Larry L. Watts
Introduction: Alexander Dallin and Romanian Historiography

As long -time advocate for the republication of Alexander Dallin's manuscript I was especially pleased at the reappearance of this remarkable work. It is remarkable for several reasons, not the least of which are the depth and breadth of his research and the fact that nearly half century later western scholarship has produced no better, or even comparable, work on the topic.
As the author states, the principal goals of his study were to reconstruct and analyze the Transnistrian experience and its effect on the Soviet population, and to compare Romanian rule with the German occupation. On both points he succeeds admirably. Dallin was less concerned with the motivations and intent of central Romanian authorities and the variance in intended policies and actual implementation, issues of central concern to Romanian specialists. Paradoxically, even though he was explicitly focused on other aims and in spite of the almost total inaccessibility of Romanian documentation when it was undertaken, Dallin's work remains the most sophisticated regarding the Romanian occupation of Transnistria.
Faced with an uneven database, particularly minuscule in the case of Romanian, intent and policies were identified primarily though the prism of those who observed or experienced their effect.1* At the start then, it is important to recognize the obstacles which confronted Dallin then and which still confront historians and analysts of Romania today. At the most general level, the availability of evidence and detail colors the subsequent nature of interpretation given the natural tendency to presume that state leaderships
exercise relatively complete central control. More evidence and greater detail inform one's of the conflicts, confusion, and failures that exist between intent and implementation and justify a less judgmental, more nuances and "forgiving " interpretation of leadership intent. On the other hand, a paucity of evidence and detail promotes interpretations of more rigid central control and a unity between intent and implementation, thereby justifying more simplistic and "harsher" interpretations of leadership intent. This continues to characterize scholarship on Romanian during this period.
The presumption of more rigid central control is often confounded with unidirectional and policy-driven analysis in which a state and/or its leadership is evaluated on the basis of only its negative aspects while its positive aspects are neglected, ignored, or categorized as marginal and unintentional phenomena and thus not meriting serious attention. (Contrariwise, the same error is committed if one judges a state exclusively on the basis of its positive aspects, categorizing its failings as marginal or unintentional.) This approach is especially prevalent among belligerents and interested parties during wartime, tending to carry over into the subsequent historiography of the war as well.2*
This is the case of the specialized literature on the region and on Romanian in spades. There is a general and pronounced tendency to attribute the occurrence of a negative phenomena in wartime Romania and in Transnistria to purposeful Romanian intent, but to explain all positive phenomena as a result of Romanian incompetence in carrying out intent, usually because of presumably greater distribution on venal characteristics among the Romanian people such as greed, corruption, and laziness.3* It may be that specific events were primarily or partly the result of such characteristics. But this has to be empirically proven, not merely assumed on the basis of cultural stereotype. While such analysis was not possible at the Dallin's work, it can and should be seriously undertaken today.
There is also a more specific effect of the uneven database deriving from the inter-relationships between Germany and Romania on the one hand and between the Soviet Union and Romania on the other. There is a general tendency in the literature, also evident here, to take German and Soviet pejorative statements and accusations directed against the Romanians at face value while questioning similar Romanian statements and accusations aimed at the Soviets and Germans as doubtful or unreliable. Obviously, the preponderance of German and Soviet sources necessarily reflects German and Soviet perspectives and biases to a far greater degree than it reflects the Romanian perspective and its biases.4* Less obviously, as recent scholarship has discovered. the Germans exhibited a consistent tendency to present their wartime allies as morally inferior, especially in connection with atrocities and treatment of Jewish populations which the Germans themselves often staged or initiated but also with regard to "normal" abuses frequently committed by troops in combat and occupation forces.5* This not to assert that Romanian troops and local populations did not engage in atrocities. Indeed, there is ample evidence of this from a host of sources, many of them cited in this book. It is to assert that German reports pertaining to their allies' behavior cannot be assumed to be as complete and accurate as once thought and should be treated with the same degree of caution and skepticism as other sources, including Romanian ones.
Several factors make the relationship between the Soviet Union and Romania and thus the evaluation of Soviet sources dealing with Romania (and vice versa) not complex. First, for a variety of reasons Moscow fostered a denigrator's attitude towards Romania ever since the founding of the Romanian principalities.

