CHAPTER VIII

Some Conclusions and Implications

The Romanian occupation of Transnistria between October, 1941, and March,1944, is often cited by Soviet refugees who lived under German rule as a foreign occupation that was considerably “better” than the German. It is this part prompted the present study. As might well have been expected, the picture of sweetness and light in wartime Odessa proves to be overdrawn. Nonetheless, the Transnistrian experience was significant and in many aspects unique.

Both in their policy and their practice the Romanians were considerably more lax than the Germans. Romanian rule lacked much of the extremism, racism, superciliousness, and rigidity of German rule. In day-to-day relations, it was far more indifferent to political consequences, but the average Romanian soldier manifested a considerably greater acquisitive spirit than did he German. In that the Transnistrian regime looked on Transnistria as an opportunity for positive Romanian colonization and its citizens as potential citizens of the mother-state, it was very unlike the Germans.

The Romanians in consequence were not reluctant, like the Germans, about investing capital in the economy and particularly in cultural projects. Romanian laxity and comparative benevolence-due in part to the ( perhaps subconscious ) respect which Odessa enjoyed among many Romanians as a cultural and economic metropolis-produced an atmosphere of bribery and speculation. More important, the absence of both Soviet controls and Nazi authority gave rise to a society which was more nearly a microcosm of a free Russia than that any other Soviet city. Odessa enjoyed opportunities for self-expression greater than it had possessed for many of year and surely much greater than any other Axis-occupied parts of the USSR.

To what extent the experience of Odessa be considered typical or indicate for the rest of the Soviet Union? It must be granted that evidence on rural Transnistria is scant and perhaps inadequate for meaningful generalization. German general statements can be made about the city of Odessa, provided, however, certain variables are kept in mind. It should be remembered that these were war years, and that war discourages certain marginal “non-essential” activities-in social, intellectual, and political life-and tends to impose a measure of austerity. In demographic composition, wartime Odessa was atypical: the number of adult males was considerably smaller than in peacetime-the largely to mobilization into the army and evacuation eastward. The evacuation also introduced a selective factor by primarily removing the pro-Soviet element of bureaucracy, Party members, and economic management, as well as a considerable number of industrial workers, foremen, and, of ethnic groups, a substantial percentage of the Jewish population. The result was a particularly acute shortage of men with administrative know-how; the intelligentsia as a whole was less significantly affected.

One may argue that Odessa was at no time a typical Soviet city. More than most other cities, it had had its own specific cultural and social reputation and routine, its own jargon, and perhaps its own values. This was more true before 1930; the trend in the Soviet era had been towards standardization, and in 1941 Odessa was in the process of being assimilated and was approaching the Soviet urban norm. Certain of its peculiar characteristics, however, persisted, and these, it may be posited, intensified the Romanian-bred proclivity for shady dealings. Odessa was perhaps a little more cosmopolitan than most Russian cities; the nationality question also was apparently-though it is hard to prove this-less acute there than elsewhere in the Ukraine. With these exceptions, the responses of the residents of Odessa may by large be assumed to have been the same as those of other Soviet urban citizens.

It is convenient to divide the Romanian occupation into three periods: the first months, in the
winter of 1941-1942, when the general uncertainty and economic chaos produced a certain crisis and near-stalemate, though signs of economic and slight cultural change were already being manifested; the major period of the occupation, from the spring of the 1942 to the summer of 1943, when both the economy and artistic and social life underwent substantial changed and gained a certain new elan, though accompanied by distinctly unsavory business practices and the prevalence of draft; and the final phase, in late 1943 and early 1944, of Axis military setbacks and the concomitant economic and political crisis in which most inhabitants looked forward to the return of the Soviet authorities and shaped their own behavior accordingly, in which prices rose as goods became scarce, and the Germany finally took over military government from the crumbling Romanian administration.

The economic, cultural, and political activities of the native population have been examined. The galvanization of economic life was most substantial and began earliest: that of cultural activities was easiest to accomplish and remarkable but was, by its very nature, limited; autonomous political activity was at least and came last, though often supplemented by or sublimated into forms which may be labeled Ersatz political action. That there was so little political activity of conventional sort does not necessarily indicate a lack of interest in public affairs. To a large extent, it is attributable to people’s preoccupation with more immediate and personal concerns, to lack of experience in making political choices, to restrictions imposed by the new authorities regime, and to the ubiquitous sense of fear that lingered even after the Soviet forces left.

There was considerably less reason for fear in economic pursuits, and many who would not dared not give public expression to their political views and desires (insofar as they were capable of articulating them) had little or not hesitation about engaging in private enterprises. The economic upsurge-if not in productivity, at least in individual participation and involvement in it-was unmistakable enough to warrant labeling it a “New NEP;” and it disproves, at least in this sphere, the hypothesis of an “inert” Soviet population.

Indeed, the occupation bared how deep-seated the quest for personal advantage was; most city-dwellers were willing and able to display initiative in order to secure it. They shaped a new way of life which was typically that of an acquisitive society.

The “inertness” hypothesis is further disproved by the high degree of sensitivity with which economic life responded to external impulses. Prices fluctuated to take into account changes in weather, supply routes, competing imports, the arrival of soldiers or leave, and other variables; currency exchange reflected not only supply and demand but also military developments and political trends.

And it is surely not an “inert” society that reacted as Odessa did to such events as the battle of Stalingrad:

The people had entirely lost their heads (the German consul cabled from Odessa in February,1943). The peasants sold what they had, in order to procure horses and carts. In the cities all cash was exchanged into foodstuffs. This contributed in turn to a substantial rise in prices. For days the food stores in Odessa were sold out. Many Russians spoke of suicide if the Bolsheviks should return...

Actually, in the year before the Soviet return many changed their minds, and there were few suicides relatively few attempts to escape in the spring of 1944. This very ability to make political choices and to change one’s mind politically further invalidates the “inertness” theory. Moreover, the evidence indicates that political choice was not a function of material well-being. Undoubtedly, their lack of an adequate subsistence level push many workers and some intellectuals into opposition to the Transnistrian authorities; and unquestionably the high standard of living attained by some of the “new elite” helped anchor their loyalties on the Romanian side. Yet there are too many instances at variance with this to accept it as the general rule; while material security may often have been necessary prerequisite, it was certainly not sufficient in itself to produce allegiance.

Although displaying economic activity and distinct hostility to certain facets of Soviet life, the population manifested unwillingly a considerable residue of the Bolshevik ethic and its patterns of behavior.

Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to assess post facto these facets, particularly on the basis of such source materials as have been available for the present paper.

The turbulent siege and occupation, with the population movements accompanying them, naturally increased social mobility, particularly in an upward direction. Most significant perhaps was the emergence of a “ new elite”-with developed partly as a result of Romanian policy but which was largely a natural outgrowth, and which secured for itself privileges in economic and social status. A small group within this elite were political figures accepted or appointed by the Romanians; a larger group, the new managers of economic enterprises and other administrative-supervisory personnel; the greatest contingent were those engaged in “ commercial capitalism” both legitimate and shady-and who had been especially successful.

The political collaborators came primarily from the intelligentsia ( in the broad Russian sense of the word); they included people who had been Soviet -trained as well as those with pre-Soviet experience. Men in the age backed between forty and fifty predominated; the younger age groups were either not in Odessa or were afraid; the older ones lacked incentives for collaboration and were at times held back by greater moral scruples than the Soviet feneration.1* The economic “entrepreneurs” came from all walks of life, both men and women, laborers and professors, both pre-Soviet and Soviet-trained; perhaps predominating were men whose previous work had prepared them for such tasks; NEP men, store-keepers, and those who had white-collar positions in the Soviet economy. The managerial elite came almost entirely from the technician class; they had had similar work in the Soviet period and when their superiors left moved upward from level of specialists to that of managers; this satisfied both their ego and their wish for greater economic reward.

