CHAPTER VII

The Last Phase

Between Battlefield and Round-Table

By summer of 1943 the military trend was unmistakable. After the calamity of Stalingrad, the German army was unable to recover the initiative for any length of time. Its counter-offensive was rapidly exhausted; its remaining positions in the North Caucasus were abandoned’ and the Red Army gradually unleashed, from the Orel down to the Black Sea, a series of blows which carried it all the way from Kharkov to Kiev. It was clear that, barring a miracle, the German retreat would continue; the remnants of the Romanian and Italian forces, badly mauled in the east, retreated to the safety of the rear areas. Transnistria, so undisturbed by military events for two years, began to feel the increasing proximity of the front and the presence of prisoners, wounded, and soldiers on leave
It was a matter of strategy for Axis forces to hold Transnistria, or at least its southern part, as long as possible. Odessa was an essential transfer point in supplying the increasingly isolated German and Romanian forces farther away from Crimea. Retaining it in Axis hands kept the Soviet forces farther away from the Ploiesti oilfields and, generally, from Romanian territory.1* The attitude of the Romanians had, however, changed considerably. Their enthusiasm for the war had considerably abated as early as the siege of Odessa, because of the heavy casualties they suffered; the defeat before Stalingrad had intensified their doubts and complaints’ and the international situation was such as to galvanize into actions the Romanian political factions who sought to approach the Axis-either Britain and the United States, or the Soviet Union-with the aim of negotiating a separate peace.2*

Relations between Romania and Germany became exacerbated, just at the time that Italy defected from Nazi fold, after Badoglio’s coup. Even physical clashes between German, Italian, and Romanian troops became commonplace, especially in etappe cities as Odessa, where soldiers could easily find relaxations and inebriation. The citizens of Transnistria had before their eyes the visible evidence of an increasingly disintegrating Romanian power.3* Yet Bucharest did not readily yield to German pressure on all points. Indeed, it was in the final months of 1943 that a bitter exchange developed between Antonescu and Hitler. It was prompted by the deteriorating military situation and the German expectation of retreating into Transnistria; evacuated agricultural equipment and inventory would reach the province even earlier.4* In addition to requesting early and heavy Romanian participation in the eastern campaign, he asked:

that the necessary utilization of Transnistria as rear area of Army Groups A and South not be impeded by some formalistic-juridical oe economic objections and difficulties... The question how many troops and supplies, cattle and grain reserves can be located in Transnistria, and how the payment can be settled etc., should not even be raised, let alone negotiated... May I request your approval that the direction of railroads in Transnistria be transferred to German hands...5*

Two weeks later, Hoffmeyer (who had meanwhile been promoted to SS general and in effect supervised the agricultural evacuation program) complained to Field Marshal von Kleist, commander of the Army Group that was retreating toward Transnistria:

On orders from Bucharest transmitted by the Governor, the Romanian agencies have for about six weeks been conducting a systematic evacuation of Transnistria, which has extended not only to the removal of industrial installations and machines but of late also to agriculture. Systematically all horses are being withdrawn; the MTS are already closed; oil, and grain mills are crated and await shipment.... so that further conduct of economic activity becomes impossible.

Since Transnistria was becoming increasingly important as an agricultural surplus area, Hoffmeyer urged Kleist to “do something” probably hoping that he would intervene with the Romanian military.6* But to no avail.

On November 15, Antonescu replay went off to Hitler-characteristically , in Romanian. He refused to increase the number of Romanian troops and supplies at the front; he welcomed the absence of German troops from Romania (since the consequences of their stay there in 1941 “could be felt for a long time” afterwards); and he asked Hitler to reconsider the question of transferring the railroads; the lines had been running to everyone’s satisfaction under Romanian management. He agreed that it was necessary to consider Transnistria a “war zone” and that problems related to it could not be approached “in the spirit of a banker.” But that was all. 7*

Berlin finally consented to leave the railroads with the Romanians, but refused to re-open the whole problem of Transnistria status. To strengthen the German position, particularly vis-a-vis Alexianu, the High Command on November 25 created the post of “Commander of German TRoops in Transnistria,” and appointed to it the general in charge of Army Croup “A” Rear Area, Lt. General Auleb. He took over the functions of the liaison office in Odessa and at the same time became territorial commander. By unilateral action Berlin was moving in to control Transnistria. 8*

Meanwhile the situation had become critical. As early as September 26, informants claimed to know that

Wives of Romanian government employees are been evacuated from Odessa and Trasnistria. German troops are to replace Romanian occupation troops in transnistria. The German are pressing Antonescu to hand over the administration of Transnistria to the Germans.