This attitude survived into the Soviet regime in exacerbated from because of the union of then Tsarist-held Bessarabia with the Romanian Kingdom in 1918 to this the impact of Soviet wartime "enemy image" projections and it becomes immediately understandable why pejorative attitudes towards Romanian and Romanians dominated among Soviet citizens. Throughout the interwar period, and even during the Soviet-Romanian rapprochement of 1934-1939, the Soviet line on Romanian "imperialism" was as a major aspect of Soviet public propaganda.
However, the greatest impetus to prejudicial Soviet appreciations came in two waves; the first after the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940, and the second after the opening of the need to brand the entire Romanian war effort criminal ( the principal crime for which Romanians leaders were branded war criminals in the 1946 trials being "aggression against Soviet Union"). This was necessary because international law still held Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina to be Romanian territories under Soviet occupation at the start of the Romanian offensive, lending it the character of just war (jus ad bellum).6* Not surprisingly, it became a matter of Soviet policy to play down Romania's defensive motivations for joining the campaign ant to attribute and emphasize non-defensive motives to Romania, the baser the better. Predictably, Romanian intent and behavior in Transnistria was a central battlefield in this propaganda.

These cautions aside, Dallin's finding and impressions regarding Romanian war aims, assimilationist policies, and the nature of Romanian control remain significant for our interpretation of Romanian occupation policies and have been substantially borne out by subsequently accessible documentation.

Unfortunately, are also often neglected in mainstream literature dealing with wartime Romania and therefore deserve something than passing comment.

Motivations for Entering the War

Dallin's finding that Romania did not annex Transnistria, and that only a small minority of Romanian officials entertained the idea, has been verified by Axis and Allies sources alike.7* As he points out, Romania was well aware that Germany sought to persuade Romania to accept the territory as a trade-off for that part of Transylvania whose transfer to Hungary Germany had underwritten in 1940, something which the Romanians were loath to do. While this was an important motivation , it was not the primary one.
Another partial motivation was a carry over of Romanian interwar efforts to implement a rapprochement with the Soviet Union which, given its military capabilities and outstanding claims on Romania like those of Imperial Russia before it, was perceived as a threat that could only be neutralized through the institution of a new less antagonistic relationship. In this sense Romanian reticence was much like that of Finland regarding participation in the siege of Leningrad. It was like considered the straw that would break the camel's back in terms of earning the undying enmity of the Russians (o Soviet depending on the outcome of the war).
Additionally, and closer to the mark in identifying first priorities, Romanian self-interest in preserving the post-World War I status quo was closely linked to the recognition that Germany could never equal the resource and manpower base of the British and French Empires, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets joined the League of Nations in 1934, almost immediately after the Germans had left it and publicly condemned the Versailles peace arrangements, Romanians conceived of the looming conflict of great powers on the continent in terms of League defenders (supporters of the status quo) and League attackers (revisionists).

The continuing and prevalence of Romanian thinking in this regard is demonstrated by the fact that Romanian wartime leader Ion Antonescu had himself pioneered the military aspects of the rapprochement with the USSR such that, during 1934-1936, the bulk of Romanian forces were transferred from the Soviet front to the Western front with Hungary(which was already in relationship of security cooperation with Germany).8* By 1937, over 15 divisions were on the border of the USSR.9* Then Defense Minister, Antonescu was projecting a clash between the "German-Italian ideology" of revisionism and the status quo oriented "Franco-Soviet ideology," to which Romania adhered for obvious reasons.10*
The appreciation of the military leaders and the military deployments that followed from it, approved and supported by the political leadership, were not seriously challenged until the German-Soviet co-invasion of Poland in mid-September 1939, despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. There was a broad consensus among Romanian military and political leaders that, along with the Allies, Romania would initially be fighting Germany and Axis on a roughly equal footing and then quickly "gain an overwhelming superiority-militarily and materially-given the immense resources of America, of the Soviets, and of the vast colonial empires of the English and French."11* This largely explains Antonescu persistence in arguing with the U.S. representatives in early 1941 that only an American intervention and compromise peace could protect Europe from disaster as well as his readiness to admit in November 1941 that Germany had lost the war against the Soviet Union.12*