The extent to which previously frustrated ambitions were now satisfied cannot be measured. Virtually all social strata sought “normalcy,” security, and abundance; these fundamentally “middle-class” aspirations stemmed both from Soviet-generated values and from a hostile reaction to certain facets of Soviet life. In refugee discussions of this period, labels such as obyvatel’skie and meschaskie (philistine) recur with striking frequency as if to underscore this desire for more comfortable living; those who could afford it sought conspicuous wealth and consumption as well as comfort. Indeed, black marketers, brass bands in the public squares, cafe life, and retail stores, a re-opened university and opera, lipsticks and corsets, were all expressions of this feeling. More than once visiting Germans characterized the prevailing spirit of Odessa as “Enjoy yourself” - or perhaps “Enrich yourself.”

All these were manifestations of what may be called the “rightist” response to the Soviet regime. There was also a “leftist” reaction, equally diffuse though much less pronounced. It objected not only to the corruption and social inequality of the Romanian-instituted system, but also to the Soviet regime’s similar shortcomings. The “leftists” rejected Soviet rule precisely because it was not as Communist as they wished it . A small minority of society, the “leftists” were to be found both among the intelligentsia (for instance at the university) and in the workers’ quarters.2*

Most of the population attached no onus to “collaboration.” There was at first some fear and wait-and-see attitude, but no moral condemnation of collaborators by fellow-citizens, except of those in certain specific pursuits. Police personnel, informants, and censors, for instance, were decidedly frowned on (even by other collaborators) for their “indecent” or “treacherous” activities. The Romanians made rather strenuous efforts to get the allegiance of the population, but though residents accepted collaborators, they did not accept their new masters. Patriotism and especially local pride seem to have been strong even where anti-Bolshevism was intense.

Two rather complex problems remain to be clarified.

(1) It has been commonly posited- and the present writer fully agrees-that the opposition to the collective farm, either in toto or to some of its salient features, is a real “Achilles heel” of the Soviet system.

This view is reinforced by the mass of evidence showing a spontaneous partition of collectives, or parts of them, when Soviet controls broke down during the war; where the kolkhoz system remained substantially intact, the kolkhoz generally became a source of popular grievances and contributed in varying degrees to the disillusionment of the rural population with the German order.3*

Oddly enough, however, widespread rural acceptance of the Romanian alternative was not preceded or accompanied by the liquidation of the kolkhoz system. Some changes were introduced, but basic institution was scarcely altered. In this instance, in other words, a satisfaction of anti-kolkhoz grievances was not a prerequisite for loyalty. The following explanations seem to carry the most weight:

(a) even though the kolkhoz system was formally retained, the spirit in which it was operated was different. The Romanians did not enforce kolkhoz regulations as the Soviet had, and this tended to make the peasant less sensitive about the collective.4*

(b) The retention of the system seemed less important than the fact that (1) deliveries to the state were somewhat reduced-this tended to raise the peasants’ standard of living, and that (2) the removal of restraints on trade and prices encouraged trade and various deals that enabled the rural folk to secure more products -necessary consumer goods as well as “luxuries”-than they had under Soviet conditions.

(c) The above factors dulled the immediacy and urgency of anti-kolkhoz sentiments, and other aspects of the Romanian occupation, such as the restoration of church life tended to give the Romanians a positive halo-at least in 1942 and part of 1943. All of this made the peasantry accept the new regime even though the collectives were as yet unabolished.

This does not invalidate the hypothesis that anti-kolkhoz sentiment was widespread; where is certainly no evidence from Transnistria that the collectives were popular or that people wanted to keep then. It does indicate, however, that under certain circumstances- and theoretically these can occur under Soviet as well as non-Soviet rule-desire for rural change can be so submerged or suppressed even among anti-kolkhoz that a regime wedded to the perpetuation, in one from or other, of the collective farms is still accepted.

(3) Another seeming paradox arises in connection with the thesis that Soviet citizens have a particularly keen sensitivity to symbols of individual and group dignity, personal abuse, physical and moral humiliation. This implies that judgments about a political system are more importantly influenced by personal, day-to-day contacts and experiences than by abstractions slogans, and ideologies (though this is not deny the role of abstractions). Yet, in Transnistria, the new system was accepted in spite of extensive abuse, looting, rape, and general atmosphere of insecurity and unpredictability. The actions of individual (and generally poorly disciplined) Romanian officials or soldiers could not be predicted, and their ubiquitous and avarice did nothing their standing in the residents’ eyes. The paradox may perhaps be explained in the following manner:

The average resident of Transnistria had considerably more contact with the occupying authorities than did the Soviet citizen in German territory; this was particularly true in urban areas, but even elsewhere Romanian officialdom was proportionately more numerous and visible than, say the Germans in backwoods villages around Briansk, Polotsk, or Pskov. In German-held areas the few contacts with the Germans were often of a ’’negative” sort-compulsory commandeering of grain, punitive anti-partisan operations forced-labor conscription, and the like; in Transnistria, because of the greater frequency of contacts, “negative” experiences a smaller proportion of the total.

But the difference in number of contacts does not seem to explain the difference attitude toward the Germans and the Romanians. One may argue with some justification that the abusive, arbitrary acts of the Romanians constituted only a part, and perhaps none too significant a part, of the total of impressions; other milder and at times more benevolent, experiences counterbalancing these went into the formation of the total judgment on the new order. Refugees and Germans alike frequently assert that in Odessa the people did not hate the occupying power-as occupation; instead, they regarded the Romanians “with contempt and almost pity.” Psychologically perhaps a natural and useful defense, this condescension on the part of occupied toward their occupier helped established a modus vivendi; the occupied did not feel nearly so “inferior” as they did in the German-occupied territory. The basic difference in the approach of the Romanians and the Germans lies at the root of the difference in the way their rule was regarded.

Thus, although individual, personal experience with the new order, and particularly impressions of abuse and humiliation, played a considerable part in Transnistria as elsewhere in Soviet territory, it was not the controlling element in determining popular attitudes toward the occupying authorities.
At the start, most residents were willing to accept the new system and make the most of it; gradually disillusioned, most were at the end willing once again to accept the Soviet system. The growth of hostility toward the Transnistrian regime, especially pronounced in 1943-1944, was due to several major causes; general war-weariness and desire to “get it over with, ” the contagious upsurge of patriotism and the widespread belief that the Soviet government had reformed and been liberalized during the war; the actual turn of the tide on the battlefield; fear of Soviet persecution for collaboration with the enemy, which prompted a rationalizing of anti-Romanian attitudes; and the deterioration of economic conditions in Odessa. And, of course, in time, any military or foreign occupation is bound to become onerous and unpopular.

When all this is said, however, the contrast with conditions in the German-held areas of the USSR strongly suggests that there is a distinct functional relationship between the type of occupation policy and contact, on the one hand, and response of the subject population, on the other. Viewed in terms of the judgment, attitude, and perhaps behavior of the Soviet population, it does seem to have mattered a good deal how the occupying power conducted itself. In the period of 1941-1945, the citizens of the USSR (as exemplified by the Transnistria sample) were neither so firmly wedded to the Soviet cause as to endorse it unquestioningly and irrevocably , nor so blindly hostile to it as to accept any alternative without further inquiry and experience. The way the balance tipped in any given situation-holding external factors such as military events constant-depended greatly on the purposes, methods, and attitudes of the alternative regime.

Without a doubt, the Romanian system in Transnistria was far more popular than was the German. Germans and neutral observers, Soviet refugees, and of course the Romanians themselves repeatedly stress that in Odessa conditions were better than in German-held areas-higher living standards and a climate of greater relaxation and security. This was significant, as in the last analysis, economic and political life in wartime Odessa was in many ways unhealthy and abortive (cultural life tended to be more genuine and of higher quality). Even so, Transnistrian experience, at least in the middle span and at least for large segments of the population, involved certain markedly economic welcome changed over either Soviet or German rule.