And a week later, sources in Bucharest reported that the Romanian government had ordered the evacuation of material and a number of men from Odessa. Three hundred railway cars were dispatched there to bring back officials and archives.9* Another month, and the situation became more serious still.

The withdrawal in the area of Army Groups “A” and South (wrote a German observer) provoked strong unrest in Transnistria in November,1943. The Romanian administration sought to save what it could. The families of officials, cattle, horses, and vehicles, machines, factories, and objects of art were “secured” by removing them to Romania. At the beginning of December the temporary
consolidation at the front and a strong word from Marshal Antonescu stopped this plunder. But there was no calming down of the population.10*

Further retreat were expected, and people spoke in terms of an impending crisis. German “hospital bases” were established at several points in the Odessa area. German supplies were moved in but, commented a German army report, “since the Romanian Governor Alexianu makes difficulties about the quartering of German supply services, we shall have to help ourselves...” By turn of the year, a refugee recalls, German troops had begun to pass through Odessa on their way westward, their morale depressed and their fighting zeal exhausted; the troops themselves ironically and sadly jested about their “elastic defenses.” Rumors began to fly that the Germans, dissatisfied with their ally, would take over the administration of Transnistria.11*

In the city meanwhile, uncertainty was spreading. The Romanian forces and the local police were scarcely able to maintain “law and order. ”A German visitor to Odessa from Bucharest reported in mid-December:

...the panic which had lasted some time has considerable diminished, bud the city is overcrowded with German and Romanian staffs...After the outbreak of darkness no lady would dare go out by herself because of the prevalent unsecutity.12*

The insecurity was compounded by the resumption of Soviet air raids. In 1942 and 1943 there had been practically none. Late in 1942 the planes began to reappear, more often on reconnaissance than on bombing missions. Anti-aircraft installations, partly German-manned, were strengthened. And a full hit by a single Soviet plane on a workers‘ project in the suburb added to the atmosphere of fear.13* The political orientation had clearly changed. A university professor recalls that his students spoke of the plans overhead as “ours“ something. that would have been impossible in 1942. Especially the younger set looked forward to the Romanians’ collapse; and when schools began registered those who would wish to be evacuated in case of crisis, the numbers who signed up were trivial. Even Soviet wartime songs and ditties got somehow into circulation-in all likelihood through the radio, rather then through the underground. It was such developments that led, in late 1943, to the arrest of many university students and some younger faculty members on charges of pro-Soviet activity.14*

The Romanians themselves made a “gesture”; they too obviously anticipated having to deal with the Soviets in the near future. About February 1944, a Soviet plane crashed landed off Odessa. Only the pilot’s corpse was rescued; his papers identified hia as twice-decorated Hero of the Soviet Union. Much the Romanians’ amazement he was found to have been wearing a cross on the his chest. The next day the local press carried an official communique of the incident and announced the flier would be given a public Orthodox burial. The funeral attracted a great crowd; the German stayed away from it. On the whole, popular response to the Romanian gesture as favorable; the was considerable debate about whether the cross dignified a genuine change in conditions in the Soviet Union, and also about what the Romanians were seeking to accomplish by sudden and unusual move, which contrasted so with their behavior on other occasions.15*

Their is no doubt that, as moved toward a climax, the population of Transnistria-except a small but growing minority irrevocably committed to the Soviet cause-clung almost hysterically to the Romanians in their distrust and fear of the Germans. Numerous incidents reveal the difference in attitude toward the two Axis states. Some involved simple chance encounters; others were calculated political gestures. Perhaps the most dramatic though entirely ludicrous came when the rumor spread that Queen Helena of Romania was on shopping tour in Odessa. Several Odessa “society ladies” came upon a group of Romanian “nobles” in a store , and, genuflection and all, approached one they assumed to be the queen. “Little Mother, for God’s sake,” they appealed, “do not forsake us and abandon us to the Germans!” To the embarrassment of both parties, the lady turned out to be no queen at all; the incident was widely reported not only in Odessa but in Bucharest and in Berlin.16*

Such outbursts were especially characteristic of those who had acquired a vested interest in the status quo-a certain universe of middle-class conveniences and phantom security. While the ladies appealed, their husbands (one may assume)were preparing to evacuate their funds and belongings. By the turn of the year, Odessa was beginning to die out. The evacuation of goods and of some of the people; the closing of stores, theaters, restaurants; arrests and disappearances-all these were tokens that the end of Transnistria was in sight.

Military Government

By January,1944, the Soviet army was advancing westward through the right bank Ukraine. The Romanian authorities now decided to face reality. Civil government in Transnistria was bound soon to become sham. The first major admission that a new situation existed was the replacement of Governor Alexianu on February 1,1944, by the military governor, Lt General Potopeanu, formerly Romanian Economy Minister. The name Transnistria dropped out of use, and the authorities were increasingly referred to as “Military Government between Dnestr and Bug.”17* The full story of Alexianu’s removal remains to be unraveled, but rule come to an end.