Thus, Romania's primary motivation for resisting the annexation of Transnistria was its manifest in preserving the defensive nature of its war and its claim to the restoration of the status quo ante, which would presumably return it the territories of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, and northern Transylvania lost in 1940, This was reflected in Romania's repeated insistence from August,1941 until August 1944 on the application of the Atlantic Charter, co-signed by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, which explicitly refused to recognize any territorial modifications implemented during the war.13*

This is an extremely important point for evaluation Romanian war aims and occupation policies and practices. If aggressive revisionism and imperial aggrandizement could be demonstrated to constitute Romania's primary motivation for joining the Eastern Campaign, then a number of presumptions can be made about Romanian intent and subsequent policies. For example, concern for international law was obviously not a priority. Therefore, subsequent atrocities and annexations policies do not require detailed explanation for the understanding of Romanian wartime behavior. The logically follow from Romania's primary motivation. First cause, imperialism and revision, obviously took precedence over any concern for the restrictions of international law.

If, however, Romania was adamant on restoring the status quo ante and was attempting to adhere to the letter of international law in pressing its case, then the presumptions regarding Romanian intent and policies are quite different. Occupation policies must be evaluated in terms other than how they promoted policies of annexation and against the stipulations and restrictions of the laws of war, and atrocities require investigation as to their cause and the official reaction to them since they presumably deviated from intended Romanian behavior. First cause, defensive response the only validating reason for the use of force under international law, must be considered not primary motivation and apparent deviations from its investigated.

The degree to which our understanding of Romania's motivations for entering the war effects our interpretation of its subsequent behavior in very specific and important ways. To take one example germane to the study at hand , wartime administrations regardless of political coloration tend to institute draconian regulations, often stipulating the death penalty for a greater number of offenses that would not be deemed as such in peacetime. These measures to preserve order in periods of crisis are designed as disincentives rather than post facto reprisals, and are generally not carried out or are carried out in only symbolic fashion. If presumption is made that the state authority values adherence to international law, then atrocities connected with such stipulations are the legitimate subject of detailed investigation to determine why and how the presumed deviation occurred and who is responsible party or parties. It is not presumed that such draconian practices typify the policies and intent of the respective authority.

If, however, an a priori presumption of expedience rather than legality is made, that atrocities linked to such measures are considered a logical and inevitable consequence of them needing no further explanation. Moreover, even, where there is no explicit evidence that such measures were implemented they are presumed to have accurately described normal regime behavior. For this reason alone, a serious reconstruction of Romanian occupation policies and Romania's role in the Second World War is very much in order.

Assimilationist Policies

Dallin was the first to establish that Romania did not adopt a program of assimilation or "Romanization" towards the resident Russian and Ukrainian populations, permitting the continued operation of their cultural establishments, schools, journals and newspapers in rather lassez-faire manner.14* In part, as he notes, this was a reflection of Romanian political guide in that Bucharest was attempting to win hearts and minds in the region in preparation for the peace conference at the end of the war as well as to create as inhospitable a climate as possible for the reintroduction of the Soviet-style Communism. Also in part, this difference with German occupation policies also reflected the fact that Romanians did not perceive the Slavs as undermensch as did Germans, but rather recognized the necessity of long-term coexistence with what would inevitably by a large Slavic state to their east no matter what the outcome of the war.