It is difficult to say just what factors were crucial in making Transnistrian rule seem to the people preferable to a German occupation, In all likelihood it was a combination of positive and negative elements. The absence of German forced-labor conscription and certain other forms of terror and duress, for instance, played a considerable part; so did the greater economic plenty, the greater leeway given the resident population in business and in cultural and educational pursuits, and the greater opportunity for self-expression enjoyed under the Romanians.

Soviet reactions reflect the preference for Transnistrian rule over German rule. The partisan movement in the area was ephemeral as compared with that in the “classical” areas of Byelorussia and the RSFSR. The Soviet authorities were hard-pressed to find effective accusations against the Romanian authorities there. The contrived and relatively shallow nature of most of their charges (except for spoliation of Soviet installations, objects of art, and private property) in itself attests to this fact.

Transnistria was no viable body politic. Virtually no one regarded it as much. Yet it demonstrated that the Soviet population was capable of operating in the non-Soviet environment and under a non-Soviet regime; and that it was willing , under certain circumstances, to adjust to a non-Soviet system once the latter appeared to be more or less solidly entrenched, and once it promised to satisfy at least some of aspirations which Soviet rule had failed to satisfy. It demonstrated that the Soviet population knew, within limits, what it wanted, that it was capable of choosing that which promised it a squarer deal.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the material well-being and prestige of some of those well off under Transnistrian auspices would not have been so great had not a significant segment of the population been removed -a consideration which, is true, might have been counterbalanced and neutralized, if factors and other evacuated or destroyed equipment had remained in operation. The emergence of a new elite, also, produced a curious operational dilemma for the occupying power: the granting of privileges anchored the loyalty of the elite more solidly; yet the very formation of an elite by these methods tended to antagonize the rest of the population. The Romanians never coped with this problem, just as they never adequately coped with the problems of the long-range political evolution of Soviet society. Transnistria was a short-term experiment. For a variety of reasons, its lessons are limited. The implications, nonetheless, remain.

Summary

As a result of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June,1941, the Odessa region found itself in the throes of mobilization, reorganization, and evacuation. Later, from mid-August tj mid-October,1941, it was under siege by Romanian forces. Finally, from October 16,1941, to April 10,1944, it lived under Romanian occupation.

At the outbreak of war, the local state and party authorities in Odessa apparently moved swiftly and even, after recovering from initial shock, efficiently to carry out the first major “war measures” passed down from Moscow and Kiev. There is little evidence of initiative on the part of local officials so long as the channels transmission of orders from above remained intact. There are suggestions that the local were afraid to improvise and awkward in devising ad hoc emergency measures. This was true mainly in political and administrative matters.

Individual initiative was more apparent in two other areas: technical and logistic ingenuity were apparent in the handling of production and transportation under emergency conditions, and some local initiative was forthcoming in proposing military moves. The prime example of the latter was suggestion by an Odessa naval officer in August,1941, that Odessa should be held rather then abandoned.

Plans for mobilization, establishment of “destruction battalions” (in theory convertible into partisan units, though in fact largely thrown into combat), and civil defense measures had been prepared in advance or were easily organized according to standard patterns. A number of other problems, such as evacuation of personnel and installations, provision of food for the city and its hinterland, and emergency mass enrollment into the so-called opolchenie, were apparently handled without much skill. Some of these tasks, such as the evacuation, were accomplished incompletely and behind schedule. Others , for example, civilian conscription, were something of a failure, probably because of the intrinsic difficulty of the tasks rather than the failings of key individuals.

Most Red Army and Navy personnel and a few party their “administrative nerve” better than managers of economic enterprises or some of the state and city officials. Many of the latter were ill-prepared to cope with such unexpected and gigantic responsibility. and were prone, on convenient pretext , to evacuate themselves and their families. Moreover, the progressive breakdown of overland contact with Odessa and the disruption of the military chain of command intensified the confusion and under the siege, fostered a sense of futility among local officials.

Party organizations generally operated more smoothly and continuously than state and soviet organs, so that responsibility for decision-making shifted informally to obkoms and gorkoms, as it may have done less conspicuously in peacetime.

At this time of crisis, the multiplicity of peacetime authorities clustered into two groups: the military (army and navy) and the political (party and NKVD). In the organization of evacuation ,the two acted jointly: the army and navy assumed responsibility for military personnel and equipment, and the party took charge of the withdrawal of civilian personnel and industrial facilities. On the other hand, the trhee major military decisions-to hold Odessa under siege, to stage a relief operation at Dofinovka, and to abandon Odessa-were all made by military alone( in this case the Soviet High Command, the stavka) and were transmitted to Odessa from outside. The first of these, however, and perhaps also the others, stemmed from local suggestions. In the mid-August,1941, the commander of Odessa Naval Base took it upon himself to suspend the evacuation and urge the Black Sea Fleet to prepare to hold out under siege, a suggestion favorably passed on by the stavka.
The full scope of NKVD and police activities cannot be gauged from the available evidence, but they seem to have dovetailed with party operations, as in the establishment underground units, control of industrial production, supervision of the fire-fighting after air raids, and apprehension of “panic-makers” and “saboteurs”.

In order to co-ordinate emergency measures during the defense of Odessa and to secure maximum of co-operation among the increasingly autonomous branches of local authorities, a network of small administrative committees was established, consisting typically of the representative each from party, state, and police (NKVD), and sometimes army. Such three-or four-man committee were left in charge of rayony and towns when the regular authorities had been evacuated or had dispersed. The effectiveness of these committees depended of the individual members. They seem to have functioned with measure of success. On the whole, order issued by the various Soviet authorities both before and during the siege were given the same kind of perfunctory or superficial obedience that Soviet decree had commanded before the war. Sometimes orders were obeyed overzealously, as after the appeal to expose enemy spies and agents; at other times, they were followed with extreme reluctance, as in the rationing of water, the destruction of certain supplies, and the mining of certain buildings-all matters which affected the individual citizen. It appears certain that the number of individuals failing to obey regulations-dodging mobilization, circumventing official evacuation, violating ration decrees-was substantially greater than in “normal” times. To same extent, the breakdown of Soviet authority and prestige was a concomitant of the deteriorating military and political position, for it stemmed from the belief that an early change of regimes would bring impunity for lawbreakers.

The most chaotic administrative operation, perhaps, was the evacuation of men and material. This was due in large measure to he absence of previous experience or preparation, as well as to contradictory directives and concepts of priority. The same difficulties afflicted the shift to underground work when the surrender of Odessa became imminent, and these were further complicated by the need to operate surreptitiously in order to avoid denunciation for “defeatism” by those zealots who did not publicly admit of surrender to the Germans.

Soviet sources are misleading on the part played by the party and the Komsomol, whose rank-and-file members clearly fell short of the achievements attributed to them after the war. Apparently party officials consciously established priorities in indoctrination. Acknowledging that they could not maintain under crisis conditions and with reduced personnel the “monolithic” control of peacetime, the authorities (probably at the oblast level) chose to concentrate on the few matters, such as the security of the port and the morale and loyalty of the key personnel.

The Odessa experience suggests that the breakdown of the Soviet prestige need not necessary entail of collapse o Soviet controls of fields where the party decided that its maintenance is crucial. The processes of government , conditioned by the increasing proximity of the front lines, were carried on long as the authorities made a point of carrying them on. Though abnormally slow and complicated, they were not disrupted significantly by popular discontent or even disloyalty. Life under Soviet conditions, both before and after the war , appears to have been marked by a wide divergence between popular feeling and overt behavior. During the siege, the many degrees of defeatism and disgruntlement had little direct bearing on behavior or on the persistence of Soviet rule.

Yet the war and the siege had profound impact on the people’s morale. Nervousness, rumor-mongering , hoarding of supplies, anticipation of Soviet defeat, resentment of evacuation of the privileged, lack of news, and sleepless nights from air attacks contributed to a sense of insecurity. With the passage of time, many of the more reliable citizens were evacuated or mobilizes. There is no evidence of fanatical determination to hold the city. The man in the street had become broadly indifferent or latently hostile to the Soviet system. Yet he continued to report for work and fulfill his duties, at once hoping for and fearing the imminent change.