During the following six weeks, the military situation deteriorated further. In February the Red Army crossed the Bug and advanced into Northern Transnistria, seizing Bel’tsy and advancing on toward Romanian soil. The Third Ukrainian Front was converging on the Black Se area, facing the German Sixth Army which was in charge of its defense. Inevitably, German influence increased in what remained of Transnistria; the Romanians were frenetically engaged in saving their skins, their belongings, and what goods they could by hook and by crook get their hands on-a most undignified repetition of their earlier plunder, which did nothing too endear them to their east while subjects. As early as January, the Transnistrian authorities ordered the praetors to honor German requests for forced- labor contingents.18* An informal agreement between the German and Romanian authorities stipulated that, in case of continued Soviet advance, the German military government would replace the Romanians; at the same time, Antonescu ordered his officials not abandon their posts in panic unless the Germans were retreating too.19* In various ways German pressure grew until, in mid-March, when the struggle for Odessa area was obviously only weeks away, Romanian rule was entirely superseded by German military government. On March 16,1944, what remained of Transnistria became a German area of military operations; German military government took over what functions Potopeanu still retained at the end of his brief interregnum.

The German order, rather elegantly; stipulated that the “assumption of administration is intended as a transitory measure” In a queer post mortem acknowledgment of what had never been formalized it stated that “The area taken over will continue to be considered a part of the Romanian state.” Interesting because it indicates the Germans’ realization of the difference between their policy and Romanian policy was stipulation that “he principle, hitherto adhered to (in Transnistria), of generous treatment must be maintained and respected even by all subordinate agencies.”20* On the whole, the Germans sought to retain most of the native administration; obviously this was no time for a basic reorganozation.21*In front areas, the army corps replaced civil administration altogether; farther back, civil administration continued to function under the supervision of regular German rear area echelons, namely Sixth Army Rear Area command, field and city komandaturas; in the northern part of Transnistria, the remaining German-held area, around Golta (west of Pervomaisk), went to the Eighth Army operating there.

The city of Odessa was likewise subjected to an administrative reorganization. Gherman Pantea and his followers had sought safety farther west. Germans appointed a military government officer, Verwaltungsrat Noruschat, as “Plenipotentiary” for the city. As mayor they named-as late as March 24 -an engineer who had collaborated with them farther east as mayor Stalino, Ivan Petushkov; information on him and his activities is scant. (Curiously enough, even well-placed refugees who were still in Odessa knew or recall little about this final phase of the city‘s non-Soviet experience). 22* The structure of the city government, or what remained of it, stayed unaltered, but Romanian directors were replaced by their Russian underlings-even that late, this apparently tickled the ego of the Russian officials. The new city administration had only a short time to go and few things to do.

The German , skeptical of victory and verging on despair, were rather conciliatory about internal affairs; they even entrusted a German army seal to the city “fathers,” to be used at their own discretion for the issuance of safe-contacts certificates.23* City government, however, rapidly became a sham.

Odessa was being cut off, and there was already talk that it might once again be besieged.24*
By late March, the Red Army was poised on the eastern bank of the Bug, about to cross the river in drive for Odessa. For the Germans and Romanians, the problem uppermost was evacuation and destruction-just as it had been for the Soviets in the summer of 1941. For the population the question was whether to go or to remain.

“Evacuation” is scarcely a suitable term to apply to the Romanians removal property, which was conducted both on an individual and on an “institutionalized” basis. Even refugees otherwise rather kindly disposed to the Romanians recall with shivers and disbelief the way things were taken to Romania. Soviet accusations against Alexianu’s men provide mach factually correct information on this arbitrary spoliation (thought the charge that more than half of the cattle and three-fourths of the horses were driven off seems a bit exaggerated and may gave been a convenient excuse for lagging Soviet harvests after reoccupation). The equipment removed included trolley cars and rails; the seats of the Odessa opera; the underground cable of an electric trunk line; thousands of pianos pieces of furniture; theatrical costumes; parts of public libraries; even closets and desks; and any objects of art that could be found. 25* All this was removed by any available conveyance-and hurriedly, since on April 1 the railroads passed from Romanian to German hands; hundreds of trucks and cars crowded the roads to Iasi and Constanta-only the minimum carried strictly “military” loads; most were filled with plunder.26*