At the same time, however, there was an obvious "Romanization" effort in that the Romanian authorities did attempt to introduce or reintroduce Romanian history, tradition and language to the "Moldavian" people-an ethnicity created by Stalin in 1924 in order to differentiate ethnic Romanians under Soviet rule from ethnic Romanians under Romanian rule and to foster the Soviet claim for Bessarabia and Romanian Moldavia.15* To this end, the occupiers introduced Romanian literature, grammar and textbooks, and established a Moldavian faculty at Odessa University. Whether this can legitimately be considered as assimilationist policy is an interesting question given the prior attitude and nationality policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Moldavians.

The transformation of the Moldavians to a privileged elite is in itself a partial explanatory variable for subsequent Soviet attitudes towards the Romanians and their administration. Moldavians under Stalin had not received anything approaching equal treatment and were consistently lower in the pecking older that either the Russians or Ukrainians. Thus, even had the Romanians implemented an impartial equality; it would have been natural for the resident Russians and Ukrainians to perceive the Moldavians as "getting uppity." Given that the average, presumably Slavic, citizen resented the study of Romanian as in imposition and sometimes insult, as Dallin points our, and further given that such things as bilingual signs were introduced and Romanian made the compulsory first foreign language, it is predictable that regardless of the "mildness" of occupation policies, and aside from the effects of Soviet interwar and wartime propaganda, a resentful attitude among the Slavic population would have developed because of this perceived assault on their relative social standing.

Central Control and Periodization

Dallin was the first to note that different periods of the Transnistrian occupation are distinguishable in terms of the politics followed by the Romanian authorities and their effect on the population. The first few months during the winter 1941/1942 characterized by terror, chaos, and insecurity, followed, in the spring of 1942 and until the summer of 1943, by a relatively beneficent period for the local population, even in comparison with the pre-war Soviet regime. And finally, the period when the departure of the Romanians seemed imminent which was characterized mire by change of attitude by the occupied towards the occupiers rather than real changes in occupation policies and practices (at least until the Germans took over). A further aspect noted by Dallin that should inform later work concerns the German presence. Even though the bulk of Germans troops left Transnistria by the spring of 1942, the Germans did not disappeared from the province, retaining a number of army echelon s, central coordinating staff, administrative headquarters for rail transport and operation of the port and antiaircraft installations, as well as offices for economic exploitation in Transnistria throughout the war.

But of the cause for the seemingly radical change from the first few months of harshness and terror to the second period of mildness and even opportunity was thus evidently related to the fact that the front move through and out of the region, that German troops, including the dreaded Einsatzgruppe, and the bulk of Romanian troops moved out of the region with it, and that the military administration was replaced be civilian one.16* In the regard it should be noted that the due to the slow pace of authority transfer, the first official Romanian decree to the population of Transnistria was made public only on November 1,1941, and the last regions (judete) were handed over by the Germans to Romanian control only in the spring of 1942.

Another part of the cause for these changes, again first identified by Dallin, was the existence of different and competing policy lines and interests within the Romanian leadership and between the Romanians and Germans. Unfortunately, this level of sophistication has not permeated mainstream specialized literature to any great extent.17* While Dallin sketches the various approaches to the Transnistrian occupation, a number of central power struggles also influenced the type and manner of policy adoption and implementation and then understanding requires a brief review of the conditions surrounding Antonescu's rise to power.