Explicit political initiative , aside from the official Bolshevik variety, remained virtually nonexistent until the capture of Odessa in October,1941. This surface passivity stemmed partly from many years of outward obedience to authority and partly from a sense that the prescription for survival was silence. Moreover, those age and social groups which might have taken political action were the very ones most likely to have been evacuated: army officers, factory managers, Soviet officials. Widespread expectation of Soviet defeat and vague talk of a new, non-Soviet order mingled, often incoherently, with Russian patriotism in such a way as to confuse the average citizen and persuade him anew that the best policy was one of watchful waiting.

The increasing hardship of life left the citizen little leisure for political ideas or action and turned his attention to hoarding , black-marketeering, and speculation, activities which the weakened Soviet controls could no longer thwart. The peak of this kind of lawless individualism was the rash of looting which broke out in Odessa during the confused days of the withdrawal of The Soviet troops and the arrival of the Romanians. The looters were by no means only professional thieves or criminals. Most of the town reportedly participated in the chaotic “appropriation” of government property and of goods from the apartments of evacuees.

Soviet administration during the siege was impeded less by popular discontent than wartime dislocations, inexperience, inability to cope with nivel situation s, and fear of assuming responsibility not formally delegated from above. This is not minimize the extent of popular discontent, which grew at the siege dragged on, presaging the end of Soviet rule. A substantial part of Odessa’s residents, expecting a complete collapse of the Red Army , prepared to accept an alternative to Soviet rule, and this fact goes far to explain the strikingly small support which, during the Romanian occupation, the people tendered the Soviet partisans and underground.

The partisan organization itself was less effective than in most other parts of the occupied USSR. Only toward the end of the war , when systematic military support from the Soviet side was given the small partisan nuclei, and when many citizens joined the bands to whitewash themselves in anticipation of the Red Army return, was it of any significance. Apart from popular discontent with Soviet rule, the main reason for the partisans’ failure to attract more support was the relatively mild occupation policy of the Romanians in the Odessa area, which they renamed the province of Transnistria. One can establish a district correlation between the toughness of occupation policy and the support received by the partisans from the population. Transnistria and the Northern Caucasus, where occupation policy was least oppressive, stand out of failure for the Soviet partisan movement.
The Romanian-occupied territory of Transnistria contrasted sharply with the German-ruled areas of the USSR. Some Romanians wanted their country to annex Transnistria und turn it into Romanian province. Others argued that Romania had no need, no capital, and no manpower to acquire Lebenstraum in the East. In any event it was not to become a colonial area, for the Romanian regime, plagued with other problems, regarded Transnistria simply as a bargaining counter for the post war return of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania.

Romanian occupation policy, both in intent and in implementation, was much laxer than that of the Germans. Romanian conduct lacked the extremism, dogmatism, and to some extent the superciliousness of the Nazis. In day0to-day relations the authorities exhibited indifference to the long-range political consequences of their actions, while the annexationist minority among the occupiers treated the former Soviet citizens much as they did their fellow-Romanians.
While Romanian policy and conduct in Transnistria were not uniformly lax, the local inhabitant enjoyed enough freedom to display their abilities and interests, and generally to demonstrate how a large urban Soviet population could operate under a measure of autonomy. The absence of both Soviet and Nazi controls made of Transnistria a microcosm of a “free Russia.“ Although Odessa was not in all way a typical Soviet city, the lessons of its wartime experience are nonetheless significant ands valid.

The Romanian occupation may be divided into three periods: the winter of 1941-1842, when economic chaos, privation, and fear combined to produce a mood of crisis; the major period , from spring of 1942 to the summer of 1943, which witnessed substantially increasing activity in economic, cultural, and social life; and the final phase, in late 1943 and early 1944, when the setbacks of the Axis powers led most of the inhabitants to adjust their activities to the expected return of the Soviet authorities.

In the middle period, the galvanization of economic life was the earliest and the most substantial sign of indigenous activity. Initiative in the fields of cultural, educational, and religious affairs was considerable. Autonomous political activity was the last to appear, the least pronounced, and was often supplemented by or sublimated into forms that have been referred to as Ersatz politics. The limited evidence of conventional political actions does not imply an innate lack of interest in public affairs, but rather a preoccupation with more pressing, personal concerns, a lack of political experience, and inhibitions lingering from the past.

On the economic side, the occupation revealed among the people a deep-seated quest for personal advantage, and the necessary ingenuity to secure it; in brief, the will to evolve toward a typically “acquisitive” society. Connected with this was the emergence of a new elite with a materially and socially privileged position. Some of its members were appointees of the new regime; others were the new managers of old enterprises; but the greatest number were adventitious captains of “commercial capitalism,” legitimate as well as shady.

While the political collaborators were predominantly “intellectuals” of both pre-Soviet and Soviet vintage (with men between the ages of 35 and 50 predominating), the new entrepreneurs came from all walks of life and included men and women with previous experience of business: store keepers, white-collar Soviet economic personnel, and NEP men. The new managerial elite consisted almost entirely of technicians who had replaced their former directors after the latter ere evacuated.

There was a segment of the population, especially among university circles and some skilled workers, that strove to provide an ideal or moral basis for the new order of society. Its aspirations never crystallized clearly, for it never acquired a medium of public expression. The views of these people conflicted violently with Romanian practice in that they opposed both corruption and social inequality.

The bulk of the population were opportunists, but their patriotism was too strong for wholesale with the Romanians. On the other hand , not until 1943 was there any considerable revulsion against the occupiers. The typical evolution was from initial accommodation , through gradual disillusionment, to ultimate hostility. Several factors were responsible: general war-weariness; an upsurge of patriotism; the reversal of fortunes on the battlefield; deterioration of material condition in Odessa toward the end of the occupation; and a sense that the Romanians, who were after all foreign and somewhat supercilious, had hot satisfied and would not satisfy their desire for security and stability.

The growth of hostility against the Romanians, however, should not be allowed to obscure the contrast between Transnistria and the German-held areas of the USSR. The relative success of the Romanians supports their thesis that the specific nature of occupation policy and behavior mattered a good deal it determining the response of the subject population.

The Odessa case confirms he suspicion that many citizens of the USSR were neither so firmly wedded to the Soviet cause in World War II as to endorse it unquestioningly , not so blindly hostile to it as to accept another form of government without inquiry and experience. Whether, given a choice between forms of government, the Soviet people will take one side or the other must depend to an appreciable extent on the purposes, methods, and attitudes of the alternative regime. With all its limitations and abuses, the Transnistrian experiment rapidly gained popular confidence through higher living standards and atmosphere of greater relaxation. The absence of terror and forced labor, and greater opportunities for self-expression, both economic and cultural, go far to explain the overwhelming popular preference for Romanian over German rule.

The story of Transnistria demonstrates that Soviet people can effectively operate in non-Soviet environment, under an anti-Soviet regime. Under certain conditions the bulk of those in one southern area were willing to adjust to and make the most of an environment more favorable to individual initiative than the Soviet system.

Appendix

Order #1
(Source: CRS, AOK 11, 22409/79)
( Translation )

To the Destruction Battalion in Komintern Rayon of Odessa Oblast, July 2, 1941

Art.1. On the basis of Order #247 of the NKVD of Odessa Oblast, dated June 25,1941, I assume the tasks of commander of the destruction battalion in Komintern Rayon. As my Deputy for Political Affairs I appoint Comrade Maksiuk.

Art.2. I appoint as chief of operative work at the headquarters of the destruction battalion, with the title of chief of staff, Comrade Komanov, I.I As adjutant of the staff I appoint Comrade Danidov.

Art.3 The destruction battalion is to be established in company strength , consisting of three platoons and two separate platoons, for which purpose the following officers are appointed.
Deputy for Political Affairs:

Art.4. All platoon leaders immediately assume their positions.