The German had problem of course; this was their first experience operating “in the sovereign territory of another, allied state and in the presence of purely private economy.” The actual transfer of economic installations to the Germans took place only shortly before Odessa was abandoned, but the stocks of supplies were substantial.27* They remained on the spot, because evacuation soon became impossible and, as will be seen, was forbidden for political reasons. Politically, the Germans did little to arouse the population, except for one interesting operation. North of Odessa, in a largely Ukrainian-populated countryside, they embarked on a systematic promotion of separatist “Bandera propaganda.“ It was assumed that this would (a) be more palatable than outright German propaganda, and (b) still tend in an anti-Soviet direction:

“Z” (i.e.,Zersetzung , or sedition) tasks camouflaged as Bandera 28* propaganda (wrote the German intelligence unit there): (1) struggle against all occupiers, with stress on the struggle against Moscow; (2) appeal to active collaboration by the Ukrainian population, hoarding of food, passive resistance by all toilers in factories and kolkhozes; (3) appeal to determined struggle against Russian imperialism, desertion, small-scale sabotage, and formation of partisan bands (when the Red Army returns). In the rear area, dropping of leaflets camouflaged as Bandera propaganda with directions for small-scale sabotage. Rumor propaganda and agitation in the rear area, primarily with female agents...29*

The effect of such moves, one suspects, must have been quite trivial. By and large, judgments had crystallized far too much to be affected was the decision whether or not to stay. The major political “line” was:

Await quietly the arrival of “our men,” that they are now “different” from what they had been, that they bring a new order, because the war had taught the authorities many things and changed police. And how many people -and this included gray- haired ones -believed this and genuinely rejoiced?

This line was propagated probably both by Soviet agents and -to a far -reaching extent-also by individuals sincerely believed it. The major reasons why the overwhelming majority of the residents stayed in Odessa (those farther north had virtually no opportunity to leave) were, however, fear, inertia, and faith in survival. To choose an unknown foreign world, alien in customs and language, never seen or tried, itself on the verge of collapse, required strong determination, especially when the physical process of evacuation had became difficult.30* A German report found that “the population would rather suffer Bolshevik reprisals than lave their homes” It goes on to say “the Soviets’ return is not desired; however, the partisans receive support from fear of subsequent repercussions.”31* The stage was set for the last act.

By late March there were still supplies enough to feed the city for three or four weeks; The Germans had all sorts of plans for new ration cards and the distribution of foodstuffs.32* This mattered little, for everyone had taken to hoarding; early in April some stocks were distributed to residents free, just as the Soviet had opened some warehouses rather than have them fall into German hands. Otherwise, the city had “died.” With the Germans’ assumption of authority and the expected Soviet arrival, overnight most stores and bodegas closed down; speculators and nouveaux-riches hurried to remove their belongings; and a few who had profited from the occupation went literally underground, hoping to secure forgiveness; the partisans displayed a little more initiative in printing and posting leaflets.33*

The evacuation of civilians from Odessa had to be strictly regulated because there were few ways to leave. The Romanians had an “evacuation point” which issued a total of about 8,000 entry permits into Romania, primarily to engineers and other specialists, intellectuals, and artists. A part of the equipment and mot of the staff of the opera and leading theaters were moved wholesale to Timisoara, in Western Romania, where many were interned after the coup d’etat in Romania the following summer; others were forcibly taken to Vienna by the Germans. The Germans Army Group “A” decided on March 23 that the evacuation of Transnistria was forbidden, primarily to avoid panic and defeatism, but also because it would have been impossible to carry out. The Sixth Army, it is true objected to this, fearing that too many adult males and too many supplies would them fall into Soviet hands, but no basic reversal took place. However, special categories of evacuees, including the remaining Germans and some specialists, were shipped out; in the way it was done it is impossible to distinguish voluntary and compulsory removal. Finally Odessa was cut off; the last departure took place-as they had from the beleaguered city in October,1941-by sea, this time to Sulima, at the mouth of the Danube.34*

On March 28, the Red Army took Nikolaev and the next day crossed the lower Bug in force. On April 5,Razdel’naia fell, and therewith the Odessa-Tiraspol’ highway was cut. The last issue of Molva appeared on the 8th. On the 19th, after a brief but bitter fight, the Red Army re-entered Odessa. On the April 12, Tiraspol’ was occupied, and four days later all Transnistria was again in Soviet hands.
During the final days, the Germans concentrated on destruction, since evacuation was impossible. Port installations, some industrial facilities, and transportation junctions were blown up’ the electric power plant, various mills, stores of bread, sugar, and other foods were destroyed. Of Odessa’s population, scarcely 200,000 remained; many had hidden in the vicinity some had sought safety in he countryside; and some had left westward with the Romanians and Germans.35*

The days of Transnistria were over.

