ E5a-5; AA, Inland II, "Vortagnotiz," June, 1, 1943, NG-3987.

100* For discussion , see chapter XX in Dallin German Rule in Russia,1941-1945.

101* Manuilovv, p.106.

102* Gen. Wi Ost, "Reiseberict...8.-16.6.42," and RueIVc, memorandum, June 3,1942, CRS, Wi/ID 2.408.

103* Vierjahresplan, GB.,Arb., "Einsatz von Ostarbeitern aus Transnistrien in Reich," October 29,1942, NG-1298.

104* The stipulations of this decree, too reflected the attempt to legislate social inequality. While "plan people" were theoretically obliged to contribute sixty days of work, certain classes of white-collar workers, managers, and entrepreneurs were given smaller loads, varying from eighteen to forty-eight days, according to the putative social status or importance of their position (U.S. Legation Stockholm, Dispatch 32332, "Conditions in Transnistria in the first half of 1943 as reflected in the German-controlled press," October 20,1943, OSS Document 52850.

105* OVOV, vol.2,pp.8-9; Ihnen, op. cit.; interview A; Tverskoi; gh, "Transnistrien," Das Reich, August 1,1943; Frankfurter Zeitung , December 1,1941.

106* Currntul, Bucharest, October 1,1942, reported by Havas, October 3,1042.

107* Interviews C and E. Individual instances of similar practices were reported as early as June, 1942 (cf.Molva,#178, July 11,1942.

108* AOK, AWiFu, "Lageberict," April 23,1944, CRS, Wi/ID 2.381; H. Gr. A, Wi-Abt. "Lagebericht fur den Monat February 1944", March 1,1944, and H.Gr Sudukraine,Wi-abt, "Beitrag zum Monatbericht," April 10, 1944,CRS, Wi/Id 201.
Another experience, which later turned out to left a profoundly hostile impact on the population, was the transshipment, in the winter of 1943-1944, of children recruited for labor battalions in Reich. The children were brought from the German-occupied Ukraine westward by way of Odessa (Richard E. Lauterbach. These Are the Russian, Harper& Brothers,1945, p.87).