Art.5. The company commander, Com Manzhos, and the other platoon leaders are to select , no later than by July 3, those persons who possess sufficient military knowledge to be made squad leaders, so as to have at least four squad leaders to each platoon, and each squad with no fewer then nine men. The roster of men assigned as squad leaders is to be submitted for my confirmation.

Art.6 I make the several platoon leaders individually responsible for the composition and condition of their platoon. Company Commander , Com. Manzhos , is personally responsible for the state of the company. In all instances of violation of discipline, internal disorder, and unrest, he is to apply the severest measures of disciplinary punishment, in accordance with regulations. He is to report all such instances to me.

Art.7. The chef of staff of the destruction battalion, Com. Romanov, is entrusted by me with the direction of operative work:

(1) elaboration of training plan;
(2) determination of alarm system;
(3) establishment of internal details for the battalion;
(4) elaboration of practical plan for tactical training, to include an attack in inhabited localities ad mine fields. Fixed days are to be set for the conduct of tactical exercises.

Art.8. My deputy for political affairs ,Com. Maksuit, is to be work out a program for political activities for the entire battalion. The implementation thereof is to be assigned to the political officers within the framework of the battalion. The direction of political work lies in the hands of Comrade Muksuit.

The order is to be made known to the entire battalion.

Commander of the destruction battalion
(Izverezhnik)

Enclosure: Top Secret
T/O of Destruction battalion

1.Btn CO-1
2.Dep. for Pol.Affairs-1
3. Chief of Staff-1
4. Staff Adjutant-1
5. Company commander-1 officer for 100 riflemen
6. Platoon leader-1 officer for 30-35 riflemen
7 Squad leader-1 officer for 9-10 men
8 Chief Ammunition Supply-1
9. Supply (clothing) NCO-1

Instructions Issued to German Military Government Organs, March 20, 1944 ?5*
(Translation)

(1) General Administration

(a) The center of gravity of the administration is the rayon. The Romanian praetors (rayon chiefs) are to remain in office for time being. All higher Romanian administrative agencies (district, sector,
etc.) disappear. The indigenous mayors remain in office object to screening.
(b) Only those branches of administration are to be continued which contribute to the maintenance
of security and order as well as those essential for supply of troops and population.
(c) Romanian administrative law remains in effect unless specifically altered by order of
German administrative agencies.
(d) Schools to be closed only where the building are needed for billeting of troops.
(e) The organization of Christian churches remains unaltered.
(f) The financial administration is to be pursued within the framework of the current budget on the
rayon level. The Bank of Transnistria remains in the country and will be taken over by competent
German officers. The rayon continue to be able to dispose of their accounts. Salaries continue
to be paid; those for March have already been paid by the Romanian administration... As receipts
from taxes are not expected to suffice, the levying of capital tax and credit with the Bank of
Transnistria are contemplated.
(g) Postal, telegram and telephone service for civilian population is not to be continued.

(2) Law

(a) Civil justice rests (i.e., is non -existent).
(b) Punitive authority against the civilian population is exercised by administrative procedure
by the rayon chiefs (up to four weeks of forced labor and monetary fine up to RM 1000)
and the district commandants (for all cases meriting higher punishment). Death sentences
and sentences to over one year of forced labor require confirmation by the (German) field
commandant...

(3) Civil heath and veterinary service: to be continued by the Romanians under direction of
army doctors and veterinarians.

(4) Direction of propaganda and cultural institutes is taken over by the (army) propaganda
agencies, to be financed by rayons or cities.

Bibliography

Note on Primary Sources

(1) The printed collections of documents, such as Trial of Major War Criminals and other materials emanating from the Nuremberg trials, contain only a minimum of pertinent information. Among the useful items are affidavits and depositions made to the Soviet authorities by Gheogrhe Alexianu, wartime governor of Transnistria, and by Romanians officials; there are available at the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

The records introduced in evidence at other . and more directly relevant, war crimes trials, particularly in Romania and Odessa itself, are not available and are known only from brief accounts in the Soviet press. The pertinent unpublished documents introduced at the subsequent Nuremberg trials are relatively low caliber.

(2) The German records at the Captured Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General Office, U.S. Army, Alexandrria, Virginia, are rather voluminous but, proportionately, or small value. They include the incomplete files of the Deutsche Heeresmission in Rumanian ( the German military liaison staff in Bucharest during the war) and some of its subordinate units in occupied Soviet territory; some materials directly from German army units and an occasional folder of the economic liaison staff in Odessa. All in all, these records are of interest for the formal and administrative arrangements governing the Romanian occupation and Romanian-German dealings, primarily, for 1941 and 1944. They are particularly poor in information on attitudes and in political reporting; they skip almost entirely the crucial period from late 1941 to early 1943.

(3) German diplomatic records seem to have been of high quality. However, by far the best single collection-the reports and records of the German Consulate General in Odessa, 1942-1944, under Dr. Werner Stephany-have not been located. Whether they were lost or were captured by the Soviet authorities cannot be ascertained. Excerpts or copies found in other files indicate, despite notable bind spots, a considerable measure of perspicacity. Some other German diplomatic records, available on microfilm in the Historial Branch, U.S. Department of State, have likewise been of interest and value.

(4) Other contemporary documents have yielded little. Romanian records are virtually unavailable; U.S. diplomatic and other wartime reports are of practically no value-a few documents from the former O.S.S. files include translations and paraphrases from newspapers and dispatches not otherwise available; Italian diplomatic files 7* could not be utilized. Romanian documents which found their way into German files have also been used.

(5) Published contemporary materials, other than Soviet sources, include several books and pamphlets produced in wartime Romania, such as historical-ethnic accounts of Transnistrian history, tailor-made to fit Romanian imperialist ambitions; several German and other Axis descriptions of Transnistria; descriptions of military events; and some rather pedestrian pieces on the reception accorded the Romanians and on their accomplishments. Of considerably grater value are the periodicals and newspapers. A search of the accessible libraries and a check by mail with various overseas depositaries have revealed no copies of any of the newspapers published in the Odessa area under Romanian occupation, except for a complete set of the German-language paper, Der Deutsche in Transnistriaen, which, however, as not only empty and inferior but also tended to ignore events that did not involve ethnic Germans. Files of Bucharest papers, however, contain a number of pertinent items, such as do unlikely newspapers as the Belgrade Donauzeitung, the Zagreb Neue Ordnung. the Madrid Arriba, and various German paper whose reports periodically visited Odessa. Also the Russian-language and Ukrainian press in Axis Europe, particularly the Berlin Novoe Slovo, contained useful dispatches from Odessa.

Note on Secondary Sources

(1) Scholarly studies on the subject are non-existent. Special aspects, however, have received attention. The fate of the Jews had been discussed in a number of serious pieces of research (see Chapter V abobe); agricultural production has been examined somewhat (Karl Brandt, ed., Management of Agriculture and Food in... Fortress Europe, Stanford,1953); and church history has been surveyed) Fridrich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine, Cologne,1953) Finally, the general problem of German-Romania relations during the war has been thoroughly covered by Andreas Hillgruber in his Hitler, Konig Carol and Marshal Antonescu (Wisbaden,1054).

(2) Soviet sources include a few contemporary accounts, interesting largely as an index to propaganda reaction which the occupation provoked. More valuable are postwar publications. Though obviously one-sided, the report of the Extraordinary Commission on Axis atrocities is noteworthy. The most substantial body of data is contained in the Volumes of documents published in Odessa after the war (Odessa v velikoi otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza; sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 3 vol., Odessa,1947-1953). Only the first two volumes have been available, the third having been apparently been withdrawn (cf., however, its mention in Voprosy istorii,#12,1953,p.180) Some useful data, particularly on the underground, are to be found in Kiev and Odessa newspaper articles; pertinent published memoirs are strikingly rare. Finally, there are a few brochures that deal with military developments, and Kataev’s much-discussed novel, For Soviet Power, contributes to an understanding of the Soviet view of Transnistria.