Again in Soviet Hands

The population of Odessa met the returning Red Army with combination of hope and fear. A young
man from Odessa, who was drafted soon after, told his German raptors:

The behavior of the Odessa intelligentsia in the face of the altering political situation was rather passive.. Only those most compromised had left; the bulk of the residents had stayed. People feared Soviet repressions, but there was no other way out. 36*

It was precisely this absence of alternatives, mixed with a measure of patriotism, wishful thinking, and nostalgia, that induces even some “collaborators” to stay. The director of the Inventory Directorate of the Primaria, Molov, remained; so did Professor Lozunski, head of the Faculty of Literature at the University, who had argued for some months that the Soviet had changed (“Oni uzhe ne zhe”) Most Russian actors stayed in Odessa. Diakonov, one of the leading lawyers who had actively worked with Romanians, not only remained, but testified profusely before the Soviet investigating commission.37*

The old Soviet atmosphere retuned promptly as controls were re-imposed, reconstruction began, and arrests and the draft were resumed.38* Within a few days of its recapture, a few plants were opened in Odessa; the Soviet authorities began collecting and soliciting funds among the workers of the port and tobacco factory. On April,23, a mass rally was held in the center of town, at which Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovski ( commander of the Third Ukrainian Front, which had taken Odessa) appealed for speedy reconstruction. Repair and reconstruction “brigades” were organized to help restore apartment houses, hospitals, and schools “voluntarily” after working hours. Though the authorities initially sought to impede the refugees’ return by withholding passes and transport certificates, gradually some of them began to filter back to Odessa. The greatest impetus to reconstruction came after total victory in 1945. Bu the fall of that year, most of the schools, the opera, theaters and university were open again. There were long delays in getting the electric power station going. The October Revolution plant was at least partly back in in operation after May,1945. The January Uprising factory had also resumed production of oil-pumping equipment and cranes, while as Marty plant shipbuilding was slowly beginning again. 39*

In the very first days after the Red Army’s entry into the city, the age groups from 1894 to 1929 were ordered drafted; mobilization, which was apparently stretched out over several months, helped not only to increase the army’s manpower but also helped the authorities apprehend “suspect” males.40* The inevitable arrests began. Unfortunately, no reliable data are available. It is known that policemen who had served under Transnistrian authorities were arrested. It is understood that a considerable number of collaborators received sentences of from five to ten years. Professor Chasovnikov, who had gone to Bucharest and, thanks to his contacts there, assumed Romanian citizenship, was extradited and tried in Odessa; rumors about his fate differ too greatly to be reliable. Other fugitives from Odessa were caught in Timisoara; after the coup in mid-1944, Soviet prisoners of war, who “liberated” themselves, helped arrest some of the refugees who remained there. Apparently individual fates were determined by a variety of considerations. Of the leading actors, to judge by the Soviet press, Makkaveiski is again acting and is favorably reported on, while Mertsalova, who had never engaged in politics, seems to have disappeared.

Professor Varneke, who had enjoyed considerable prestige in prewar Russia, seems to have fallen from grace: the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia had devoted a long article to him; the second, postwar, edition fails altogether to mention him.41*

With the evacuees’ return, here, as elsewhere in the USSR, residents divided into two fairly hostile camps: evacuees and stay-behinds.42* The government generally backed the evacuees as the more active and loyal elements. Their attempts to reclaim apartments, furniture, and other goods abandoned four or five years earlier (and which meanwhile might have been resold several (times) often ran into stalwart opposition. Court action was often required to settle disputes. A new question in standard Soviet forms was whether or not the individual had lived under the occupation.

As late as 1950, a postwar escapee reported that students were refused admission to a mechanics’ school in Odessa because, as children, they had lived under the Romanians.
Yet, gradually, the experience of the war receded and discrimination abated. Housing, is true, was had to obtain: priority went to public and industrial construction. The standard of living was lower than before the war, at least for a number of years. In spite of official attempts to combat it, speculation once again thrived in Odessa. In 1951, visitors could see orphans and beggars walking the streets. On the whole, however, by 1951 Odessa had resumed its life as a major Soviet city.43*

How the Soviet authorities treated the Transnistrian experience lends support by direction to the interpretation of the impact of Romania rule advanced in this paper. What is left as significant as what is made explicit. During the war, the Soviet press had glorified the defenders of the city and portrayed the siege as a major military and political fear. Over 400 of the “heroes” were decorated, and by decree of December 22,1942, a special medal ”For the Defense of Odessa” was instituted. Odessa has customarily ranked the special gun salute reserved for “hero-cities.” About the Romanians, however, the Soviet wartime press was strikingly silent. Now and then there would be brief mention of partisan warfare in the Odessa area or the Moldavian SSR, but little real news about what went on in Transnistria. After the area’s recapture, it was convenient to blame agricultural and industrial difficulties (and not without reason) on the destruction wrought by the retreating enemy. Only rarely did the Soviet press give a detailed picture of Romanian-held Odessa, as Ilia Ehrenburg did in 1944. In the customary amalgam of truth and untruth, he made bitter fun of the “Daco-Romanian” claims to Russian territory. The accomplishments of the pioneers of “Greater Romania,” he wrote, were limited to the opening of swish bordellos in Odessa. “In Odessa University semi-literate violinists...give lectures of the Daco-Romanians, while Romanians gendarmes use gas against the Odessa residents hiding in the catacombs.”44* Compared with the ferocious and documented accounts of German atrocities there were mild and toothless charges.