Antonescu was appointed the leader of the state by King Carol at the beginning of September 940, after Carol invited the Iron Guard into Government and while the Germans were insisting that the Guard remain in gjvernment.18* From the start, the Guard backed principally by Hitler's SD and the Nazi party, fought with Antonescu over control of the state. Events came to a head in the January 21-23, 1941, when the Guard mounted an unsuccessful coup against Antonescu. This did not end German support for joint Antonescu-Guardist government, however, and together with the German Foreign Ministry, Hitler continued to insist that Antonescu rule with allegedly "healthy sections" of the Iron Guard. In order to placate the German that his refusal to do so did not mean greater unreliability of the Romanian leadership, Antonescu appointed a noted pro-German, General Iosif Iacobici, as Minister of Defense four days after the Iron Guard rebellion.19*

Iacobici was an intimate of the Minister in Bucharest, a frequent unofficial visitor to the German Embassy throughout 1941-1942, and was known to be "very close" to the National Socialist circles as well.20* On September 9,1941, after the repeated failures and huge losses already incurred in the siege of Odessa, Iacobici was named Commander of the 4th Army responsible for the siege. As this was perceived a temporary posting given mistaken appreciations that Odessa would soon fall, Iacobici apparently retained the titular leadership of the Defense Ministry as well. On September 22, after the Romanian Chief of Staff was killed in a freak accident, Iacobici was named to that post, retaining his Command of the 4th Army while relinquishing the Defense Ministry to Antonescu's ad interim leadership.

Thus, Iacobici, who still had his staff at the Defense Ministry, was simultaneously the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the 4th Army fighting to take Odessa, a completely generis concentration of responsibilities.21* Following the explosion of Romanian Headquarters in Odessa on October 22, Iacobici requested Antonescu to approve the reprisals he ordered on the scene. The reprisals quickly became a massacre in which some 19,000 were killed. A massive cover up was mounted with the full complicity on the 4th Army Staff and the Headquarters General Staff; a feat which Iacobici was in unique position to accomplish.22*

At about the same time as these events, Iacobici was initiating a restructuring of the Romanian General Staff that would place in on equal footing with the Ministry of Defense, making it and him independent of the Defense Minister's control and thus replicating Germany's independent Oberkommand Wehrmacht.23*

Antonescu had repeatedly refused Iacobici earlier proposals in this regard even though the latter had German support. More to this point, the restructuring would create a position for Iacobici in which his authority would be second only to that of Antonescu and in which he would be empowered to take executive decisions in the latter's absence.

The discovery of this unauthorized initiative, previously rejected by Antonescu, led to open and acrimonious conflict that was only partially resolved by Iacobici's dismissal on January 20,1942.24* Iacobici then apparently sought support of Berlin and the Iron Guard. Finally, in December 1942 putsch attempt mounted be the Germans and the Iron Guard, Iacobici launched an unsuccessful bid to replace Antonescu as chief of state.25* Along with crisis in Romanian-German relations, Antonescu subsequently cashiered Iacobici from the army altogether.

Such dynamics as this, which obviously influenced both Romanian internal politics and external politics in sometimes radical fashion , were first hinted at by Dallin even though he was hampered by virtually no access to official Romanian documents. Interesting questions remain as to whether and to what degree such power struggles affected the divergence in Romanian policies in Transnistria before and after the winter of 1941/1942.

Context

Perhaps the principal strength of Dallin's study is its comparative nature, making sense of the Romanian occupation policies. While Dallin was uniquely qualified to undertake this particular comparison given his earlier work on German occupation policies in the Soviet Union, there are a number of other comparisons that promise to further enlighten our understanding of the Romanian occupation and deserve consideration.26*

For example, there is no comparison of the Soviet occupation policies in Bessarabia and Bucovina that preceded the Romanian occupation of Transnistria. While the study of the Soviet occupation of these territories in 1940-1941 is still in its infancy, the potential for providing a valuable context for interpreting the subsequent Romanian occupation policies in the Soviet Union is self-evident.27* Also useful in this regard would be comparisons with the Soviet postwar treatment of the respective populations in both Bessarabia and former Transnistria.