(3) Memoir material is also rather poor on the German and Romanian sides. The announced second volume of Barbul’s political apologia of the Antonescu regime, which was discuss the Transnistrian issue, never appeared. Some interesting information is to be found in such refugee memoirs as Vladimir Petrov’s Retreat from Russia (New Haven, 1950). However, the second part of the Fevr memoirs, which was to contain his account of a prolonged sojourn in Odessa, was never published.

Interviews and Written Materials

In view of the inadequacy of the materials discussed above, a special effort was made to supplement them with data from interviews or written communications. For this purpose various institutes, libraries organizations were contacted. Four manuscripts by refugees resident in Odessa during the war were gound. At the author’s suggestion, a brief one produced by Eugene Tverskoi in Munich in 1951 for the Harvard Refugee Interview Project. Another, much longer and more substantial, was produced in 1952 for the Research Program on the USSR by Michael Manuilov, a defector who, until his death, lived in Canada. The Institute for study of the USSR in Munich commissioned two useful, though not fully reliable, manuscripts. A refugee from Odessa, I. Peterle, published an excellent article on the war years in the New York Russian -language newspaper Novoe Russkoe Slovo (June 1,1952); and an unpublished novel by Peter Ershov, Strannyi konets, is based on first-hand experience in Transnistria. In addition, several persons had notes or clippings from the period. Finally, personal interviews with a few refugees from the Odessa area and former Romanian officials proved quite helpful.

I. Bibliographies

Library of Congress, Division of Bibliography, The Balkans: IV. Ruminia: A selected List of Reference, Washington,1943

Yiddish Scientific Institute ( YIVO), New York, The Jews in Transnistria (special YIVO file in bibliography project).

II. Books

Akademia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii, Ocherkii istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945
( AOK II,Ic) Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim, Erich Zande, Berlin,1943
Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945, Columbia University Press, New York,1955
(Barbul, Gheorghe) Memoiral Antonescu-le III homme de l’Axe, Vol.1, Ed. de la Couronne, Paris, 1950
Boldur, Alexandru, Romanii si stramosii lor istoria Transnistriei, revised and enlarged ed., Liga culturala, Iasi, 1943 (1042 ed. in Russian not located).
Borisov, A.D., Odessa-gorog -geroi, Voenizdat, Moscow,1954.
Bova Scoppa, Renato, Colloqui con due dittatori, Ruffolo Editore, Rome,1949
Brandt, Karl, et.al., Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford,1953.
Carp Mathias, Carea neagra: suferintele evrelor din Romania 1940-1944, Socec& Co., Bucharest, 1946-1948, Vol.3,1947, Transnistria (also translated in Yiddish as Transnistrie, Buenos Aires,1950)
Chekaniuk, A., Narodnoe opolchennia v heroichnyi oboroni Kyiva i Odesy, Ukrivid, Moscow,1943.
Chubai, Mstislav A.,Reid orhanizatoriv OUN vid Popradu po Chorne more, Cicero, Munich,1952
Conateanu, Nicolae D, L‘organisation de l‘agriculture roumaine en temps de guerre, “La Roumanie et la guerre,”.Bucharest,1943
Dallin Alexandr, German Rule in Russia,1941-1945, MacMillan, London, 1957.Second edition,1981.
Dol’nik, A.,Bessarabiia pod vlastiiu rumynskikh boiar, Gospolitizdat, Moscow,1945
Ehrenburg, Il’ia, Voina, Vol.3, OGIZ, Moscow,1944.
Fadeev, Anatolii Vsevolodovich, Geroicheskaia oborona Odessy v 1941 g., Gospolitizdat,Moscow,1955
Fevr, Nikolai, Solntse voskhodit na zapade, Novoe slovo, Buenos Aires,1950.
Geroicheskaia Odessa al’manakh, Odessa,1945
Gheroghe, Ion, Romaniens Weg zum Satellitenstaat, Verlag Welsermuhl, Wels (Austria),1952
Goroga geroi, OGIZ,Leningrad,1943
Great Britain, Ministry of Economic, Warfare, (Basic handbooks) Rumania, London,1943
Heyer, Friedrich, Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945, Rudolf Muller, Cologne,1953
Hillgruber, Andreas, Hitler, Konig Carol and Marschal Antonescu, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1954
Hoffmann, Walter, Rumanien von heute,2d rev.ed., Felix Leipzig,1942
Kataev, Valentin Petrovich, Za vlast’ sovetov, Detizdat, Moscow,1949, Red.ed., Sov. pisatel’, Moscow,1953
Kononenko, V.M., Chernomortsy v boiakh za osvobozhdenie Kryma i Odessy, Voenizdat, Moscow,1954
Laeuen, Herald, Marschall Antonescu, Essener Verlagsanstalt, Essen,1943
Landra, Guigo, Il problema della razza in Romania, Instituto italo-romeno di studi demografici razziali, Bucharest.1942
Lauterbach, Richard R., These Are the Russians, Harper & Bros., New York,1945
Lebed’, Mykola, UPA, Vol. 1, Nimets’ka Okapatsiia Ukrainy, UHVR, 1946
Lee, Arthur G., Crown against Sickle, Hutchinson, London,1950
Lemkin, Rafal, Axis Rule in occupied Europe, Carnefie Endowment, Washington,D.C.1944
Leverkuehn, Paul, German Military Intelligence, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London,1954
Malaparte, Curzio, Kaputt, Dutton, New York,1946
Manstein, Erich von, Verlorene Siege, Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn,1955
Nistor, Iancu, Aspecte geopolitice si culturale din Trasnistria, Buchrest 1942
Odessa, Obl.komissiiia po istorii Otezhestvenooi Voiny, Odessa v velikoi otechestvennoi voine, 3 Volumes ( Vol.3), Odesskoe obl.izdat., Odessa,1947-1953.
(Odessa, Serviciul de presa si propaganda a Municipality Odesa), Ein Jahr rumanische Verwaltung in Odessa, (Municipality), Odessa, 1943
Ogni Chernomoria, Odessa,1949.
Penezhko, G.I., Zapiski sovetskogo ofitsera, Sov.pisatel’, Leningrad,1949
Penzin, K.V., Chernomorskii flot v geroicheskoi oborone Odessy, Voenizdat, Moscow,1955
Petrov, Vladimir, My Retreat from Russia, Yale University Press, New Haven,1950
Pihido, Fedor, Velyka vitchyznianna viina, Vydannia “novoho Shlikhu,” Winnipeg,1954
Popp, Nicolae M., Transnistria. Incercare de monografie regianala, Dacia Traiana, Bucharest,1943
Prost, henri, Destin de la Roumanie, 1918-1954, Berger-Levrault, Paris,1954
Reitlinger, Gerald, The Final Solution, Beechhurst Press, New York,1953
Roberts, Henri L., Rumania, Yale University Press, New Haven,1951
Rumania,Trei ani de guvernare, Imprimeria Nationala, Bucharest, 1943
Rumaniens heiliger Krieg in Spiegel der deutschen Presse, Bucharest,1942
Rumanisches Blut fur das neue Europa: Rumaniens heiliger Krieg im Spiegel der italienischen Presse, Buchrest,1943
Senkevich, V.M., Sovetskaia Moldaviia v borb’be protiv fashiskikh zahvatchiikov, Gospolitizdat, Moscow,1944
Smochina, nicolae P., Die Rumanen in Sowietrussland, Iasi,1939
Sobolev, Leonid, Dorogami pobed v Bukhareste, Voenizdat, Moscow,1944.
Stepanov,M.A., ed., Deistviia voenno-morskogo flota, Voenizdat Moscow, 1956
Toynbee, Arnold and Veronica, ed., Hitler’s Europe 1939-1946 (Survey of International Affairs),
Oxford University Press, London, 1954
Transnistria,1941-1943, Odessa, 1943
United States, Office of Strategic serfices, Research and Analysis Branch.”Population Movements of Black-Sea Germans,” #2611, November 13,1944
Vielvolkerheere und Koalitionskriege, Leske, Darmstadt, 1952
Virski, Fred, My life in the Red Army, MacMillan, New York,1949
Vorob’ev,E.D. and V.M. Kravtsov, Pobeda sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine,1941-1945, Voenizdat, Moscow,1953
Werner, Paul, Ein schweizer Journalist sieht Russland, O.Walter, Olten, 1942
Wolff, Robert Lee, The Balkans in Our Time, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1956
Zagonov, Slavcho, et al., The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Conutries, 1935-1945, Stanford University Press, Stanford,1955.