In 1944, it was possible for several foreign newspapermen, including the New York Times correspondent W.H. Lawrence, and Richard E.Lauterbach, to visit Odessa within a week of the recapture to gather information of Romanian rule, and to interview men such as Dean Vasili of Uspenski Cathedral.

Bearing in mind the treatment accorded the Nazis by the Soviet press in 1944, it seems remarkable that censorship passed Lawrence’s dispatch, which did little more than say that the Romanians had put silk stockings up for sale in Odessa and that in general “the Romanians had been somewhat loose and lax administrators, open to bribery and corruption.” 45* The same “non-totalitarian” picture was implicit in the lengthy official report of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission released in June 13,1944. Compared with its reports on the other areas -separate reports were produced on every German or Romanian held area-this was a strikingly weak document. Its main of lines of attack were on (a) corruption; (b) destruction and plunder by the Romanians, and German destruction before they left in April, 1944; (c) atrocities. Interestingly, in the latter category not the least indication is given that the overwhelming number of the victims were Jews; on the contrary, the document took considerable pains to give non-Jews names of a few sample victims as if to reinforce thee reader’s impression that all Soviet citizens were exposed to murder and abomination. The report claims, without a conclusive breakdown, that a total of 200,000 persons perished in Transnistria-a figure none too meaningful unless it is known whether prisoners, Bessarabian Jews, and other categories are included. 46*

Both this and other Soviet reports named various Romanian and German generals and officers sought as war criminals. In May,1945, several of these, including General Trestorianu, the Odessa commandant, were tried in Bucharest by the Romanian authorities. Antonescu, Alexianu, and other leading Romanian officials were sentenced to death and executed after a secret trial.47*

Soon after the war, the Odessa oblast’ authorities set up a “Commission for the History of the Fatherland War.” In 1947 it published the first volume, covering the period of occupation, appeared two years later, and third on 1953. Interestingly enough, their publication was scarcely publicized; volumes II and III are apparently far less readily available than the first; and they are not mentioned as a source in any of the subsequent books and articles on the subject (such as the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia or the Borisov pamphlet). The second volume is a collection of factual, though propagandistically selected documents and the keen can reader can gather between the lines the limited success and support the Bolshevik organization enjoyed in Transnistria. Still, the volume is helpful to the analyst; moreover it contains excepts from other books and magazines not otherwise available. The third volume has not been located abroad.

Soviet authorities had publicly to face the problem of how to treat Transnistria after the publication of Valentin Kataev’s novel, For Soviet Rower!. in 1949. As mentioned earlier, the first version of this book, though typically Soviet, revealed something of the shortcomings, the diversity of views, the relative inactivity, and the small scope of the partisan movement in Transnistria. In February,1950, a leading Soviet writer-critic, in a lengthy article that merits close study, sharply attacked Kataev;48* he clearly had official support and encouragement. The upshot was extensive revision by Kataev. A few significant changes may be mentioned. The underground group’s leader emerge as far more authoritative, and the dealings between the Party Secretary and the members appear more formal; now the underground group keeps records, adopts resolutions, conducts “meetings. ” They are much more aware of their objectives, and their preparations are better planned and less chaotic than in the earlier version. The group’s operations now seem much more extensive and ambitious, and also more coordinated with other groups. Several new characters appear, including a “Comrade Vasili,” the commander of a parachutist team, who comes “from Moscow”-introduced in an obvious effort to stress the omniscient wisdom and centralized direction emanating from The Kremlin and extending as far as the Odessa catacombs. Moreover, the partisans apprehended by the Romanians now kill the “traitor” who has infiltrated the group and exposed it to the authorities. The entire book has a far heavier impress, and much of the charming spontaneity of the earlier version has been replaced by the conventions typical of Soviet fiction.49*

For “patriotic” as well as dramatic reasons, even Katev exaggerated the role of the partisans. Overemphasis on the partisans and the great role assigned to the party in virtually all postwar partisans memoirs characterizes other and more recent Soviet articles and books on the war years in Transnistria-in general there are fewer of them than on other critical areas. A certain awkwardness in the treatment of the whole problem persist. Since 1953,several “factual” pamphlets, largely on the military aspects of the campaign and siege, have appeared in Moscow.50* It perhaps reveals the “new spirit” that the latest article, published in Kiev in May,1955, stresses Romania abuses that were both real and genuinely important in determining popular attitudes: “Every enemy soldier could enter a house as if it was his own, and could appropriate whatever he liked. The occupant’s boot trampled the native (rodnoe) soil and ...human dignity.”51*
______________
1* V.M. Kononenko, Chornomortsy v boiakh za osvobozhdenie Kryma i Odessy, Voenizdat,Moscow,1954, chapter I.