Finally, in seeking to analyze Romanian policies in Transnistria it might be more useful, as originally suggested by Gerald Reitlinger, to treat the Jewish populations of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina deported to Transnistria separately from the Jewish populations that remained under Romanian sovereignty throughout the war in the Old Kingdom and southern Transylvania.28* As present, the Transnistrian deportations are generally interpreted as part of a Romanian Final Solution aimed at "dumping" unwanted ethnicities abroad (and murdering as many as possible along the way). Such an interpretation renders inexplicable the radical improvement of the treatment of deported Jews in the spring of 1942; Antonescu's guarantees, made in 1941 and 1943, of the physical safety of the rest of the Jewish population under Romanian control (some 320,000), and of his refusal to deport them to death camps in the autumn of 1942; aside from lending a schizophrenic quality to Romanian occupation policies generally. If approached in differentiated manner, useful comparisons might then be drawn with other displacements of alleged "enemy aliens" during the war; for example, the evacuation of ethnic Japanese (also numbering about 120,0000 ) from the Pacific West Coast in the United States during 1942 and the relocation of various minorities within the Soviet Union during the war (Volga Germans and , after their annexation , Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, etc.).29*

In conclusion, because of the stated intention of the work and the paucity of Romanian sources Dallin could only present Romanian intention and policy from the perspective of those who experienced or observed their practical effects. At the same time, his insight has made this work the principal scholarly reference on Romanian occupation policies during the war to this day and a great boon to the historiography of the Romania generally. I fully share Dr. Dallin's hope that the appearance of this work will spark further study of a long-neglected aspect of World War II history. I also share his belief that his basic themes and general conclusions will stand the test of time. Indeed, after almost half a century, one might argue that they already have.
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1* Perhaps the most pertinent materials now accessible are those in Archivele Statului Bucharest (Bucharest State Archives) and Archivele Ministerrului Apararii Nationale (Archives of the Ministry for Motional Defense in Bucharest and Pitesti, and in less easel accessible military cabinet records of Romania wartime leader Ion Antonescu held in Osobii Archiv in what used to be the Central State Archives of the USSR in Moscow. There are significant collections of pertinent American and British materials related to these problems that have been declassified since 1974 in the United States Archives in Washington D.C. and the British Public Records Office at Kew, England.

2* Compare, for example, the Second World War construct of the "Grand Alliance" and its effect on propaganda and subsequent historiography, with the differentiated treatment of the states and leaderships in the 1991 Yugoslav crisis. For an interesting discussion of the first case see Norman Davies, "The Misunderstood War", The New York Times Review of Books, June 9,1944, pp.20-22. For the second, see Constantine P.Danopoulos and Kostas G.Messa, editors, Crisis in the Balkans: Views from the Participants, Boulder, West view.

3* This approach is to prevalent in the literature that the cultural stereotyping it represents, and the presumption of guilt and culpability implied within it, continue to go unremarked by serious scholars. Simply put, if Romanians did something bad they meant it. If they did something good, they did not. It fact, they preferred and attempted to do something worse but were prevented by their own incompetence and venality. Can this seriously be considered a valid framework for analysis? Dallin's findings can be read as a wake up call for applying the same rules of empirical validation to Romania during this period as to any other object of historical inquiry.

4* E.g., compare the evaluations of Romanian motivation and intent with those presented in Kurt Treptow, ed., A History of Romania, Iii, Center for Romanian Studies,1997.

5* Daniel Jonah Goldhagen describes how the German Einsatzgruppe often misattributed their carefully orchestrated atrocities tom local populations and allies in his Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary German and the Holocaust, New York, Alfred A. Kmopf,1966, pp.518-520.

6* This was a unique situation. In Finland, for example, Helsinki was compelled to sign the Treaty of Moscow in March 1940 thus legally ceding Finnish territories lost in the Winter War to the Soviets and placing international law on the side of the USSR. Since Moscow evidently covered more Romanian territory to such treaty was ever concluded over Bessarabia or Bucovina before the end of the war. Romania also had other defensive arguments for participating in the offensive. For instance, the Soviets seizure of several Romanian islands in October 1940, and maneuvers and dispositions indicating Soviet plans for a preemptive attack. See, e.g., Brian I.Fugate and Lev Dvoretsy, Thunder on the Dneper: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg, Novato, CA, Presidio,1997, and R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press,1993. For the debate over the broader significance of Soviet offensive plans see John Erikson and David Dilks, editors, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994, and Joseph L. Wieczynski, editor, Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on the Soviet Union June 22,1941, Salt Lake City, Charles, Schlacks, Jr.,1993.