III. Series and Articles

Alliba (Madrid):
De la Aldea, Juan manuel, “Odessa-la ciudad ha sido incorporada a nuesta civilizacion,” December 5,1943.
Berliner Zeitung Berlin):
Riedl, Franz, “Aufbau am Dnjestr,” December 9,1942
Biulleten’ odesskogo zemliachestva (New York):
Peterle, Iak., “Odesskaia tragediia,”#6,1953
Bol’shevistskoe znamia (Odessa) February-May,1945.
Bukarester Tageblatt (Burachest), 1941-1944 incomplete.
Bukarester Woche (Bucharest), 1944 incomplete
Chornomors’ka Komuna (Odessa),1944-1945 incomplete.
Curentul (Bucharest), incomplete.
Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung (Berlin):
Schmacher, Hans, “Im Gouvernement Transnistrien,” October 14,1943
Deutsche Arbeit (Berlin):
Puls, Willi, “Wieder deutsche Schulen in Transnistrien,” Vol.42, #8, August,1942,pp.235-237
Wolfrum, Gerhard, “deutsche Aufbaurbeit in Transnistrien,” Vol.42, #12, December 1942,pp.370-376.
Deutsche Bug-Zeitung (Nikolaev),1942-1943.
Der Deutsche in Transnistrien (Odessa), Weekly, Vol.1,#1, July 19,1942, to Vol.2 #49, December 12,1943
Deutsche Post aus dem Osten (Berlin);
Lang, Gustav, “Transnistrien,” Vol14,1942,July,pp.32-33
Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung (Rovno):
Muller, Karl J.,”Das land zwischen Dnjestr und Bug,” July 26, 1942
Poppenberger, Fritz, “Das land am Ostfer des Dnjestr,” September 12,1942 (also in Hamburger
Fremdenblatt, September 10,1942).
“Friedliches Odessa,” January 10,1943
Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland (Riga):
Kaush, Hans-Joachim, “Rumaniens Anteil: Der Aufbau in Trasnistrien,” August 17,1943.
Donauzeitung (Belgrade):
“Anbauplan fur Transnistrien,” April 9, 1942
Editorial, December 24,1942
Hermann, Gerhart, “Dornroschen Odessa,” August 8,1943
Econonia romana (Bucharest):
“Agricultura sovietica in Transnistria,” Vol.24,#1,1942 p.40
“ Aspectul economic al Transnistriei,”ibid.,#2,p.33
Egyseg (Cluj):
Sztern, Ignac, “Transzniztria” (Diary), May 30,1946,and ff.
Europaische Revue (Berlin);
Gheorghe Dabija, “Rumanien an der Ostfront,” Vol.19, February,1943,pp.57-84
Excelsior (Bucharest)
Codrescu, Florian, “Transnistria,” October 25,1942
Frankfurter Zeitung (Frankfurt)
hh.,”Die Aufbauarbeit in Transnistrien,” Novemberg 10,1942
Hamburger Frendenblatt (Hamburg ):
Sedlatzek, Karl, “Siegereicher Einzug in Odessa,” October,18,1941
Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift (Bern):
Spuler, Bertold, “Die orthodoxen Kirchen,” a semi-annual survey, Volumes 32-34, 1942-1944.
Izvestiia (Moscow):
Gordienko, V., “Odesshchina nakanune uborki urozhaia,” July 6,1944
(Odessa Military District, Tribunal, Reports), January 11 and 18,1946
Krakauer Zeitung (Cracow):
“Zwei Jahre Transnisrien,” August 21,1943.
“Transnistrien liefert bereit fur Rumanien,” September 12,1943
Krakivs’ki Visti (Cracow),1942-1943
Krasnaia Zvesda (Moscow):
Petrov, General-maior I., “Pravda o bor’be za Odesu,” October 22,1941
Kurbatov,V., “V Odesse,” November 16,1945
Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft (Vienna):
“ Transnistrien,” Vol.86,Nos.4-6,1943,pp198-200.
Molva (Odessa), 1942-1944 Only individual clippings available.
Monatshefte fyr auswartige Politik (Berlin)
G.E.U., “Transnistrien,” Vol.8,#12, December,1941 pp.1025-1026
Munchner Neueste Nachrichten (Munich):
W.A.B., “Transnistrien als Teil Rumaniens,” September 4-5,1943
Der Nahe Osten (Istanbul),1943.
Nation und Staat (Vienna),1941-1944
Neue Ordnung (Zagreb):
Bauer,Ernest, “Odessa,” March 22,1942
Bauer Ernest, “Das rumanische Transnistrien,” August 16,1942
Berge, Ferdinand, “Besuch in Odessa,” October 18,1942
Bauer Ernest, “Odessa-die Stadt hinter der Front,” November 28,1943
The New York Ties (New York),1943-1944
News Digers (London, HMSO), (E.H.series), 1941-1944
Novoe Russkoe Slovo (New York):
Nikolaevski, B., “Vnutrennaia liniia i Kap K.A. Foss,” April 16,1950
Peterle, Ia.,(pseud.), “Odessa-stolitsa Transnistrii,” June 1,1952.
Solonevich, Ivan, letter to the editor, May 24, 1950
Novoe Slovo (Berlin),1941-1944
Odessa (Odessa), 1941-1944
Odesskaia gazeta (Odessa),1941-1944 (Clippigs only available)
Octiabr’ (Moscow)
Bubennov, M., “O novom romane Valentina Kataeva ’Za vlast’ sovetov,“ #2, February,1950,pp3-19.
Osteuropa-Institut, Jahrbuch (Breslau):
Sztuka, Alfred, “Wirtschaftskundliche Grundlagen des nordostlichen Karpatenvorlandes einsclisslich Transnistrien,” 1942,pp.199-216
Osteuropa-Institut, Ostraum-Berichte (Berlin):
Breckner, Friedrich A., “Rumanien,”N.F., 1942,pp.192-212
Die Ostkartei (Berlin)
Heft 6: “Transnistrien,” (1944)
Ostland (Berlin);
“Transnistrien und die Rumanen,” Vol.20, #24, December 15,1941,pp.428-432
(“Government of Transnistria”). Vol.22,#3,Ferbuary 5,1943,pp.54-55
Parizskii Vestnik (Paris),1942-1944
Pravda Ukrainy (Kiev):
Prisiazhiuk, A.,M. Genkin, and Gr. Limonov, “Partizanskaia Iskra,” May 7 and 8,1955
Pribugskie izvestiia (Golta),1942-1943
Das Reich (Berlin):
gh. “Transnistrien: Das Werk des Guverneurs Alexianu,” August 1,1943
Revaler Zeitung (Reval)
Koepp, Friedrich, “An der Bugbrucke,” November 13, 1942.
Rivista di studi politici internationali (Florence):
Alvus (pseud.,) “Il maresciallo Antonescu e la guerra contro L’URSS,” Vol.15,1948,pp.335-376
Romania. Monitorul Oficial (Bucharest),1941-1944
Rumanischer Wirtschasspigel (Bucharest):
“Die Wirtschaft Transnistriens,” March 1,1942
“Guterverkehr in und mir Transnistrien,” November 20,1942.
“Schafe aus Transnistrien,” November 20,1942
Soviet War News (London), 1941-1944:
Vilenski, E.,”What I Saw in Odessa,” #51,September 8,1941.
Petrov, Major-General, ‘The Defense of Odessa,” #69, September 29,1941
Krylov, Colonel N., “Enemy Tactics in the Battle for Odessa,”#80, October 11,1941
Krieger, Evgeny, “Odessa’s Night and Morning,” #841, April24,1944
Sudost-Echo (Budapest-Vienna):
Dr. B., “Wiederaufbau in Transnistrien,” Vol.12,#43, October 23,1942
-th., “Die Rumanen in Transnistrien,” Vol.12 #45, November 6,1942.
VRR Kluber, “Leiwahrrung in Transnistrien,” Vol.12,#51, December 18, 1942
Transnistria (Bucharest),1941-?
Transnistria Cristiana (Odessa),1942-1944
Universul (Bucharest),1941-1944. Scattered issues.
Volk und Reich (Berlin):
Christoph, Gerhar, “Bessabien und Transnistrien,“ Vol.18,1942, pp.99-103
Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin):
Theil, Karl Hermann, “Rumanen jenseits des Dnjestr,” July 23,1941
Zierke,Fritz, “Jenseits des Dnjestr,” July 19 and 20,1943
Volkstum im Sudosten (Vienna):
“Rumanen im ehemaligen Russland,” Vol.18,1942,pp.194-195
Voprosy istorii (Moscow):
Shterstein,Ia.M., “Rabochie odesskogo porta v oborone goroda v 1941 godu.” #6,1956.pp.99-109
Wirtschaftsdienst (Hamburg):
W.M., “Wiederaufbau in Transnistrien,” Vol.27,#8, February 20, 1942,pp.114-115
“Aufbau in Transnistrin,” Vol.27,#42, October 16,1942,p.783
YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science (New York):
Schechtman, Joseph B., “The Transnistria Reservation,” Vol.8,1953,pp.178-196