2* For a summery of these negotiations, see Hitler’s Europe; for an extensive discussion, see Hillgruber, op. cit.

3* A notorious incident involving German and Italian troops and Romanian police in an Odessa cafe was reported by three different informants (Cf. Manuilov,pp.137-140; interview C; Peterle, op. cit).

4* On October 22,1943, Cottlob Berger notified Himmler: “Today such shocking reports about the threatening situation in the Ukraine arrived from the Reich Commissar and from (agricultural chief) Korner that Rosenberg had requested the Fuhrer to secure Marschal Antonescu’s consent for us to bring agricultural machinery, cattle, and grain into Transnistria with our own escorts...” (Berger to Himmler, October 22,1943, CRS, EAP 161b-12/335).

5* Hitler to Antonescu, October 25, 1943, USSR-240; excepts in Hillgruber, op. cit., p.176. and Trial of the Majot War Criminals, vol.7,pp.318ff.

6* Hoffmeyer to Kleist, Novemberr 9,1943, CRS, Wi/ID 2.419.

7* Antonescu to Hitlar, November 25, 1943, USSR-239; excepts in Hillgruber, pp.176-177.

8* Hillgruber, pp.177;ORW/WFSt/Wu. Vew. I (Keitel). “befehl fur die Einzung des Befehlshabers der deutschen ruppen in Transnistrien,” November 25,1943, CRS, DHMR and EAP 99/72.

9* OSS Documents 47308 and OB5630.

10* Beauftragter bei der Heeresgruppe Sud to RMfdbO., Fuhrungsstab Politik, February 2,1944, CRS, EAP 99/1184.

11* Peterle, op. cit.; Leit.San.-Offiz. DHMR, “Monatlicher Lagebericht,” October 15,1943, CRS,DHMR, H.GrA, HWiFu, “Kriegstagebuch,” 1943-1944,CRS, Wi/ID 2419.
No such plan seems to have existed. Rosenberg, after seeing Hitler about the problem of German supplies moving to and though Transnistria on November 17,1943 noted that “some of the German active there seem to consider themselves, as it were, forerunners of a German administration. I have forbidden this, but I wanted to ask the Fuhrer whether the problem of Transnistria might become acute for us. The Fuhrer replied in the negative...” (Rosenberg ), “Vermerk Uber Besprechung im Fuhrer hauprtquartier am 16 / 17.11.1943.” Document 039-PS.

12* Deutsche Akademik Munchen,op. cit.; interview D.

13* Manuilov, p.141; Peterle, op. cit.

14* Interview C; Manuilov, p.150.
This was an addition reason for the orders of October-November,1943, closing schools and preparing for the university’s evacuation westward from Transnistria. See OVOV vol.2, pp.67-68.

15* Manuilov, pp.141ff; interview A.

16* Peterle, op.cit.; interview C.

17* Hillgruber, op. cit., p.177; DNB, February 4.1944, reported in New Digest, London, February 7,1944,#1363, p.19.

18* AOK 8, AWiFu, “Zehntagemeldung,” January 21,1944, CRS, Wi/ID 2.587.

19* OKH/GenStdH/Gen Qu., “Monatsbericht Ost January 1944,” February 21,1944 (Army Group “A”), Document EC-107, p.9.

20* Hillgruber, op. cit., p.183; AOK 6, OQu/Qu 2, “Ubernahme der Verwaltung in Transnistrien,” March 20, 1944, CRS, AOK 6,59352/8; AOK 6,OQu, “KTB-Beitrag,” March 26, 1944, CRS, AOK 6, 59352/7.

21* Both for the Germans’ plan and for their estimate of the situation as it existed, the instructions issued for the military government organs on March 20,1944 are of some interest. The text is reproduced in the Appendix to this study.

22* AOK 6, Ia/OQu, “R-,L-, Z- Massnahmen im Grossraum Odessa,” March 26,1944, CRS, AOK 6, 59352/7; AOK 6, AwiFu, “Lagebericht,” April 23, 1944, CRS, Wi/ID 2.361; The New York Times, April 22; Lauterbach, op. cit., p.87.