7* Perhaps the clearest statement of Romanian official policy can be found in Foreign Relations of the United States 1941, Volume I, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1958,pp.326327. Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State, Cordial Hull with Romanian Charge d'Affaires, Brutus Coste September 4,1941. See also ,United States National Archives (USNA), State Department Records, Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Report #1518, "Romania: The Present Situation, "December 17, 1943,p.14. The literary attempts of the pro-annexationists were meager in comparison with similar Finnish attempts regarding the annexation of Soviet Karelia. See, e.g., C. Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, Bloomington, Indiana University Press,1957, pp.125-142.

8* See, e. g .,ASB, fond Presedintia Consiliului de Ministri, dosar nr. 24/1934, f.1-2, and MAN, fond 948/RSS3, dosar nr.I 315,f.116-120 and dosar nr.I 414, f.3; fond 948, dosar nr.437,and fond nr.332, dosar nr.30, f 4, 47 and 99-102.

9* MAN, fond 948/RSS3 (General Staff Operations), dosar nr. 380,f.56, dosar nr.456, f.273, dosar nr.I 414,f.184'dosar nr.I 594,f. 6; fond 948, dosar nr.416,f. 398-402,407 and 490-495, dosar nr.434,f. 65-70 and 152-155, and dosar 438,f.627; fond 333,dosar nr.601,f.430-437; and fond Marele Stat Major, Sectia 3 operatii, vol 1024,f. 120-121.

10* MAN, fond 948,dosar nr.438, f.268-269.

11* MAN, fond 948/RSS3 (General Staff-Operations), dosar nr. I 706, f. 31-37, and fond 948 dosar nr. 493,f.153.

12* See, e.g., USNA, State Department Records,7400011,February 25,1941,Franklin Mott Gunter to the Secretary of State; ibid, March 28,1941, Gunter to the Secretary of State; ibid, 871.oo/911, Telegram #960, November 15, 1941, Franklin Mott Gunter to the Secretary of State. Antonescu was equally insistent to the German that only a quick offensive against the USSR, launched and completed before the resources of the United States could be brought to bear, had a chance of success.

13* See, e.g., British Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/43992, Document R 1472, Telegram #5, January 21,1944, Lieutenant Colonel Neame, Press Reading Bureau, Stockholm, to Political Intelligence Department, London,pp.100102. Antonescu was equally insistent with Hitler that his goal was to restore the status quo and reestablish Romanian territorial borders, not expand them. USNA, Modern Military Branch, OSS Record Group 226, Document #1196781, February 11,1942, Ion Antonescu to Adolph Hitler.p.2.

14* Subsequent work on Ukrainian history continues to omit this important detail, implying an effort to forcibly assimilate the Slavic population. See, e.g., Paul Robert Magosci, A History of Ukraine, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1996,p.625.

15* Charles King, "The Moldavian ASSR on the Eve of the War: Cultural Policy in 1930s Transnistria," Romanian Civilization, IV:3 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp.25-52.

16* For example, the staff of the 4th Army based in Iasi and in closest liaison with the Germans had proven an uncertain instrument even before the campaign. During the rebellion of January 1941, the 4th Army Commander publicly supported the Iron Guard against Antonescu. According to one authority, other senior Romanian officers considered Antonescu only primus inter pares and, as consequence of "decades of close involvement in civilian government," insubordination and disobedience "continued to plague the officer corps." Mark Axworthy et al., Thirt Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War 1941-1945, London , Arms and Armour,1995,p.60.