IV. Unpublished Documents

Individual documents are cited in full in footnotes to the text. The following indicates the broad categories of documents surveyed:
German Foreign Office, records in custody of U.S. Department of State, Historical Division:
Microfilm reels 244,1273,2066,5078-5088
Harvard University Refugee Interview Project:
Interview protocol series B6: Nos.96,314,542
Nuremberg Military Tribunals:
USSR series (particularly official Soviet reports)
PS series (particularly on high-level and intra-Axis relations)
NO series (particularly on ethnic Germans)
NG series (particularly on forced labor and treatment of Jews)
EC series (particularly on Army Group “A”).
YIVO Archives, New York:
Series Occ E 4(Romania and the Balkans).
Captured Records Section, DRB, The Adjutant General’s Office, Alexandria, Va.
Deutsche Heeresmission in Romaneien (DHMR)
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (EAP 99)
Economic agencies (Wi/ID)
Himmler files (EAP 161)
SS/SD reports from the occupied Eastern territories Military records, particularly Heeresgruppe A
and Heeresgruppe Sud, AOK 11, AOK 6 and subordinate units (LIV Ak, LXXII AK,XXX AK, 50
ID, 132 ID, and others)
Kdt.Dt. Truppen vor Odessa and VSt Wehrmachtr fur Transnistrien (Russia Collection)
Miscellaneous German Abwehr and Fremde Heere Ost reports
Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, miscellaneous records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Major collections not consulted include:
Bavarian Military Archives, Munich (records of Heeresgebiet Sud)
Hauffe, Gen.der Inf. Artur, “Nachlass,” (file of documents and clippings on Transnitria)

V. Manuscripts

Anonymous, “Odessa: Poslevoennyi period,” Research Program on the USSR, New York,1952
Brautigam, Otto, “Uberblick uber die besetzten Ostgebiete wahrend des 2 Weltkrieges,” Institut fur Besatzungfragen, Tubingen,1954
Bussmann, Walter, “Deutsche-rumanische Verhandlungen uber das Gebiet zwischen Dnjepr und Dnjestr,” Germany,1941 (Cited in Hillgruber, p.359)
Desenko, L.I., “Narodnoe opolchenie v geroicheskoi oborony Odessy (Iun-octiabr’ 1941 g.),” Candidate’s desseration, Institute of History, Academy of Science of the Ukrainian SSR,1953.
Ershov,P(etr), Strannyi konets (povest)” (Germany ,1948?)
I.G.Farben A.G., Wirtschaftliche Abteilung , “Transnistrien (Gebiet,Bevolkerung, Wirtschaft),” Microfilm PB 73518, frames 185-196, Library of Congress, July,1942
Karov, D.P,(pseu.) “Sovetskoe podpol’noe i partizanskoe dvizhenie v Odesse i odesskoi oblasti v voinu 1941-1945 gg., ”Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Munich,1955
Mamukov, E.I., “Rumynskaia okkupatsii Odessy i Transnistrii v 1941-1944 gg., Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Munich,1955
Manuilov, Mikhail, “Odessa during World War II,” Research Program on the USSR, New York,1952 (Typescript in Russia)
Muller-Hillebrand, General-major Burkhart, “Germany and Allies in World War II,” MS P-108, Part II, Chapter 5: “Rumania,” Office, Chief of Military History, U.S.Army,1954,pp.152-180
Tverskoi, Evgenii, “Rumynskaia okupatsiia oblasti mezhdu Bugom i Dnestrom v 1941-44gg” Russian Research Center, Harvard University ,1951
U.S. Army, Office, Chief of Military History, “Supply in Far-Reaching Operations,” Vol. 19, Annex C, “Supply Difficulties of Army Group A,1943-1944,” Ms T-8,1951,pp.113-154.
World Jewish Congress, Romanian Section, “Breviare des souffrances des juifs en Transnistrie 1941-44,” Bucharest, n.d. (1946?)

VI. Informants

To preserve anonymity have been referred to in the text by alphabetical letter only. A though K. Notes taken at oral interviews and letters from informants are retained by the author. ______________
1* It is interesting to note in this connection that, with one single exception (Lazarev, born 1895), the Communist underground and partisan leaders in and around Odessa belonged to a slightly younger group. While the political collaborators were often born between 1890 and 1905, the Communists often had been born between 1900 and 1917 (e.g., Gorbel’ 1905, Drozdov 1905, Morgunenko 1905, Kostiuk 1907, Badaev 1910).

2* One may assume that there was a larger proportion of “leftists” than “rightists” among the personnel evacuated and absent from Odessa: the “leftists” were more often the younger generation and more often among the official and other categories entitled to evacuation. They often had a better understanding-and a stronger a priori rejection-of Nazism; and they tended to accept the Soviet regime as the “lesser evil” so long as the war lasted.

3* The author has sought to examine some of these problems in an earlier paper, “The Peasantry as a Source of Soviet Vulnerability in World War II,” War Documentation Project,1955.

4* A nationalist Ukrainian peasant boy, who defected to the West after the war, commented that the kolkhoz population during the war fared best under the Romanians, for in spite of condescension and abuse, there was less looting , lower taxis, and more self-government (Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, B6,#314).

5* AOK 6,O Qu/Qu 2, “Einzelanweisungen betr. Vewaltung des Gebiets zwischen Dnjestr und
Bug,” Mrch 20,1944, CRS, AOK 6, 59352/8.

6* The files of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (brief, VoMi) are located in Berlin. To judge from a few excerpts introduced at the Nuremberg trials, they contain a good deal of material on Transnistria, largely however on the ethnic Germans there. Because they were SS-oriented and concerned primarily with topics not germane to this study, and because of difficulties of access, no attempt was made to exploit them for the present paper.

7* So far as the Italian consulate general in Odessa is concerned, the former consul (now Italian ambassador to Switzerland) writes that “all the archives of the Odessa office as well my personal records had to be destroyed when I had to leave Odessa after the Italian armistice, in order to avoid that such material should fall in the hands of German police...I am also given to understand that the existing archives of the foreign Ministry in Rome are rather incomplete for the period, as a consequence of what happened during the months of German occupation in Rome.”(Maurilio Coppini, letter to author, January 14, 1956.)