23* Manuilov, pp.152-155.

24* The German Naval High Command insisted that Odessa “ must remain in our possession” because its importance for the supply of German forces in southern Russia and the Crimea (Bemerkungen des Ob.d.M., “Uber die Bedeutung von Odessa fur die Kriegsfuhrung in Sudosten,” March,1944, CRS,OKW/104).

25* An American scholar, then Balkan specialist in the Office of Strategic Services, recalls that “in the fall of 1944, I myself saw some of the Odessa trolleys running on the streets of Timiosoara in the Banat, with their Russian markings still not painted out” (Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, Harvard University Press, cambridge,1956, p.235).

26* Document USSR-47; V.Gordienko, “Odesshchina nakanune uborki urozhaia,” Izvestiia July 6,1944; Manuilov, pp.152-153.

27* ”Berich uber die Durchfuhrung de Z-Massnahmen in Gross-Odessa, Tiraspol and Beljaevka,” April,18,1944, CRS, Wi/ID 2.361.

28* Stefan Bandera was the leader of a quasi-fascist Ukrainian nationalist organization.

29* Abwehrtrupp20-1,”Tatigkeitsbericht,”March1,1944,CRS, AOK 6, 50808/4.

30* Peterle, op. cit.; interview E.

31* OKH/Gen.StdH, op. cit., pp.5,8.

32* AOK 6,Qu.2 “Ubernahme...”; AOK 6, Armeeintendant, “Afindung von einheimischen Arbeitskraften die bei deutschen Dienststellen in Transnistrien beschaftigt werden” April 23,1944,CRS, AOK 6,59352/7.

33* Manuilov,p.140,interview E; Kataev, op. cit., pp.50ff.

34* Manuilov,pp.27,152-154; Peterle, p. cit.; interview D; AOK 6, “Abfindung...” H.Gr.A., Wi.-Abt., “Lagebericht,” March 1,1944,CRS, Wi/ID 201.

35* Borisov, op. cit., pp.63-72; AOK 6, AwiFu, “Lagebericht.”

36* OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIIa), “Kgf.-Vernehmung,” February 18,1945, CRS, H3/690,pp.245-246.

37* Document USSR-47.

38* A few days later the reoccupation of Odessa, a Soviet newspaperman wrote:
...Beyond Sabaneyev Bridge is an extraordinary chaos of pianos with smashed keyboards and torn-out pedals .The Germans set fire to the charming colonnaded Stolarsky music school, pillaged the class rooms... On Deribas Street, the facades of buildings grown shabby during the occupation are covered with cheap Romanian signs. What did the Romanians sell in Odessa? The property of the people of Odessa...
All Odessa wants to be given something to do. At the first news that military commissariats have set up, everyone comes rushing. Our car gets stuck in Komsomolskaya Street. It is impossible to get through. The entire street is blocked with people waiting to enlist... (Evgeny Krieger, “Odessa’s Night and Morning,” Soviet War News, #841, April 24, 1944).

39* Borisov, op. cit., pp.74-75; Kurbatov, “V Odesse, ”Krasnaia Zvesda, November 16,1945; anonymous, “Odessa: Poslevoennyi period” (MS),1952.

40* It is interesting that a random sampling of German prisoner-of -war interrogations for the winter of 1944-1945 revealed at least one young deserter from Odessa who gave as the reason for his dessertation his experiences under the Romanians.

41* OKH/GenStdH/GenQu.,op. cit.; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIIa), op. cit.,pp.228-229; Manuilov,p153; interviews D and E.

42* Frequently a by-product of this division was a growth of anti-Semitism among those elements who had stayed on the spot; virtually all surviving and returning Jews (uniformly deprived of all previous possessions) invoked, or sought to invoke, official help to recover what remained of their former goods.

43* “Odessa: Poslevoennyi period.”

44* I.Ehrenburg, Voina, Vol3; 1945-1944, OGIZ,Moscow,1944,pp.66-67; Gordienko, op. cit.

45* The New York Times, April 22,1944 (dispatch filed April 16,1944).See also Lauterbach, op. cit.,pp.79-89.

46* Document USSR-47.

47* Bol’shevitskoe znamia, Odessa, May 18, 1945; Izvestiia, January 11 and 18,1946.

48* Michail Bubennov, “O novom romane Kataeva,”Octiabr’, Moscow, February ,1959, pp.3-19.

49* Kataev, Za vlast’ sovetov, Moscow,1949 (Ist ed.), and 1953 (rev’d ed.).

50* See Borisov, Kononenko, and K.V. Penzing, op. cit.

51* Pravda Ukrainy, May 7,1955.