17* See, e.g., The treatment in Keith Hitcheens, Romania 1866-1947, Oxford, Clarendon Press,1994, especially pp. 471-487.

18* For a description of the dynamics between King Carol, the Iron Guard, and Antonescu see Larry Watts, Romanian Cassandra:Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, New York, Columbia University Press,1993, especially chapters IV,V, and VI.

19* General Colonel Damitru Cioflina, coordinator, Sefii Marelui Stat Major Roman 1941-1945, Bucharest, Editura Militara,1995,pp.17-19 and 75-76. Iacobici had actually fought against Romania as an officer with the Central Powers in World War I. On the other hand, the Germans did not yet consider Antonescu a "safe man" See Archivele institului de studii istorice si social politice, fond 10, dosar nr.9G,f.90; Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauffrag Sudot 1940-1943: Bericht eines fleigenden Diplomaten, Berlin, Musterschmidt Verlag,1957,pp.52-53; Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Volume V, Document 169,pp.234-236.

20* Romanian and Allied sources, are in agreement on this point. See, e. g., Ion Gheorghe, Rumaniens Weg zum Satellitenstaat, Heilelberg, Kurt Vownickel Verlag.1952, pp.223-224; PRO, FO 371/373/74, Document R482, Telegram #31, January 22,1943,D.Howard to Foreign Office, and FO 371/373/76, Document R9441, pp.19-20.

21* Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Karol and Marschal Antonescu:Die Deutsche-Rumanischen Bezeihungen 1938-1944, Weisbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag,1954, p.142. Antonescu was functioning at the time as Commander-in-Chief of the entire war effort as well as head of state.

22* Axworthy (1995), pp.143 and 217. See also the testimony at the war crimes trial reproduced in Marcel Dumitru Ciuca, Procesul Maresalului Antonescu:Documente, Volume III, Bucharest, Europa Nova, 1995, p.169.19,000 is generally accepted the most probable figure but Soviet sources immediately claimed 60,000 deaths and later Swedish pamphlet claimed 26,000. While in Soviet captivity Antonescu was compelled to sign two confessions, one claiming the massacre of 100,000 at Odessa and one 200,000.

23* Cioflina (1995) pp.20 and 95-98; MAN, fond 316, dosar nr.25, f.3-7.

24* Order #19 of the Commander-in -Chief, Marshal Ion Antonescu to Army Corp General Iosif Iacobici, 20 January 1942 in MAN, fond Cabinetul Militar al Conducatorului Statului, dosar nr.25, f.3-7.

25* USNA, Modern Military Branch, OSS Record Group 226, Box 993, Document #89221, Report #D-1692, August 2,1944, and Ibid, Military Field Branch, Record Group 319, Box 968, File 092., August 18, 1943, Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, Middle East (JICAME0),USAFIME, PIC Pap#14, "Political Alignments in Roumania, November 1942 to July 1953."

26* See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, London, St. Martin's Press, 1957 (second edition,1981).

27* The significance of such a comparison is suggested in Dennis Deletant's contribution on Bessarabia in I.C.B.Dear and M.R.D. Foot, editors, The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press,1995,p.129. Initial attempts that merit attention include Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Constantin, Bessarabia in anii celui de-al doilea Razboi Mondial, Iasi, Institutul European,1995; Adrian Pop, editor, Sub Povara Granitei Imperiale, Bucharest, Editura Recif,1993; and Ion Siscanu, Raptul Basarabia 1940, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Dacia, 1993.

28* Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945,New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1971,p.426 and footnote 42. See also pp.540-541.

29* See, e.g., Page Smith, Democracy on Trial :The Japanese American Evacuation and in World War II, New York, Simon & Schuster,1995,pp.121-124; Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps; North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada and Canada During World War II, Melbourne, FL.,1981; and Martin Macauley, "Deportations" in Dear and Foot, The Oxford Companion to World War II, op. cit.,pp.295-296.